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T he International Property Rights Index (IPRI) is the flagship publication of the Property RightsAlliance (PRA). The PRA is committed to promoting property rights around the world. TheIPRI is an annual comparative study that aims to quantify the strength of property rights – both
physical and intellectual – and to rank countries accordingly. The IPRI report demonstrates the link 
between property rights protection and economic development. The 2011 edition contains the ranking
of 129 economies, which represents 97 percent of the world GDP. 
The 2011 edition contains the IPRI rankings, rankings by IPRI core components, regional distribution
of IPRI scores, and changes in IPRI scores since 2010. The 2011 edition again features individual
country profiles, which provide the historic progression of IPRI scores and their components, point
to any advances or regressions, and show strong or weak aspects of countries’ property rights. 
Additionally, to account for gender-based disparities existing in property rights in developing 
countries, a separate chapter is focused on gender equality.
The 2011 report features a variety of case studies on property rights contributed by IPRI partner 
organizations. The case studies highlight developments in property rights in various regions of the
world to provide clear and compelling evidence for the positive role that property rights play in 
economic development. The case studies in the 2011 IPRI include the following: immigration and
Property, The Nisga’a Landholding Transition Act, A Half Century of Land Reform Experience in
Nepal, The Coase Theorem and Informal Property Rights, and Preservation vs. Property Rights in
Hong Kong.
In its effort to produce the IPRI, PRA has secured the support of 67 think tanks and policy 
organizations in 53 countries involved in research, policy development, education, and promotion of
property rights in their countries. The IPRI provides an international platform to highlight its partners’
efforts to advance physical and intellectual property rights grounded in a strong legal framework and
effective enforcement. 
The 2011 IPRI serves as a tool for policy makers, think tanks, academics, business leaders, and other
parties interested in promoting the protection of property rights and economic development. 
www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org
A Project of the Property Rights Alliance
Cover_ATR_2011_spread_Layout 1  3/8/11  11:13 AM  Page 1
The International Property Rights Index (IPRI) is the flagship publication 
of the Property Rights Alliance (PRA). The PRA is committed to promoting 
property rights around the world. The IPRI is an annual comparative study 
that aims to quantify the strength of property rights – both physical 
and intellectual – and to rank countries accordingly. The IPRI report 
demonstrates the link between property rights protection and economic 
development. The 2011 edition contains the ranking of 129 economies, 
which represents 97 percent of the world GDP.
The 2011 edition contain  the IPRI rankings, ankings by IPRI core 
components, regional distribution of IPRI scores, and changes in IPRI 
scores since 2010. The 2011 edition again features individual country 
profiles, which provide the historic progression of IPRI scores and their 
components, point to any advances or regressions, and show strong or 
weak aspects of countries’ property rights.
Additionally, to account for gender-based disparities existing in property 
rights in developing countries, a separate chapter is focused on gender 
equality.
The 2011 report features a variety of case studies on property rights 
contributed by IPR  partner organizations. The case studies i hli ht 
developments in property rights in various regions of the world to 
provide clear and compelling evidence for the positive role that property 
rights play in economic development. The case studies in the 2011 IPRI 
include the following: immigration and Property, The Nisga’a Landholding 
Transition Act, A Half Century of Land Reform Experience in Nepal, 
The Coase Theorem and Informal Property Rights, and Preservation vs. 
Property Rights in Hong Kong.
In its effort to produce the IPRI, PRA has secured the support of 67 
think tanks and policy organizations in 53 countries involved in research, 
policy development, education, and promotion of property rights in their 
countries. The IPRI provides an international platform to highlight its 
partners’ efforts to advance physical and intellectual property rights 
grounded in a strong legal framework and effective enforcement.
The 2011 IPRI serves as a tool for policy makers, think tanks, academics, 
business leaders, and other parties interested in promoting the protection 






























Study conducted by Kyle A. Jackson, 





Marcos Hidding Ohlso and Martin Krause
Nicole Alpert
 
A Project of the Property Rights Alliance
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  P R O P E R T Y  R I G H T S  I N D E X  
2011REPORT
Study conducted by Kyle A. Jackson, 2010 Hernando de Soto Fellow
with contributions by:
Marius Doksheim, Joseph Quesnel, Krishna Neupane
Marcos Hidding Ohlson, Martin Krause and Nicole Alpert Adriatic Institute for Public Policy, Croatia  •  Albanian Socio Economic Think Tank, Albania  •  Alternate Solutions Institute, Pakistan  •  Asociación de Consumidores Libres,  Costa Rica • Austrian Economics Cen-
ter, Austria •  Bishkek Business Club, Kyrgyz Republic •  Cathay Institute of Public Affairs, China •  CEDICE,  Venezuela •  CEED, Montenegro
•  Centre for Free Enterprise, Korea • CADI, Romania •  CLDS, Serbia •  Center for Mozambican and International Studies, Mozambique •  CIDAC, Mexico •  CEDAH, Burkina Faso •  Centre for Civil Society, India
•  Centre for Policy Research, India •  CIIMA-ESEADE, Argentina •  Civita, Norway •  Competere, Italy •  EBI Think Tank Institute, Mongolia •  Eudoxa, Sweden •  European Coalition for Economic Growth, Austria •
F. A. Hayek Foundation, Slovakia •  F.A. v. Hayek Institute, Austria •  The Free Market Foundation, South Africa •    Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Germany •  Frontier Centre for Public Policy, Canada •  Fun-
dación Atlas 1853, Argentina •  Fundación IDEA, Mexico •  Fundación Libertad,  Argentina •  Fundación Libertad, Panama •  IMANI Center for Policy and Education, Ghana •  Initiative for Public Policy Analysis, Nigeria
•  Institut Constant de Rebecque, Switzerland •  IDEAS, Malaysia  •  Institute for Free Enterprise (IUF), Germany •  Institute of Future Studies for Development, Thailand •  Institute for Market Economics, Bulgaria •  In-
stitute for Public Affairs,  Australia •  Instituto de Libre Empresa, Peru •  Instituto Liberdade, Brazil •  International Policy Network, United Kingdom •  International Research Foundation, Oman •  IIER, Iraq •  Jerusalem
Institute for Market Studies, Israel •  Liberales Institut, Switzerland •  Libertad y Desarrollo, Chile •  Liberty Institute, India •  Limited Government, Nepal •  The Lion Rock Institute, Hong Kong •  Ludwig von Mises Insti-
tute, Poland •  Minimal 
Government Thinkers, Inc., Philippines •  The Nassau Institute, The Bahamas •  New Economic School, Georgia •  New Zealand Business Roundtable, New Zealand •  OHRID Institute, Macedonia •  Pal-Think For Strate-
gic Studies, Palestine •  PAFERE, Poland •  Property Rights Alliance, United States •  Timbro, Sweden •  The Ukrainian Reform Support Foundation, Ukraine •  ZIPPA, Zambia
Institute of Public Affairs
Australia’s Leading Free Market Think Tank









2 0 1 0  I P R I  P A R T N E R  O R G A N I Z A T I O N S
T he Internatio al Property ights Index (IPRI) is the fl gship publication of the Property RightsAlliance (PRA). The PRA is committ d to promoting property rights around the world. TheIPRI is an annual comparative study that aims to quantify the strength of property rights – both
physical and intellectual – and to rank countries accordingly. The IPRI report demonstrates the link 
between property rights protection and economic dev lopment. The 2011 edition contains the ranking
of 129 economies, which represents 97 percent of the world GDP. 
The 2011 edition contains the IPRI rankings, rankings by IPRI core c mponents, regional distribution
of IPRI scores, and changes in IPRI scores since 2010. The 2011 edition again features individual
country profiles, which provide the historic progression of IPRI scores and their components, point
to any advances or regressions, and show strong or weak aspects of countries’ property rights. 
Additionally, to account for gender-based disparities existing in property rights in developing 
countries, a separate chapter is focused on gender equality.
The 2011 report features a variety of case studies on property rights contributed by IPRI partner 
organizations. The case studies highlight developments in property rights in various regions of the
world to provide clear and compelling evidence for the positive role that property rights play in 
economic development. The case studies in the 2011 IPRI include the following: immigration and
Property, The Nisga’a Landholding Transition Act, A Half Century of Land Reform Experience in
Nepal, The Coase Theorem and Informal Property Rights, and Preservation vs. Property Rights in
Hong Kong.
In its effort to produce the IPRI, PRA has secured the support of 67 think tanks and policy 
organizations in 53 countries involved in research, policy development, education, and promotion of
property rights in their countries. The IPRI provides an international platform to highlight its partners’
efforts to advance physical and intellectual property rights grounded in a strong legal framework and
effective enforcement. 
The 2011 IPRI serves as a tool for policy makers, think tanks, academics, business leaders, and other
parties interested in promoting the protection of property rights and economic development. 
www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org
A Project of the Property Rights Alliance
Cover_ATR_2011_spread_Layout 1  3/8/11  11:13 AM  Page 1
InternatIonal 




hernando de soto Fellow
liberalReport
IPRI_2011_Titel-e.indd   1 09.03.2011   10:45:01 Uhr
2010 IPRI PARTNER oRGANIZATIoNs
Adriatic Institute for Public Policy, Croatia • Albanian Socio Economic Think Tank, Albania • Alternate Solutions Institute, Pakistan • Asociación de Consumidores Libres, 
Costa Rica • Austrian Economics Center, Austria • Bishkek Business Club, Kyrgyz Republic • Cathay Institute of Public Affairs, China • CEDICE, Venezuela • CEED, 
Montenegro • Centre for Free Enterprise, Korea • CADI, Romania • CLDS, Serbia • Center for Mozambican and International Studies, Mozambique • CIDAC, Mexico • 
CEDAH, Burkina Faso • Centre for Civil Society, India • Centre for Policy Research, India • CIIMA-ESEADE, Argentina • Civita, Norway • Competere, Italy • EBI Think Tank 
Institute, Mongolia • Eudoxa, Sweden • European Coalition for Economic Growth, Austria • F. A. Hayek Foundation, Slovakia • F.A. v. Hayek Institute, Austria • The Free 
Market Foundation, South Africa • Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Germany • Frontier Centre for Public Policy, Canada • Fundación Atlas 1853, Argentina • Fundación 
IDEA, Mexico • Fundación Libertad, Argentina • Fundación Libertad, Panama • IMANI Center for Policy and Education, Ghana • Initiative for Public Policy Analysis, 
Nigeria • Institut Constant de Rebecque, Switzerland • IDEAS, Malaysia • Institute for Free Enterprise (IUF), Germany • Institute of Future Studies for Development, 
Thailand • Institute for Market Economics, Bulgaria • Institute for Public Affairs, Australia • Instituto de Libre Empresa, Peru • Instituto Liberdade, Brazil • International 
PolicyNetwork, United Kingdom • International Research Foundation, Oman • IIER, Iraq • JerusalemInstitute forMarket Studies, Israel • Liberales Institut, Switzerland • 
Libertad y Desarrollo, Chile • Liberty Institute, India • Limited Government, Nepal • The Lion Rock Institute, Hong Kong • Ludwig von Mises Institute, Poland • Minimal 
Government Thinkers, Inc., Philippines • The Nassau Institute, The Bahamas • New Economic School, Georgia • New Zealand Business Roundtable, New Zealand • OHRID 
Institute, Macedonia • Pal-Think For Strategic Studies, Palestine • PAFERE, Poland • Property Rights Alliance, United States • Timbro, Sweden • The Ukrainian Reform 
Support Foundation, Ukraine • ZIPPA, Zambia
A Project of the Property Rights Alliance
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  P R O P E R T Y  R I G H T S  I N D E X  
2011REPORT
Study conducted by Kyle A. Jackson, 2010 Hernando de Soto Fellow
with contributions by:
Marius Doksheim, Joseph Quesnel, Krishna Neupane
Marcos Hidding Ohlson, Martin Krause and Nicole Alpert Adriatic Institute for Public P licy, Croatia  •  Albanian Socio Economic Think Tank, Albania  •  Alternate Solutions Institute, Pakistan  •  Asociación de Consumidores Libres,  Costa Rica • Austrian Economics Cen-
ter, Austri •  Bishkek Business Club, Kyrgyz Republic •  Cathay Institute of Public Affairs, China •  CEDICE,  Venezuela •  CEED, Montenegro
•  Centre f r Free Enterprise, Ko a • CADI, Romania •  CLDS, Serbia •  Center for Mozambican and International Studies, bique •  CIDAC, Mexico •  CEDAH, Burkina Faso •  Centre for ivil Society, India
•  Centre for Policy Research, India •  CIIMA-ESEADE, Argentina •  Civita, Norway •  Competere, Italy •  EBI Think Tank Institute, Mongolia •  Eudoxa, Sweden •  European Coalition for Economic Growth, Austria •
F. A. Hayek Foundati , Slovakia •  F.A. v. Hayek Institute, Austria •  The Free Market Foundation, South Africa     Friedrich Nauma n Foundation, Germany •  Frontier Centre for Public Policy, Canada •  Fun-
dación Atl s 1853, Argentina •  Fundación IDEA, Mex co •  Fund ción Libertad,  Argenti a •  Fundación Libertad, Panama •  IMANI Center for Policy nd Education, Ghana •  Initiative for Public Policy Analysis, Nigeria
•  Institut Constant de Rebecq e, Switzerland •  IDEAS, Malaysia  •  Institute for Free Enterprise (IUF), Germany •  Institute of Future Studies for Developme t, Thailand •  Inst tute for Market Econom s, Bulg ria • In-
stitute for Public Affair ,  A stralia •  I stituto d  Libre Empresa, P ru •  Instituto Liberdade, Brazil •  ternational Policy Network, United Kingdom •  Internatio al Research Fo ndation, Oman •  IIER, Iraq •  Jerusalem
Institute for Market Studies, Israel • Libe ales Institut, Switzerland •  Libertad y Desarr llo, Chile •  Libe ty Insti ute, India •  Limited Government, Nepal •  The Lion Rock Institute, Hong Kong •  Ludwig vo  Mises Insti-
tute, Poland •  Minimal 
Government Thinkers, Inc., Philippines •  The Nassau I itute, The Bahamas •  New Ec nomic School, Georgia •  New Zealand Business Roundtable, New Zealand •  OHRID Institute, Macedonia •  Pal-Think For Strate-
gic Studies, Palestine •  PAFERE, Poland •  Property Rights Alliance, United States •  Timbro, Sweden •  The Ukrai ian Reform Support Foundation, Ukraine •  ZIPPA, Zambia
Institute of Public Affairs
Australia’s Leading Free Market Think Tank









2 0 1 0  I P R I  P A R T N E R  O R G A N I Z A T I O N S
T he International Property Rights Index (IPRI) is the flagship publication of the Property RightsAlliance (PRA). The PRA is committed to promoting property rights around the world. TheIPRI is an annual comparative study that aims to quantify the strength of property rights – both
physical and intellectual – and to rank countries accordingly. The IPRI report demonstrates the link 
between property rights protection and economic development. The 2011 edition contains the ranking
of 129 economies, which represents 97 percent of the world GDP. 
The 2011 edition contains the IPRI rankings, rankings by IPRI core components, regional distribution
of IPRI scores, and changes in IPRI scores since 2010. The 2011 edition again features individual
country profiles, which provide the historic progression of IPRI scores and their components, point
to any advances or regressions, and show strong or weak aspects of countries’ property rights. 
Additionally, to account for gender-based disparities existing in property rights in developing 
countries, a separate chapter is focused on gender equality.
The 2011 report features a variety of case studies on property rights contributed by IPRI partner 
organizations. The case studies highlight developments in property rights in various regions of the
world to provide clear and compelling evidence for the positive role that property rights play in 
economic development. The case studies in the 2011 IPRI include the following: immigration and
Property, The Nisga’a Landholding Transition Act, A Half Century of Land Reform Experience in
Nepal, The Coase Theorem and Informal Property Rights, and Preservation vs. Property Rights in
Hong Kong.
In its effort to produce the IPRI, PRA has secured the support of 67 think tanks and policy 
organizations in 53 countries involved in research, policy development, education, and promotion of
property rights in their countries. The IPRI provides an international platform to highlight its partners’
efforts to advance physical and intellectual property rights grounded in a strong legal framework and
effective enforcement. 
The 2011 IPRI serves as a tool for policy makers, think tanks, academics, business leaders, and other
parties interested in promoting the protection of property rights and economic development. 
www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org
A Project of the Property Rights Alliance

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IPRI_2011_Titel-e.indd   2 09.03.2011   10:45:04 Uhr


Study conducted by Kyle A. Jackson, 





Marcos Hidding Ohlson and Martin Krause
Nicole Alpert
 
Copyright © 2011 by the Americans for Tax Reform Foundation/Property Rights Alliance.
Published by:
Americans for Tax Reform Foundation/Property Rights Alliance






For more information contact PRA’s Executive Director, Kelsey Zahourek, at kzahourek@propertyrightsalliance.org
Authored by Kyle A. Jackson
Edited by Ryan Balis
Designed by Instinct Design LLC., Fairfax, VA
Americans for Tax Reform Foundation (ATRF) performs research and analysis in order to educate taxpayers on the true causes and effects
of legislation and regulatory affairs. ATRF’s efforts inform debate, initiate conversation, and emphasize the importance of fundamental tax
reform and spending restraint. In turn, Americans for Tax Reform (ATR), a 501(c)4 non-profit lobbying organization, uses this research
and analysis to track initiatives beyond the traditional tax increase model. In addition to the International Property Rights Index, ATRF also
produces and publishes the Cost of Government Day® Report and the Index of Worker Freedom.
Property Rights Alliance (PRA), an affiliate of Americans for Tax Reform, stands as an advocacy organization dedicated to the protection of
physical and intellectual property rights, both domestically and internationally. 
Printed and bound in the United States of America
Digital copy and data are available at www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org
oduction by COMDOK GmbH, Berlin
Published by the Liberal Institute of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Potsdam-Babelsberg




   
  
Letter from Hernando de Soto .........................................................................................................................................3
Letter from the Executive Director of the Property Rights Alliance ..................................................................................4
Foreword by Richard E. Wagner.......................................................................................................................................5
Acknowledgements...........................................................................................................................................................7
Premise of the Hernando de Soto Fellowship Program .....................................................................................................8
About the Author .............................................................................................................................................................8
About the Contributors....................................................................................................................................................8
About the 2011 International Property Rights Index .....................................................................................................10
Partners ..........................................................................................................................................................................11
Chapter I:     INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................19
Chapter II:    PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT..............................................................20
Chapter III:   INDEX COMPOSITION AND COVERAGE .......................................................................................21
Chapter IV:   RESULTS .................................................................................................................................................27
IPRI Ranking.....................................................................................................................................27
Ranking by Index Core Components................................................................................................32
Changes in Scores (2009–2010) .......................................................................................................32
Regional Distribution of IPRI ..........................................................................................................40
IPRI and Economic Outcomes..........................................................................................................41
Regression Analysis ............................................................................................................................48
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................48
Chapter V:    CASE STUDIES ......................................................................................................................................49
Immigration and Property.................................................................................................................49
By Marius Doksheim
Creating Indigenous Property Rights: The Nisga’a Landholding Transition Act ...........................52
By Joseph Quesnel
A Half Century of Land Reform: Nepal’s Experience .......................................................................55
By Krishna Neupane
The Coase Theorem and Informal Property Rights..........................................................................58
By Marcos Hidding Ohlson and Martin Krause 
Preservation vs. Property Rights in Hong Kong ..............................................................................61
By Nicole Alpert
Chapter VI:   IPRI AND GENDER EQUALITY ..........................................................................................................64




Appendix I:   COUNTRY PROFILES ..........................................................................................................................72
Appendix II:  DETAILED METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCE INFORMATION ......................................138
Appendix III:REGIONAL DIVISION OF COUNTRIES ..........................................................................................41
Reference List ..............................................................................................................................................................143
Endnotes ......................................................................................................................................................................143
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1:       Structure of the IPRI ................................................................................................................................22
Figure 2:       Ranking by IPRI Score
Figure 3:       IPRI Ranking by Quintile ........................................................................................................................28
Figure 4:        Ranking by LP Score ................................................................................................................................32
Figure 5:        Ranking by PPR Score ..............................................................................................................................34
Figure 6:        Ranking by IPR Score ..............................................................................................................................35
Figure 7:        Average Scores by Region and Component ..............................................................................................40
Figure 8:        Average Per Capita Income by IPRI Quintile ............................................................................................41
Figure 9:        Relationship between IPRI and GDP Per Capita ......................................................................................42
Figure 10:      Relationship between LP and GDP Per Capita..........................................................................................42
Figure 11:      Relationship between PPR and GDP Per Capita ......................................................................................43
Figure 12:      Relationship between IPR and GDP Per Capita ........................................................................................43
Figure 13:      Relationship between IPRI and FDI Inflows as a Percent of GDP ............................................................44
Figure 14:      Relationship between LP and FDI Inflows as a Percent of GDP.................................................................44
Figure 15:      Relationship between PPR and FDI Inflows as a Percent of GDP ............................................................45
Figure 16:      Relationship between IPR and FDI Inflows as a Percent of GDP ..............................................................45
Figure 17:      Relationship between IPRI and GDP Growth ..........................................................................................46
Figure 18:      Relationship between LP and GDP Growth..............................................................................................46
Figure 19:      Relationship between PPR and GDP Growth ..........................................................................................47
Figure 20:      Relationship between IPR and GDP Growth ............................................................................................47
Figure 21:      Structure of the Gender Equality Component (GE)..................................................................................64
Table 1:        Scores by Country ....................................................................................................................................29
Table 2:        Top 10 by Component (Number Indicates Rank) ....................................................................................30
Table 3:         Bottom 10 by Component (Number Indicates Rank) ..............................................................................30
Table 4:         Summary Statistics ....................................................................................................................................33
Table 5:        Changes in the IPRI Score (2009–2010) ..................................................................................................36
Table 6:        Changes in the LP Score (2009–2010)......................................................................................................37
Table 7:        Changes in the PPR Score (2009–2010) ..................................................................................................38
Table 8:        Changes in the IPR Score (2009–2010) ....................................................................................................39
Table 9:         Ranking by IPRI(GE) Score......................................................................................................................66





n 2007, the Property Rights Alliance (PRA) established the Hernando de Soto fellowship as a means ofproducing the International Property Rights Index (IPRI). Now in its fifth edition, the IPRI remains themost comprehensive international measurement of property rights around the world. The first edition 
compared the efforts of physical and intellectual property rights protection in 70 countries. The 2011 Index
has grown to examine 129 countries. 
With each new year, the link between economic prosperity and property rights protection becomes increasingly
clearer. The 2011 IPRI once again emphasizes the evident connection between countries with the greatest
economic strength and countries with the strongest protections of property rights. Looking at the trends
found in the past four editions of the IPRI, the latest Index continues to show advancements in property
rights protection around the world, while drawing attention to the improvements that must be made, 
especially the extension of more universal property rights. 
Now that the correlation between economic well-being and property rights has been established, it is imperative
to continue improving property rights on a global level. Weak property rights are most commonly seen in
the developing world. As the citizens of these countries are in the greatest need of economic growth, it is
crucial that their physical and intellectual property be granted protection. This Index, and similar efforts,
seek to educate politicians, economists, academics, and entrepreneurs about the necessity to protect property
rights around the world.
Due the vast quantities of data necessary to compile the IPRI, the task of doing so is far from easy. I congratulate











Property Rights Alliance (PRA), in collaboration with our international partners, is proud to present the fifth edition of the 
International Property Rights Index (IPRI).
With regard to private property rights, PRA has and continues to subscribe to the notion that the protection of both physical and
intellectual property is equally important in nature. Individual freedom, economic expansion and job creation depend on securing
property rights.   Patents, trademarks and copyrights provide inventors and great thinkers with the ability to be rightly rewarded
for their innovations.  Likewise, land rights provide empowerment through ownership, allowing citizens to utilize and prosper from
their investment. Economic growth only occurs when property, in all forms, is respected and protected.
As property rights continue to face challenges around the world, we hope this study will be a useful tool for policymakers, think
tanks, academics, and investors by highlighting the importance of property rights as a key building block for economic growth.    
We would like to thank all of the partners and other contributors for all of the hard work that they put into the development of the
2011 IPRI. Additionally, I would like to thank the author of this year’s index, Kyle Jackson, for his time and dedication to the
success of this project.
We would also like to give a special thank you to Hernando de Soto whose commitment to furthering the cause for property rights
has inspired PRA’s Hernando de Soto Fellowship program. His vision has helped make the 2011 IPRI possible.
Best regards,
Kelsey Zahourek
Executive Director of the Property Rights Alliance
Washington, DC
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Private Property and Collective Action: Managing a Faustian Bargain 
By Richard E. Wagner, George Mason University
If you go to Google Images and type in “Korean Peninsula at night,” you will see a variety of satellite photos that show South Korea
brightly illuminated, while North Korea is dark. Some of those photos will also take in surrounding territory from China and Japan.
Those territories, too, are brightly illuminated, though China not so much as Japan. It is said that a picture is worth a thousand words. In
this respect, those pictures from space tell a tale of how private property promotes human flourishing, while collective property impairs it. 
This tale is not new. It is ancient, going back at least to the classical Greeks and the debate between Plato and Aristotle over the
raising of children. Plato proposed that children be raised collectively to prevent some children from gaining advantage because
their parents reared them in particularly good fashion. The trouble with Plato’s scheme, Aristotle pointed out, was that all children
would be treated with equal indifference, leading to the degradation of all children. 
This ancient debate is alive in the comparison of North and South Korea. North Korea is based on communal property; South
Korea on private property. People have generally weak incentive to develop common property, while having strong incentive to
abuse it. Suppose a lake is held in common by a thousand adjoining residents. Someone who catches immature fish will have strong
incentive to keep the fish rather than return for someone else to catch. It is better to have a small fish than no fish. Thus, communal
property undergoes degradation unless it is managed in voluntary fashion, as Elinor Ostrom’s Governing the Commons explains.
While the world presents us with numerous particular arrangements of human governance, the apparent surface complexity rests upon
two simple principles. One principle is private property, which entails individual responsibility for the value consequences of one’s 
actions. The other principle is communal property, where value consequences are diffused throughout society. Grounding in private
property gives us the illumination of South Korea; grounding in communal property gives us the darkness of North Korea.
Late in the 18th century, Adam Smith concluded that “little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from
the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural
course of things.” Smith’s conclusion presents us with a puzzle. There would surely exist universal agreement that liberty and opulence
are superior to servility and destitution. Yet liberty and opulence have not dominated human history and are far from universal
today. Human interaction is only incompletely governed by principles of private property. In the presence of a universal desire for
liberty and opulence, how can we account for the limited place of private property in the organization of human governance through-
out the world? Both technical and moral issues are involved in limiting the range of private property. 
As a technical matter, private property requires a suitable administrative apparatus. Objects of ownership must be established and
recorded. Transfers of ownership must likewise be recorded. Such recordation is necessary to help resolve disputes over ownership that
will inevitably arise. Dispute resolution, in turn, will require the development of institutional arrangements and their associated
processes and procedures. There are different paths this development can follow, and these can operate with varying quality. This 
administrative apparatus, moreover, will be operated by people who may undertake their activities with varying degrees of skillfulness
and rectitude. The talents and capacities required to accommodate governance through private property are many and varied. 
While the significance of these technical matters should not be underestimated, the most severe impediments to private property
are surely moral. Human governance through private property requires both that people embrace responsibility for the value
consequences of their actions and that they forbear from interfering with the similar actions of other people. You may open a
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business, but you must also forbear from interfering in the equal right of other people to open businesses, even if their businesses
compete with yours for customers. If your business does not do well, it is you who will bear the loss. Forbearance entails a morality
of individual responsibility for both losses and gains. 
This morality is invariably undermined by governmental action, more fully in some countries than in others. Governmental power
inescapably involves a form of a Faustian bargain: a government can use force to accomplish good, but it will also accomplish harm.
Good is secured to the extent a government uses its powers to secure rights of private property, as illustrated by the efficient keeping
of records and the impartial administration of justice. But power is never used just for good; this is the Faustian bargain at work.
Governments will require modest amounts of taxation to support their universally beneficial activities. But governments are never
modest in their appetites for revenue, or for power. 
An impartial administration of justice requires but modest revenue and leaves government as a background participant in the life
of a society. Government officials are like stagehands. But governments can use their taxing and regulating powers to propel their
officials onto center stage. This happens all too easily, always with harmful consequences, as illustrated by the recent credit crisis. 
At base, credit is a simple contract regarding the use of private property. A lender gives temporary custody of property to a borrower.
If the borrower does not return the property according to the terms of the contract, the government should assist the lender by en-
forcing compliance with the terms of the contract. That the object that is rented is intangible, in contrast to the tangible character
of a contract to rent a house or a car, does nothing to change the simple nature of a credit transaction. 
All complications that arise over credit contracts are manifestations of governmental stagehands forcing their way onto center stage.
Credit contracts are no longer simple relationships between borrowers and lenders. Governments have become active participants
in those relationships and in many particular ways, all of which move away from the impartial administration of justice. Some gov-
ernmental actions protect borrowers who do not repay their loans. Other governmental actions force lenders to make loans they
would not have made under an impartial administration of justice. Yet other governmental actions offer rewards to lenders who
support the movement onto center stage of government officials. 
In her masterful Systems of Survival, Jane Jacobs described a well working society as involving carriers of two distinct moral 
syndromes: the commercial and the guardian. Within this societal architecture, carriers of the commercial syndrome occupy center
stage and carriers of the guardian syndrome support the commercial carriers through the impartial administration of justice. Power
might be reasonably contained in such a well working society but it can never be tamed. To the extent power breaks its containment,
hybridization results between commercial and guardian syndromes, which Jacobs described as “monstrous moral hybrids.” Rather
than seeking to compete by developing better products, businesses come to compete by supporting governmental efforts to restrict
the ability of others to compete. Rather than being content with enforcing commercial contracts, governmental officials move onto
center stage by becoming participants in commercial activity. 
Despite the immense complexity we see in systems for governing human relationships throughout the world, there are really only
two contrasting principles by which that governance can be secured. One operates through private property and individual respon-
sibility. The other operates through common property and collective responsibility. With private property, we are the director of
our actions, and our relationships with other people follow the principle of equality under law. With collective property, by contrast,
our actions are to a significant degree directed by those who possess power over us, and with relationships among people thereby
mired in positions and attitudes of deference and supplication. 
Neither principle operates in its pure form, of course, and nor could it. There is good reason to think, however, that the work of
the Property Rights Alliance in promoting awareness that property rights are the true foundation for genuine human rights will
help to spread the blessings of liberty and human flourishing throughout the world. 
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We would like to express our appreciation for Hernando de Soto’s exemplary work in the area of securing property rights for the
world’s poor. His ideas and efforts continue to be a source of encouragement and inspiration for us. We are honored to have the 
fellowship bear his name and grateful for his support. We look forward to working with him and the Institute for Liberty and
Democracy (ILD) in the future. 
We are particularly thankful for the continual intellectual and financial assistance of Grover Norquist and the Americans for Tax
Reform Foundation (ATRF). Their support for the Hernando de Soto Fellowship program was instrumental in making the annual
publication of the International Property Rights Index (IPRI) possible. Much is owed to the staff at Americans for Tax Reform
(ATR) for all their assistance throughout this project.
Special thanks are due to Alexandra C. Horst (2006 Hernando de Soto Fellow), Satya Thallam (2007 Hernando de Soto Fellow),
Anne C. Dedigama (2008 Hernando de Soto Fellow), and Victoria Strokova (2009 Hernando de Soto Fellow).  Their hard work
and effort on previous editions made this year’s index possible.  We also thank Scott LaGanga whose conceptualization of the
program and continual encouragement were instrumental.
We extend our special appreciation to Katerina Bricker for her excellent research assistance. Her efforts made it feasible to again in-
clude individual country profiles in the 2011 IPRI.  Many thanks are due to Ryan Balis for his thorough editing of this publication. 
The 2010 International Property Rights Index benefited from outstanding papers by the following contributors: Marius Doksheim
(Civita); Joseph Quesnel (Frontier Centre for Public Policy); Krishna Neupane (Limited Government); Marcos Hidding Ohlson
and Martin Krause (ESEADE); Nicole Alpert (The Lion Rock Institute); and Richard E. Wagner (George Mason University). We
thank our contributors for their valuable time and insights, which greatly enriched this report.
We appreciate the continued support and commitment of our partner organizations and welcome all our new partners.
Many individuals have contributed to this project in a variety of ways. To those not mentioned above, we are thankful for your sup-
port and effort.
Kyle A. Jackson, 2010 Hernando de Soto Fellow, Property Rights Alliance




The International Index of Property Rights (IPRI) is a product of the efforts of the Washington, DC-based Property Rights Alliance
(PRA). The PRA is dedicated to the protection of property rights (physical and intellectual) in the U.S. and around the world. The
PRA is an affiliate of the taxpayer advocacy organization, Americans for Tax Reform (ATR).
Despite the growing accessibility of international data and research regarding property rights, existing indices and studies traditionally
focus on either the physical or intellectual aspects of property rights. Additionally, most global indices are dedicated to broader
topic areas instead of a focused debate on property rights. However, noted exceptions include the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street
Journal Index of Economic Freedom and the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of the World, which do address property rights, although
in the context of assembling a larger snapshot of each country. To overcome the consequent lack of a more broadly defined property
rights gauge, the PRA introduced the Hernando de Soto Fellowship in 2006. The annually offered fellowship provides continuous
data development and concept improvement for the annual publication of the International Property Rights Index, presented here
in its fourth edition.

Kyle Jackson is pursuing a doctoral degree in economics at George Mason University.  He received his Bachelor of Arts in economics
from Hillsdale College in Hillsdale, MI and a Master of Arts in economics from San Jose State University. Most recently he was a
summer fellow at the American Institute for Economic Research where he was a recipient of the Roy A. Foulke, Jr. Award, given to
the student fellow who demonstrates the highest potential for development as an economic scientist.
Mr. Jackson’s previous research has been in the area of economic development, specifically the origin and nature of institutions that
facilitate economic growth.  Through this work he has come to appreciate the vital role property rights play in promoting prosperity
and freedom and hopes to further our understanding of this role through the International Property Rights Index.
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Nicole Alpert
Ms. Nicole Idanna Alpert is The Lion Rock Institute’s Editor of Best Practice, Lion Rock’s first journal. Before joining Lion Rock in 2008,
Ms. Alpert managed a boutique wine company and worked in cross-cultural literature for Lingnan University’s Dept. of English and Dept.
of General Education.  She received her BA in Economics and International Relations from Washington College of Maryland.
Marius Doksheim
Mr. Marius Doksheim is a Political Economy Adviser at Civita.  He holds a BS in Economics from the University of Oslo and a
MS in Political Economy from the Norwegian School of Management, BI.  Mr. Doksheim has co-authored several books and
papers, among them Svikt!, on public choice, and Migrasjon og frihet, on immigration.
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Martin Krause
Dr. Martin Krause is a professor of Economics at the Law School, University of Buenos Aires, and Director of the Center for
Research on Institutions and Markets (CIIM-ESADE). The author of several books and academic articles, Dr. Krause is also a
member of the Mont Pelerin Society.  He earned his PhD in Management from the University of La Plata, Argentina.
Krishna Neupane
Mr. Krishna Neupane is the founder and president of Limited Government, Nepal’s first free market think tank.  After working at
free market think tanks in India and the United States, Mr. Neupane served as the Technical Specialist for Ministry of Health and
Population (Nepal) to reform its budgetary management in 2008 and 2009.  He earned an MS in Development Planning and
Management from Purbanchal University with distinction and also holds an MA in Economics from Wichita State University.
Marcos Hidding Ohlson
Mr. Marcos Hidding Ohlson is a Professor of International Economics at the School of Economics and Business Administration
(ESEADE) in Buenos Aires, Argentina where he teaches microeconomics. Between 2002 and 2006 he worked as an economic
analyst at Delphos Investment and IB & CP, after which he spent 6 months in South Africa as a missionary, living in a Township,
where he gained firsthand experience of life in an informal settlement.  The editor of the daily Republican Forum, he also serves as
a City Councilor in San Isidro, a suburb of Buenos Aires.  He holds a BA in Economics from the Universidad Católica Argentina
(UCA) and a Masters in International Economics, JIBS (Jönköping International Business School), Sweden.
Joseph Quesnel
Mr. Joseph Quesnel is a policy analyst at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy. Mr. Quesnel is the lead researcher on the Centre’s
Aboriginal Frontiers Project, which examines governance issues on First Nations communities and researches many other aboriginal
related issues. He is from the Sudbury region of Northern Ontario, and has Metis ancestry from Quebec. He holds a BA in Political
Science and History from McGill University in Montreal, Quebec and is completing a Master of Journalism degree at Carleton
University in Ottawa, Ontario. 
Dr. Richard E. Wagner
Richard Wagner is Holbart Harris Professor of Economics at George Mason University. He has published numerous books and ar-
ticles in economic theory and political economy. The uniting thread running through that body of work is the continuing contest
between liberty and servility, with a focus on seeking to understand better how liberty might expand and servility contract. His
most recent books are Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance (2007) and Mind, Society, and Human Action: Time and




This report presents the fifth edition of the International Property Rights Index (IPRI).
The IPRI is an annual study that compares countries in terms of their protection of property rights – both physical and intellectual.
Like previous editions of the IPRI, the 2011 report seeks to investigate the effects of a country’s strong legal and political environment,
recognition, and enforcement of physical and intellectual property rights on the economic development of a country. This year’s 
report compares 129 economies using these three variables as core components and ranks them accordingly.
Because of the expansion of some of the underlying data sources this year’s index welcomes the addition of Angola, Iran, Lebanon,
Rwanda, and Swaziland. Being both geographically and economically diverse, these countries significantly contribute to the com-
prehensiveness of the index. Unfortunately, a lack of data on intellectual property rights prevented the Kyrgyz Republic from being
ranked and included in this year’s index. The net change of four countries to some extent hinders a direct comparison of the IPRI
rankings in this report to last year’s report. The reader is reminded that some changes in relative positions of the countries could
reflect changes in the sample of countries instead of substantive changes within a country’s property rights regime. To enable assessing
changes in countries’ performance, the authors present new tables showing the changes in absolute scores for the IPRI and its com-
ponents (Tables 5-8).
Since its inaugural publication in 2007, the authors have focused on identifying the data sources that best represent the strength of
a nation’s property regime while keeping in mind the necessity for consistency of the index. The 2011 index uses the same compo-
nents and data sources as the 2010 index and maintains consistency with the previous editions by using the same weighting scheme.
Additionally, an extensive analysis of the previous years’ data has been done to identify any issues that could hamper the comparison
of scores across years.
To better compare countries’ IPRI scores across time country profiles have been included to provide the historic progression of the
IPRI scores and its components, point to any advances or regressions, and show strong or weak points in countries’ property rights. 
Following last year’s shift, the gender equality component of the 2011 IPRI focuses solely on non-OECD countries. The total
number of countries scored for this component is 83 this year, which represents a small increase from last year. The authors believe,
however, that the issue of gender equality is especially relevant to developing countries where large disparities in land rights continue
to exist and large improvements in their property rights remain to be realized. Therefore, the focus of this component on 
non-OECD countries is appropriate. 
In addition to providing a quantitative measure of the protection of property rights, the report highlights various aspects of property
rights through case studies. Once again, the authors have collaborated with the IPRI’s partner organizations to identify issues that
need further elaboration in the index. The case studies present an opportunity to draw attention to aspects of property rights that
even the most comprehensive index might not be able to address. They also highlight the developments in property rights in various
regions of the world with the aim of providing clear and compelling evidence for the positive role that property rights play in 
economic development. The 2011 report contains five case studies on various property rights issues contributed by the IPRI partner
organizations. 
The 2011 IPRI builds on the previous editions to provide an even more comprehensive measure of property rights. Despite significant
improvements over the years, there continue to be data limitations and challenges with data collection and interpretation. We are
confident that future editions of the report will address and progressively overcome these issues.
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Adriatic Institute for Public Policy (AI) – Croatia
www.adriaticinstitute.org
The Adriatic Institute is an independent, free market think tank
founded in 2004 in Rijeka, Croatia. AI is dedicated to advancing
economic freedom and advocating free market reforms in Croa-
tia and southeast Europe. AI promotes innovative thinking, ad-
vancing principled and pro-growth solutions that have been
successfully implemented in Eastern Europe’s post-communist
countries. With its engaged advisors and research fellows, AI has
dedicated resources to sponsoring research, conferences and
strategic events that augment the competition of ideas by fea-
turing experts in fields ranging from economics to security.
Albanian Socio Economic Think Tank (ASET) – Albania
www.aset-al.org
The Albanian Socio Economic Think Tank is a non-profit or-
ganization established in 1999. Its goal is to promote economic
development and social welfare. ASET has developed more than
30 projects in cooperation with different national and interna-
tional organization such as the Government of Albania, various
Albanian ministries, World Bank, SOROS Foundation, U.S.
Embassy, IFAD, GTZ, SEED, and GDN, among others.
Alternate Solutions Institute – Pakistan
www.asinstitute.org
Alternate Solutions Institute is Pakistan’s first free market
think tank. It is an independent, non-profit, non-governmen-
tal, educational research entity, established for the “welfare of
the people by the people,” based on mutual help and coopera-
tion free from any political or partisan influence. The guiding
philosophy of the Institute is based on the values of limited
government, rule of law, protection of property rights, market
economy, individual freedom, and private initiative.
Asociación de Consumidores Libres – Costa Rica
www.consumidoreslibres.org
The Asociación de Consumidores Libres is a non-profit organ-
ization created to defend the rights of consumers to freely
choose. Its goal is to defend at all costs consumer rights against the
state, producers, and manufacturers. The Asociación de Consum-
idores Libres defends the right to trade, which includes the right
to purchase goods and services from any bidder, regardless of race,
religion, nationality, or any other characteristic.
Association for Liberal Thinking – Turkey
http://www.liberal.org.tr
Association for Liberal Thinking, ALT, was established in De-
cember 1992. The objectives of ALT as a non-profit, non-gov-
ernmental organization are to introduce to Turkish public the
richness of the intellectual tradition that lay at heart of the liberal
democratic civilization to engage in activities that promote un-
derstanding and acceptance of values and concepts like liberty,
justice, tolerance, peace, human rights, the rule of law, to en-
courage academic researches on liberal themes; and to contribute
to finding effective solutions to Turkey’s political and economic
problems within liberal thought.
Austrian Economics Center (AEC) – Austria
AEC promotes the ideas of the Austrian School of Economics.
Its main goal is to help create a free, responsible society. The
Center addresses questions concerning economic and social pol-
itics by offering studies and solutions on a scientific basis. AEC’s
goal is to improve public understanding of the key economic
questions needed to promote a free society.
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We express our sincere gratitude to our partner organizations for their commitment and dedication towards ensuring and furthering
property rights in their respective countries and around the world. We thank our partners for providing the feedback and ideas that
allowed us to identify areas for improvement and make the index an even more useful tool in advancing property rights. 
This year, we have partnered with the following organizations:
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Bishkek Business Club – Kyrgyz Republic
www.bdk.kg
Bishkek Business Club is a public association founded as a non-
profit, non-governmental organization. The Club seeks to 
radically improve the business environment in the Kyrgyz Re-
public and change Kyrgyzstan into a major dynamic business
center. The Club strives to help the citizens of the Kyrgyz Re-
public to access better social, information, technological, and
economic world systems. The Club endeavors to become a
credible organization that will have an impact on regional
strategic solutions.
Cathay Institute for Public Affairs – China
www.jiuding.org
The Cathay Institute is a free market organization in China that
conducts research on free enterprise issues in China and around
the world.
Center for the Dissemination of Economic 
Knowledge for Freedom (CEDICE) Venezuela
www.cedice.org.ve
Founded in 1984, CEDICE is a non-partisan, non-profit pri-
vate association. It is dedicated to the dissemination, research,
education, and promotion of free market ideas, individual lib-
erty, and limited government. CEDICE promotes individual
initiative, democracy, and property rights and conducts activities
conducive to better understanding of the free market system and
free and responsible societies.
Center for Entrepreneurship and Economic 
Development (CEED) – Montenegro
The Center for Entrepreneurship and Economic Development
was formed in 1993 to support entrepreneurship and economic
development. The Center understands the importance of ap-
plying proven international business development concepts to
the local environment. The Center’s activities include training
and facilitating business start-ups, business consulting, research,
and creating policy analysis recommendations.
Center for Free Enterprise (CFE) – South Korea
www.cfe.org
Established in 1997, the Center for Free Enterprise propagates
research, education, and publications to diffuse classical liberal-
ism and market principles throughout Korea. CFE has also
come to act as the medium for market economists of Korea to
inform the people of Korea of their principles and research. 
Center for Institutional Analysis and 
Development (CADI) – Romania
www.cadi.ro
The Center for Institutional Analysis and Development is a re-
search, outreach, and consultancy center promoting the insti-
tutions underpinning economic and civil liberties. CADI
evolved as an umbrella think tank for libertarian, classical liberal,
neoconservative, and other branches of the center-right. CADI’s
activities range from public debates and workshops to syndi-
cated publications in support of public policies.
Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies (CLDS) – Serbia
www.clds.org.rs
CLDS is an independent think tank that studies policy, pub-
lishes public policy proposals, and organizes seminars and lec-
tures on policy issues as part of its mission to influence the
public discourse and issues in Serbia.
Center for Mozambican and International Studies
(CEMO) – Mozambique 
CEMO is a newly constituted non-profit association that pro-
motes in-depth analysis and discussion on public policy strategies
surrounding governance and development. It seeks to advance
knowledge sharing in the areas of science and technology, politics,
economics, culture, and society. The Center’s mission is to con-
tribute to the socio-economic development of Mozambique and
to produce innovative thinking in our society through research,
debates, surveys, and analysis of public policies.
Center of Research for Development (CIDAC) – Mexico
www.cidac.org
CIDAC is a not-for-profit think tank that undertakes research
and proposes viable policy options for Mexico’s economic and
democratic development. The organization seeks to promote open,
pluralistic debate in the pursuit of rule of law and democracy, mar-
ket economy, social development, and strengthening Mexico-U.S.
relations. CIDAC offers the results of its work to the general public
with the objectives of enriching the public debate and contributing
to relevant decision making in the country.
Le Centre Des Affaires Humaines (CEDAH) – Burkina Faso
www.cedahburkina.com
The CEDAH is a free market educational and research public
policy think tank founded in 2007 in Burkina Faso. The
CEDAH is an independent, non-profit organization with no
affiliations to any political party. The mission of the CEDAH
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is to propose original and innovative solutions for crafting 
efficient public policies, using successful reforms applied else-
where as models. The CEDAH studies how markets function
with the aim of identifying the mechanisms and institutions that
foster prosperity and the long-term welfare of all individuals
who make up our society.
Central Asian Free Market Institute — Kyrgyz Republic 
http://www.freemarket.kg/
The Central Asian Free Market Institute (CAFMI) is an inde-
pendent, non-profit, think-tank founded on April 6, 2009, with
offices in Bishkek and Dushanbe and activities spanning Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. CAFMI experts to develop
into Central Asia’s major advocacy and research hub for public
policy issues.
Centre for Civil Society – India
www.ccs.in
The Centre for Civil Society is an independent, non-profit re-
search and educational organization devoted to improving the
quality of life for all citizens of India by reviving and reinvigo-
rating civil society.
Centre for Policy Research (CPR) – India
www.cprindia.org
CPR is an independent and non-partisan research institute,
think tank, and one of the 27 national social science research
institutes recognized by the Indian Council of Social Science
Research (ICSSR) of the Government of India. Its main objec-
tives are to provide thought leadership and creative solutions to
address pressing intellectual and policy issues. CPR is recognized
for its multi-disciplinary approach and unique blend of schol-
arship and practical expertise. 
Centro de Investigaciones de Instituciones y Mercados
de Argentina (CIIMA-ESEADE) – Argentina
www.ciima.org.ar
CIIMA is the Center for Research on Institutions and Markets
of Argentina, a public policy think tank part of the ESEADE
Graduate School in Buenos Aires. Its mission is to evaluate and
to promote the institutions that allow markets to properly 
function with a focus on to property rights, contracts, and 
individual freedom.
Civita – Norway 
www.civita.no
Civita strives to increase consensus on important market econ-
omy principles and their implications on welfare, freedom, and
democracy. Civita is also dedicated to promoting personal re-
sponsibility and civil society through research and exposition,
publications, seminars, conferences, and general information to
inform the public audience.
Competere – Italy
www.competere.eu
Competere is an Italian think tank that promotes greater market
freedom and individual liberty to create prosperity for individ-
uals and for their community. Its purpose is not only to spread
the values of liberalism but also to develop and implement classi-
cal liberal politics to contribute to the betterment of the Italian
economy by creating a more competitive market with less state
presence, a more qualified young workforce, and a flexible labor
market. Competere’s projects focus on the urgencies and problems
of companies operating in the Italian and European markets.
EBI Think Tank Institute (EBI) – Mongolia
www.ebi.mn
EBI, founded in 2008, is a non-profit, non-partisan think tank
based in Ulaanbaatar whose mission is to discover, develop, and
support “intellectual entrepreneurs” who can advance the Insti-
tute’s vision of a society of free enterprise and development of
democracy. EBI strives to achieve its mission by identifying, re-
cruiting, training, and placing young outstanding people in pol-
itics and government to increase the number and effectiveness
of public policy leaders.
Eudoxa – Sweden
www.eudoxa.se
Eudoxa is a think tank based in Stockholm, Sweden. Its main
focus is to explain the cultural impact of emerging technologies
by integrating research with classical free market ideas 
and dynamist thoughts of experimentation, innovation, and 
decentralization.
European Coalition for Economic Growth (ECEG) – Austria
www.e-growth.eu
ECEG acts as a European net hub, and cooperates extensively
with more than 100 public policy organizations. It promotes
the ideas of free market economics, the Austrian School of 
Economics and public choice as viable economic alternatives in
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Austria and Europe not only by means of a public think tank
but also as an academic institute. Additionally, ECEG addresses
questions relating to public economic illiteracy, economic and
social politics, and offers scientific studies and solutions to help
improve public understanding of the key economic questions
involved in promoting a free society.
F.A. Hayek Foundation (FAHF) – Slovakia
www.hayek.sk
FAHF, founded by a group of liberally oriented Slovak econo-
mists, has as its core mission the establishment of a tradition of
liberal thinking in Slovakia. From this liberal tradition, the foun-
dation seeks to offer practical reform proposals for market solu-
tions to economic and social problem. FAHF seeks to widen
and propagate classical liberal ideas in the reform process
throughout Slovakia, provide a platform for the exchange of opi-
nions of experts and the broader public, and further develop
basic liberal ideas and values. 
F.A. v. Hayek Institute – Austria
www.hayekinstitut.at
The F.A. v. Hayek Institute was founded in 1993 to commem-
orate the work of Nobel Laureate Friedrich August von Hayek
and to promote the ideas of the Austrian School of Economics.
It is a private and independent academic research institution.
The Institute cooperates extensively with other like-minded
think tanks, and it organizes academic conferences, seminars,
and lectures tackling current economic issues.
The Free Market Foundation – South Africa 
www.freemarketfoundation.com
The Free Market Foundation is an independent, non-profit pol-
icy organization founded in 1975 to promote and foster an open
society, the rule of law, personal liberty, and economic and press
freedom as fundamental components of its advocacy of human
rights and democracy based on classical liberal principles. 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation – Germany
www.freiheit.org
The Friedrich Naumann Foundation is an independent, non-
profit, and non-governmental organization that is committed
to promoting liberal policy and politics. Originating in Ger-
many, the Foundation promotes freedom in human dignity as
the ultimate precondition of a society where people can live
freely and in peace. The Foundation supports various projects
in cooperation with partner organizations in Africa and is also
active in over 50 countries worldwide.
Frontier Centre for Public Policy – Canada
www.fcpp.org
The Frontier Centre for Public Policy is an independent public
policy think tank based in western Canada. Its mission is to de-
velop and popularize policy choices that will help Canada’s prairie
region live up to its vast but unrealized economic potential.
Fundación Atlas 1853 – Argentina
www.atlas.org.ar
Fundación Atlas 1853 is a non-partisan non-profit organization
established in 1998. Its mission is to lead the change towards an
open society based on the defense of individual freedom, the exis-
tence of institutional limits to government action, the market econ-
omy, private property, free enterprise, and the rule of law. 
Fundación IDEA – Mexico
www.fundacionidea.org.mx
Fundación IDEA is a recently created, non-profit, and non-par-
tisan research center located in Mexico City. Its mission is to
conduct independent research, analysis, and evaluation of public
policy in Mexico and other developing countries. It seeks to
generate policy recommendations to improve policies and 
programs that can improve equality of opportunity through 
economic development, education, and poverty reduction. 
Fundación Libertad – Argentina
www.libertad.org.ar
Fundación Libertad is a non-profit organization whose objective
is to promote liberal ideas in the social field by means of research
and diffusion of public policies related to socioeconomic and
business areas. Fundación Libertad was created in Rosario in
1988 by a group of businessmen, professionals, and intellectuals,
and it is supported by more than 200 private companies. Its ac-
tivities include courses, lectures, seminars, researches, publica-
tions, and also an important presence in the media through its
own columns and programs.
Fundación Libertad – Panama
www.fundacionlibertad.org.pa
Fundación Libertad is a non-profit organization established in
the Republic of Panama in 2001. Its mission is to spread and
defend individual freedom principles and promote a society of
free and responsible citizens. 
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IMANI Center for Policy and Education – Ghana
www.imanighana.org
IMANI, founded in 2004, is an African based non-profit, non-
governmental organization dedicated to educating society on
the principles of a free economy and fostering public awareness
of important policy issues concerning business, government, and
civil society. Through seminars, publications and articles,
IMANI and its international partners seek to promote enlight-
ened inquiry based on sound values and scholarship. 
The Initiative for Public Policy Analysis (IPPA) – Nigeria
www.ippanigeria.org
IPPA is a public policy research institute in Nigeria. Founded
in 2001, IPPA’s focus is on the principles and institutions under-
lying a free and open society, specifically in Africa and Nigeria.
IPPA conducts research and advocacy on public policy issues, in-
cluding development economics, trade, entrepreneurship, property
rights, education, environment, health, and security.
Institut Constant de Rebecque – Switzerland
www.institutconstant.ch
The Institut Constant de Rebecque is an independent, non-
profit think tank in Switzerland. The Institut Constant de Re-
becque promotes a climate of opinion favorable to individual
growth, private initiative, and free enterprise through a network
of thinkers, researchers, and young scholars. To that end, the
Institut develops innovative and sustainable solutions to current
challenges and broadens the public debate.
Institute of Political Economy – Ecuador
http://www.ieep.org.ec/en/
The Ecuadorian Institute of Political Economy, IEEP, is an or-
ganization devoted to public policy analysis and the dissemina-
tion of ideas of freedom in Ecuador. It was founded in 1991 by
Dora of Ampuero as a private, independent, nonprofit. IEEP
finances its activities through voluntary donations from indi-
viduals, corporations and foundations. IEEP conducts research
related to socio-economic problems that affect Ecuador within
a framework of respect for individual liberties, private property,
free markets and limited government and responsible.
Institute for Democracy and Economic 
Affairs (IDEAS) – Malaysia
www.ideas.org.my
IDEAS is Malaysia’s first think tank dedicated to promoting
market-based solutions to public policy challenges. IDEAS is an
independent, non-profit organization. As a cross-partisan think
tank, it works across the political spectrum. IDEAS’ purpose is
to advance market-based principles by working with an exten-
sive network of experts who share its ideals.
The Institute for Free Enterprise (IUF) – Germany
www.iuf-berlin.org
IUF is Germany’s free market think tank. The Institute works
towards policy change by developing concepts for reforms with
local and international experts. Those ideas are then proposed to
policy makers, thereby challenging the interventionist mindset.
Institute of Future Studies for Development (IFD) – Thailand 
www.ifd.or.th
The Institute of Future Studies for Development is a non-profit
academic research organization that aims to stimulate a long-
term vision for the holistic development of Thai society, espe-
cially in the field of economics, human resource, and national
development.
Institute for Liberty and Democracy – Peru
http://www.ild.org.pe/
The Institute for Liberty and Democracy (or ILD) is a Lima-
based think tank devoted to the promotion of property rights
in developing countries. To provide governments with the 
expertise and information to implement institutional reforms
in property and business rights that allow citizens to be included
in the market economy and thus pull themselves out of poverty
and prosper.
Institute for Market Economics (IME) – Bulgaria
www.ime.bg
Established in 1993, IME is the first and oldest independent
economic policy think tank in Bulgaria. Its mission is to elabo-
rate and advocate market-based solutions to challenges citizens
of Bulgaria and the region face in reforms. IME provides an in-
dependent assessment and analysis of the government’s eco-
nomic policies and strives to be a focal point for an exchange of
views on market economics and relevant policy issues.
Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) – Australia
www.ipa.org.au
The IPA is an independent, non-profit public policy think tank,
dedicated to preserving and strengthening the foundations of
economic and political freedom. Since 1943, the IPA has been
at the forefront of the political and policy debate, defining the
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contemporary political landscape. The IPA supports the free
market of ideas, the free flow of capital, a limited and efficient
government, evidence-based public policy, the rule of law, and
representative democracy.
Instituto de Libre Empresa (ILE) – Peru
www.ileperu.org
ILE was founded in 1998 and is a non-profit Peruvian think
tank based in Lima, which advocates a system of free enterprise
under the values and virtues of limited government, private
property rights, and free markets. 
Instituto Liberdade (IL-RS) – Brazil
www.il-rs.org.br
The Instituto Liberdade do Rio Grande do Sul (IL-RS) is a
Brazilian private non-profit organization think tank whose
major purpose is to foster the research, creation, and dissemi-
nation of educational and cultural assets. IL-RS achieves its goal
by displaying to all individuals the advantages of an organized
society based on the principles of individual rights, limited and
representative government, and respect for private property
rights, contracts, and free initiative.
International Research Foundation (IRF) – Oman
www.irfoman.org
The International Research Foundation is an independent, non-
profit economic think-tank with emphasis on the Arab world,
which focuses its research and public affairs agenda on a collegial
basis, relying on the input of its research staff, its editorial board
and Senior Fellows. IRF’s vision is to promote growth through
economic freedom, and its mission is to measure, research and
communicate to a regional and global audience the impact of
competitive markets on the welfare of individuals.
Iraq Institute for Economic Reform (IIER) – Iraq
www.iier.org
The Iraq Institute for Economic Reform is an independent re-
search institute based in Baghdad. Its mission is to assist Iraq in
its transition to a modern market economy by promoting re-
form based on sound research and case studies. IIER seeks to
structure a system of formal property rights and to assist in the
development of an effective civil society by promoting vigorous
public debate among stakeholders about the future of Iraq. 
Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies (JIMS) – Israel
www.jims-israel.org
JIMS is an independent, non-profit economic policy think tank
whose mission is to promote social progress in Israel through
economic freedom and individual liberty. Founded in 2003, it
has quickly become one of Israel’s most successful non-profit
economic policy think tanks. JIMS regularly publishes influen-
tial economic policy papers and editorials, runs a number of in-
novative private educational projects, and administers a unique
public opinion survey called the Israel Panel Study of Opinion
Dynamics (IPSOD).
Liberales Institut – Switzerland
www.libinst.ch
Founded in 1979, the Liberales Institut pursues as its mission
the research and dissemination of ideas of freedom. The Institut
advances the Swiss tradition and culture of individual liberty,
peace, openness, and political diversity, and it furthers the de-
velopment of the liberal intellectual tradition.
Libertad y Desarrollo – Chile
www.lyd.com
Libertad y Desarrollo is a private research and study center – a
think tank – independent of any political, religious, business,
and government affiliations. The institute is dedicated to the
analysis of public policies and to promoting the values and prin-
ciples of a free society. To achieve this objective, Libertad and
Desarrollo is organized around core pragmatic activities.
Liberty Institute – India 
www.indefenceofliberty.org 
Liberty Institute is an independent think tank dedicated to 
empowering the people by harnessing the power of the market.
It seeks to build understanding and appreciation of the four in-
stitutional pillars of a free society – individual rights, rule of
law, limited government, and the free market. The Institute un-
dertakes a number of activities, among them research and ad-
vocacy on public policy issues. It organizes conferences and
seminars, and it has a publications program. The Institute is
working on a range of public policy issues, including economic
development and trade policy, energy policy and environmental
quality, education and health policies, democracy and gover-
nance reforms, and intellectual property rights and innovation,
among others.
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Limited Government – Nepal
www.lgn.org.np
Founded in 2007, Limited Government is an independent, non-
partisan, non-profit research and educational institute. Its mis-
sion is to facilitate and elevate the debate on the ideas of liberty
among opinion-leaders and civil society by cultivating a climate
of ideas that advocates for free market public policy reforms.
The Lion Rock Institute – Hong Kong
www.lionrockinstitute.org
The Lion Rock Institute was founded in 2004 and is a public
policy think tank advocating free market solutions for Hong
Kong policy challenges. It espouses open and free markets, prop-
erty rights, small government, low taxes, and minimal restric-
tions on the business environment to create the best
environment for freedom and prosperity.
Ludwig von Mises Institute – Poland
www.mises.pl
Ludwig von Mises Institute is an independent and non-profit
center for research and education based in Poland. The main
purpose of the Mises Institute is to raise social awareness of the
economic processes and basic institutions of a laissez-faire econ-
omy. We also promote relations based on free will and peaceful
cooperation between individuals. The Mises Institute draws
from the tradition of the Austrian School of Economics, writ-
ings of classical liberalism, and libertarian political thought. 
Minimal Government Thinkers, Inc. – Philippines
www.minimalgovernment.net
Minimal Government Thinkers, Inc. is an independent think
tank advancing five core principles: small government, small
taxes, free markets, rule of law, and personal responsibility. It
believes that society will be more peaceful and dynamic if indi-
viduals, parents, firms, and their voluntary organizations will
assume more individual and voluntary responsibility for their
lives, their families, and their communities.
The Nassau Institute – The Bahamas
www.nassauinstitute.org
Founded in 1995, The Nassau Institute is a think tank that pro-
motes capitalism and free markets. Its mission is to formulate
and promote public policies for The Bahamas based on the 
principles of limited government, individual freedom, and the
rule of law. The Nassau Institute encourages the revival of 
historical research promoting the free and enterprising 
commonwealth and countering the political philosophy of 
statism in all its forms.
New Economic School (NESG) – Georgia
www.nesg.net
NESG is a not-for-profit institution oriented towards creation
of public opinion, based on classical liberal economic thought.
Its main ideas are methodological individualism, personal free-
dom, and limited government. NESG’s activities include dis-
semination of economic knowledge through seminars,
conferences, publishing, translations, public lectures, etc. It is
involved in the public policy development process through or-
ganizing meetings, seminars, participating in debates, govern-
ment commissions, inviting international experts, etc.
New Zealand Business Roundtable – New Zealand
www.nzbr.org.nz
The New Zealand Business Roundtable is an organization com-
prising primarily of chief executives of major business firms
committed to contributing to the development of sound policies
that reflect overall national interests. It is founded on the belief
that a healthy, dynamic business sector and open and competi-
tive markets are fundamental to the achievement of a prosperous
economy and fair society.
OHRID Institute for Economic Strategies and
International Affairs – Macedonia 
www.oi.org.mk
The OHRID Institute is an independent, non-profit think tank.
It is commited to providing balance to the policy discourse in
Macedonia by conducting economic policy research, promoting
private sector and free market reform, and acting as a “watch-
dog” on government activities to ensure accountability. It strives
to contribute to Macedonia’s development into a market-based
democratic society.
Pal-Think for Strategic Studies – Palestine
www.palthink.org
Pal-Think for Strategic Studies is an independent, non-profit,
non-political, non-governmental, and non-sectarian think tank
that aims to stimulate and inspire rational public discussions
and consensus for the well-being of Palestinians and the Region.
Pal-Think was established in 2007 in Gaza-Palestine by a group
of Palestinian researchers and community activists who have 
intimate relations and diverse knowledge of the Middle East, its
current problems, potentials, and possibilities.
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Polish-American Foundation for Economic Research and
Education (PAFERE) – Poland www.pafere.org
PAFERE is an independent, non-governmental organization
dedicated to free market education and promotion of economic
freedom, free trade, and private property. It also studies the re-
lationship of ethics to economics and the development of eco-
nomic sciences. PAFERE’s main objectives are to propagate
basic economic knowledge and the understanding of relation-
ships between ethics and economy, to promote research on free
market economics, and to expose economic myths and fallacies.
Samriddhi Foundation –Nepal
http://www.samriddhi.org/
Emulating the principles of democratic practices recognized in
the 21st century, Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation is reg-
istered under the Company Act of Nepal as a not for profit or-
ganization. It believes in people’s power and recognizes
individuals as the top notch of the power center
Timbro – Sweden
www.timbro.se
Since 1978, Timbro has advocated for free markets, free trade,
and free societies. Timbro’s mission is to originate, promote, and
disseminate ideas and issues supporting the principles of free
markets, free enterprise, individual liberty, and a free society.
The Unirule Institute of Economics – China
http://english.unirule.org.cn/
The Unirule Institute of Economics (Unirule) is an independent,
nonprofit, non governmental (NGO) think tank, which was
jointly initiated in July of 1993 by five prominent economists,
Prof. Mao Yushi, Prof. Zhang Shuguang, Prof. Sheng Hong,
Prof. Fan Gang, and Prof. Tang Shouning. Unirule is dedicated
to the open exchange of ideas in economics in general, with a
particular focus on institutional economics, and maintains a
highly prestigious status within academic circles.
The Ukrainian Reform Support Foundation – Ukraine
www.ufpr.org.ua
The Ukrainian Reform Support Foundation is a public non-
profit organization founded in 1993 with the objective of en-
couraging economic reforms in Ukraine in the direction of the
creation of an economically efficient, self-governed Ukrainian
society and democratic Ukrainian state. 
The Zambia Institute for Public Policy Analysis (ZIPPA) –
Zambia
Founded in 2004, ZIPPA is an independent, non-political, and
educational research institute. Its mission is to promote wider
appreciation of the key role free markets and competition play
in economic development. ZIPPA undertakes and supports 
research on economic matters and public policy, comments 
on legislation related to economic and social matters, and 
organizes discussions and debates on economic and social issues.
It strives to spread the principles of free markets by holding 
seminars, workshops, and conferences, by publishing and dis-
tributing books, journals, and pamphlets, and by networking
with like-minded people and organizations in Zambia and 
internationally.
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“Nobody is at liberty to attack several property and to say at the same time that he values civilization. The history of the two
cannot be disentangled.” — Sir Henry Maine
Economic development is both fairly simple and impossibly difficult. We know it’s fairly simple because 235 years ago Adam Smith was
able to boil it down to three words: division of labor.  While visiting a pin factory Smith observed that instead of making each pin from
start to finish the workers would instead specialize in one or a few steps of the process and then pass their product on to another laborer.
This focus allowed the employees to hone their skills and increase their productivity, albeit in only a few steps of pin making.  But Smith
found when the slightly more productive employees work together the result is a fantastic increase in output. The same basic principle
is in play for people who specialize in one industry and trade their surplus output with people who specialize in other industries. More
output means more consumption which is essentially economic development.  Simple as that.
And yet something is missing. The wealthy industrialized countries are certainly characterized by specialization and division of
labor.  But large portions of the world’s population still engage in economic activity best described as self-sufficient.  In fact, wealthy
industrialized countries are a relatively new phenomenon.  For most of human history life could be best described as poor, nasty,
brutish, and short.  So while the mechanism for achieving economic development is fairly simple, the process of getting that mech-
anism going in the first place appears to be quite difficult.  Otherwise all these poor and stagnant societies would (presumably) just
specialize and trade and become wealthy.  What do the wealthy industrialized countries have that other societies lack?
The answer is a system of secure property rights. Property rights internalize costs and benefits and provide the proper incentives for
good stewardship of resources. A farmer will treat a parcel of land or a tractor or a hat differently if she is the one reaping the
benefits.  A baker is more likely to bake breads and pastries for sale if he knows that someone else will not confiscate the profits of
his activity.  Property rights give the baker the incentive to bake.
Property rights also play a vital role in directing resources to those uses most valued by society. This was first pointed out by the
economist Ludwig von Mises in the academic debates about the efficiency of socialism in the 1920s.  When privately owned goods
are sold they are transferred between owners at some price. These market prices contain in them important information about the
resources’ relative scarcity. As a good becomes more scarce either through a decrease in supply or an increase in demand, its price
will rise indicating to society that it is more valuable and should only be used for higher valued purposes. Mises pointed out that
without private property there are no exchange markets, and with no markets there are no prices. This makes it impossible to allocate
resources efficiently. Should cars be built with steel or some alloy?  Should a restaurant use plastic silverware and plates or more
durable ones?  Without prices to act as a guide people can only guess at the answers to questions like these.  The result is resources
being used less efficiently than would otherwise be the case and society is poorer as a result.
The International Property Rights Index helps illustrate the vital role property rights play in generating material well being.
By ranking countries’ respect for property rights we are able to make comparisons and see the consequences of having a weak or
strong property rights regime. As with any study, there are limitations to our approach.  Data limitations prevent us from ranking
every country for example.  But we remain confident that this study clearly demonstrates the positive relationship between property




A well-functioning property rights regime allows for economic assets to be productive by reducing transaction costs and encouraging
the creation of surplus value that can be reinvested without fear of expropriation. The link between secure property rights and eco-
nomic development lies in the ability of the property rights system to infuse what Hernando de Soto called “dead capital” into the
formal economy. Many developing countries’ experiences, however, illustrate the difficulty in creating and maintaining a property
rights system that works for all citizens. It is, therefore, even more important to continue to highlight the benefits of property rights
regimes that facilitate economic growth and development.
Private Property Rights 
Economists have identified at least four ways that insecure property rights negatively affect economic activity. Professors of Economics
and Political Science at the London School of Economics Tim Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak have recently summarized these four
aspects. First, insecure or weakly enforced property rights increase the risk of expropriation, which diminishes incentives to invest
and to produce. Second, insecure property rights decrease productivity by necessitating the need to defend property. Third, insecure
property rights fail to facilitate gains from trade (i.e., if property rights are not full or entirely secure, assets sometimes cannot be
transferred to those who can use them most productively). Finally, property serves as an important tool in supporting other trans-
actions such as obtaining financing via its role as collateral (Besley & Ghatak, 2009). 
Hernando de Soto’s pioneering work documenting the amount of “dead capital” – assets that cannot be represented in the formal economy
or used for collateral – in the developing world spurred an increasing interest in property rights. Governments around the developing
world are presented with a puzzle on how to convert dead capital into viable economic assets that can put their countries on a path
toward prosperity. One of the answers lies in ensuring that the poor can register their assets within a formal property rights system with
minimal transaction costs. As de Soto discovered, there is still ample work that needs to be done in eliminating these hurdles.
Finally, no property rights system can operate in a vacuum without full support of the legal and judicial system aimed at enforcing
property transactions. An institution with a strong rule of law and independent judiciary void of corruption and political instability
provide the environment for a formal property rights system to flourish. 
While property rights hold the key to economic prosperity and growth, it is important to keep in mind that many other social 
institutions play a significant role. In particular, a well developed banking system to provide the capital necessary to infuse the economy
is largely complementary in the development process. Recent microfinance efforts have been successful in bringing loans to the poorest
in developing countries. But a sophisticated financial system is needed to integrate these economies into the world market. 
Intellectual Property Rights
The modern economy relies not only on physical property rights but also intellectual property rights (IPRs). Intellectual property
rights are exclusive rights over creations of the mind. These include inventions, literary and artistic works, and symbols, names, im-
ages, and designs used in commerce. The world economy has come to depend on IP goods – from airplanes to business software,
and from pharmaceuticals to cell phones.
In many ways, intellectual property rights play a similar role to physical property rights. Secure intellectual property rights create
incentives for innovation just as secure property rights create incentives for production. Similarly to physical property rights, IPRs
can reduce transaction costs. For example, trademarks signal information about the quality of products, which reduce consumer
search costs (Baroncelli, Krivonos, & Olarreaga, 2004). 
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The challenge of protecting intellectual property rights, however, is even more daunting compared to physical property rights
because theft of IPRs is facilitated by their own intrinsic qualities. Therefore, countries with weak IPRs require substantial resources
to build an effective enforcement system of IPRs. While some countries may feel this investment is beyond their means, they need
to realize that an effective IPR system is an important ingredient for long-term economic success. In addition to spurring domestic
innovation, strong intellectual property rights can increase incentives for foreign direct investment (Branstetter & Saggi, 2009),
which in turn also leads to economic growth (Saggi, 2002).
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This chapter presents the concept behind the International Property Rights Index, the three core components, and the 10 variables
used to compile it. It also includes detailed explanatory notes on the methodology employed and the country set of the IPRI 2010.
Finally, it points out some of the limitations of this study and presents future considerations. 
The Concept
The goal of any index is to develop a gauge by which one can compare countries or other jurisdictions. The IPRI develops such a
measure for property rights. To conceptualize property rights for the purposes of this study, the authors reviewed a wide range of
literature on property rights. Additionally, the authors sought suggestions from experts and practitioners in the field of property
rights to finalize the set of core categories (hereto referred to as “components”) as well as variables (“sub-components”) that make
up those components. 
The following are the three core components of the IPRI: 
1. Legal and Political Environment (LP)
2. Physical Property Rights (PPR)
3. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
Harold Demsetz defined property rights in his seminal work on the theory of property rights in 1967 as follows: 
Property rights are an instrument of society and derive their significance from the fact that they help a man form
those expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others. These expectations find expression
in the laws, customs, and mores of a society. An owner of property rights possesses the consent of fellowmen to
allow him to act in particular ways. An owner expects the community to prevent others from interfering with his
actions, provided that these actions are not prohibited in the specifications of his rights. (Demsetz, 1967)
Demsetz is among the many scholars to point out the role of laws and mores of society as crucial to understanding property rights.
Therefore, the Legal and Political Environment (LP) was included as an essential part of any property rights system. The index 
includes several measures of the legal and political environment despite the fact that they measure much broader aspects than just
property rights. 
The other two components – physical and intellectual property rights – reflect the two forms of property rights, both of which are
crucial to economic development. The variables included in these two categories account for both de jure rights and de facto outcomes




The 2011 IPRI is comprised of a total of 10 variables, which are divided into the three main components: Legal and Political 
Environment (LP), Physical Property Rights (PPR), and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Despite a large number of property
rights related variables considered by the authors, the final IPRI study focuses only on core factors that directly relate to the strength
and protection of property rights. The final ranking is very similar to the alternative rankings calculated with other factors included.
Finally, preference was given to the variables that were available for a greater number of countries and were updated on a regular
basis to ensure that the resulting scores were comparable across countries and years.
Of the 10 variables incorporated into the index, the Registering Property variable is made up of two sub-variables. In sum, the IPRI
comprises 11 data points for each country.
Figure 1: Structure of  the IPRI
1.  Legal and Political Environment (LP)
• Judicial Independence
• Rule of Law
• Political Stability
• Control of Corruption
2.  Physical Property Rights (PPR)
• Protection of Physical Property Rights
• Registering Property
• Access to Loans
3.  Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
• Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
• Patent Protection
• Copyright Piracy
Legal and Political Environment (LP)
Even the most comprehensive de jure property rights cannot be enforced unless a strong rule of law and independent judiciary are
present to enforce them. Furthermore, political stability and lack of corruption allow for a property rights regime that does not dis-
courage economic transactions related to property. Therefore, these four sub-components constitute the 
Legal and Political Environment (LP) component.
Judicial Independence
This variable examines the judiciary’s freedom from influence by political and business groups. The independence of the judiciary
is a central underpinning for the sound protection and sovereign support of the court system with respect to private property.
Source: World Economic Forum’s 2010-2011 Global Competitiveness Index
   
  
Rule of Law
This variable measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. In particular, it measures the
quality of contract enforcement, police, and courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The variable combines several
indicators, including fairness, honesty, enforcement, speed, and affordability of the court system, protection of private property
rights, and judicial and executive accountability. This variable complements the judicial independence variable. 
Source: World Bank Institute’s 2010 Governance Matters
Political Stability
The degree of political stability crucially influences one’s incentive to obtain or to extend ownership and/or management of property.
The higher the likelihood of government instability, the less likely people will be to obtain property and to develop trust in the
validity of the rights attached.
Source: World Bank Institute’s 2010 Governance Matters
Corruption
This variable combines several indicators that measure the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. This includes
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. Similarly to the other variables
in the LP component, corruption influences people’s confidence in the existence of sound implementation and enforcement of
property rights. Corruption reflects the degree of informality in the economy, which is a distracting factor to the expansion of
respect for legal private property.
Source: World Bank Institute’s 2010 Governance Matters
Physical Property Rights (PPR)
A strong property rights regime commands the confidence of people in its effectiveness to protect private property rights. It also
provides for seamless transactions related to registering property. Finally, it allows access to credit necessary to convert property into
capital. For these reasons, the following variables are used to measure private physical property rights protection (PPR). 
Protection of Physical Property Rights
This variable directly relates to the strength of a country’s property rights system as it reflects experts’ views on the quality of judicial
protection of private property, including financial assets. Additionally, it encompasses professionals’ opinions on the clarity of the
legal definition of property rights.
Source: World Economic Forum’s 2010-2011 Global Competitiveness Index
Registering Property
This variable reflects businesses’ point of view on how difficult it is to register property in terms of the number of days and procedures
necessary. According to the source of this information, the variable records the full sequence of procedures necessary to transfer the
property title from seller to buyer when a business purchases land and a building. This information is critical because the more difficult
property registration is, the more likely it is that assets stay in the informal sector, thus restricting the development of the broader public’s
understanding and support for a strong legal and sound property rights system. Moreover, registration barriers discourage the movement
of assets from lower to higher valued uses. This variable reflects one of the main economic arguments set forth by Hernando de Soto.
Source: The World Bank Group’s 2010 Doing Business Report
Access to Loans
This variable is included in the IPRI because access to a bank loan without collateral serves as a proxy for the level of development
of financial institutions in a country. Financial institutions play a complementary role, along with a strong property rights system,
to bring economic assets into the formal economy.
Source: World Economic Forum’s 2010-2011 Global Competitiveness Index
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Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
The IPR component evaluates the protection of intellectual property. In addition to an opinion-based measure of the protection 
of IP, it assesses protection of two major forms of intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights) from de jure and de facto per-
spectives, respectively. 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
This variable contains opinion survey outcomes reflecting a nation’s protection of intellectual property; therefore, it is a crucial
aspect of the IPR component. Expert participants in each country were asked to rate their nation’s IP protection, scoring it from
“weak and not enforced” to “strong and enforced.”
Source: World Economic Forum’s 2010-2011 Global Competitiveness Index
Patent Protection
This variable reflects the strength of a country’s patent laws based on five extensive criteria: coverage, membership in international
treaties, restrictions on patent rights, enforcement, and duration of protection.
Source: Ginarte-Park Index of Patent Rights (2005)
Copyright Piracy
The level of piracy in the IP sector is an important indicator of the effectiveness of the intellectual property rights enforcement in
a country. Information for this variable was collected from the International Intellectual Property Alliance’s (IIPA) submission to the
Special 301 Report, prepared by the U.S. Trade Representative in the context of its annual review of countries’ intellectual property
practices. It contains information on the piracy level for copyright-protected industries, including Business Software and Records &
Music. Because this variable reflects de facto outcomes based on ‘hard data,’ it rates a country according to its effectiveness in protecting
IPR. Data from the IIPA was supplemented with the most updated available statistics from the Business Software Alliance. 
Source: International Intellectual Property Alliance’s 2010 Special 301 Report, Seventh Annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy
Study (2009)
Explanatory Notes on Methodology
The overall grading scale of the IPRI ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 representing the strongest level of property rights protection and
0 reflecting the non-existence of secure property rights in a country. Similarly, each component and variable is placed on the same
0 to 10 scale.
For the calculation of the final index score, the variables within each component are averaged to derive the score for each of the
three components. The final overall IPRI score is itself the average of the component scores. During construction of the index, a
number of weighting methods for the components were tried. These were based on the authors’ subjective views as well as to account
for the different variances within each variable. However, the choice of the weighting method had little impact on the final rating
and ranking of the countries. Thus, for reasons of simplicity and objectivity, the final numbers presented in this report are the result
of a simple average calculation. It combines available variables into the three component area ratings, which in turn are averaged
into the final IPRI score. However, the authors do not wish to imply that all components and areas in the index are of equal im-
portance. Thus, readers who prefer to weight the variables in a different manner are invited to do so.
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The 10 variables included in the IPRI stem from different sources. Most of them can be easily normalized to the IPRI’s 0-10 scale.
To combine variables that did not come in an indexed form, we applied the following standardization formula:
Xi rrepresents the individual country’s value (either number of steps or number of days to register property) from the raw data.
Xmax and Xmin are the highest and lowest values from the original sample of countries in 2007. This method was used to 
standardize the Registering Property variables in the PPR component.
This rescaling procedure, while similar, is slightly different than that which was employed in the previous years. Previously, the
maximum value for each of the factors was allowed to change with changes in the sample of countries. This year, it was anchored
to the benchmark value in the sample of countries in the 2007 IPRI report. This change allows for a more objective comparison of
countries from year to year. Previous years’ data were rescaled, and scores were recalculated to account for this change. It is important
to note that the recalculation of previous years’ scores for PPR as well as IPRI had a very minor effect on rankings for those years. 
The Countries
The 2011 International Property Rights Index ranks a total of 129 countries from around the world. Five new countries were ranked
while one country (The Kyrgyz Republic) dropped out due to a lack of data.  The selection of countries was determined by the
constraint of available data only. Covering 97 percent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product, these countries differ substantially in
economic performance and market structure. For means of comparison, the economies included in the IPRI were assigned to seven
geographic regions, which include the following: Latin America and Caribbean, Western Europe, Central/Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia, Middle East/North Africa, Africa, Asia and Oceania, and North America.
It is important to note that the number of countries covered by the IPRI’s different data sources varied significantly. Therefore, the
authors were provided with significant variation in the number of potential countries to be included in the IPRI. To be considered
for the final IPRI ranking, a country’s data needed to be represented in a minimum of one half of the included variables per category,
although in most cases countries exceeded this threshold. Consequently, there are some countries that do not enter any of the final
country sets of the index’s three components and some that met the threshold of only one or two of the components. The countries
that qualified for all three categories are the 129 included in this report. 
Limitations and Future Considerations
Several things must be kept in mind when understanding the conceptualization and outcomes of the IPRI. First, the IPRI ranking
covers a relatively large number of nations from greatly varying economic, political, and cultural backgrounds. Consequently, many
of the countries’ idiosyncratic characteristics with respect to property rights protection and strength cannot be considered here. 
None of the data used for the construction of the IPRI is generated by the authors themselves but was instead collected from third-
party sources such as the World Bank, World Economic Forum, and trade groups. While this allows the study to refrain from any
potential bias, it limits the ability of the authors to reconstruct any missing data. The problem of missing data becomes serious
when the variable that is missing is not highly correlated with the ones that are available. In those cases, a country’s score can be not
as representative as those countries with all data available. Moreover, changing data availability from year to year can result in changes
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in scores that are not related to the actual changes in the situation with property rights. The authors tried their best to point out
any such cases throughout the report and particularly in the country profiles (Appendix I). 
As in the past, this study remains constrained by the availability of intellectual property rights data, especially by the lack of data
on trademarks. In 2009, trademarks were dropped as one of the sub-components because of the lack of updated data, a situation
that persists.  However, the authors remain confident that in future years reliable data will be available because of development of
new databases by authoritative sources. Additionally, the IPR data can significantly benefit from better measures of enforcement ef-
forts in the area of intellectual property rights. Similarly, the PPR component could also be improved by including more ‘hard data’
on the security of property rights. These remain the areas with the most potential for further improvement of the data underlying
the IPRI. 
Finally, as the index enters its fifth year the authors were able to start using time-series aspects of the IPRI data. However, the nature
of institutions is such that effects of their changes might not be felt in the outcomes of interest for many years. Additionally, lack
of updated data on economic outcomes significantly interferes with this analysis. The authors hope that these constraints will be
overcome in the future and that the theoretical relationship between property rights institutions and economic well-being can be
tested empirically using more robust methods.
   
 

This chapter presents the results of the 2011 International Property Rights Index (IPRI). The complete scores and rankings, presented
according to various criteria, follow a brief overview of the data and outcomes. Notes on score adjustments can be found here. The
chapter concludes with a presentation on the relationship between IPRI scores and countries’ economic well-being.
Data and Outcome Characteristics
The IPRI’s 2011 rankings are based on data obtained from currently available authoritative sources. Most of these sources derive
their data from opinion surveys. Generally, experts in their respective fields participate in these surveys, and the resulting ratings in
the form of a numeric factor are based on their judgment. Based on these sources, a country that ranks the highest or lowest in the
IPRI does not necessarily have the strongest or weakest property rights, respectively. Instead, rankings are based on the perception
of the relative strength of a country’s property rights regime. Nevertheless, the authors view the expert surveys to be a good and
reliable source of judgment related to a country’s de facto characteristics instead of some measure of what laws and practices may
exist in statute only. 
Several variables in the IPRI are based on ‘hard data.’ For example, the numbers of procedures and days necessary to register property,
while also based on surveys, are not based entirely on perceptions but on estimates of actual procedures involved. Similarly, estimates
of the level of piracy are based on actual economic data from trade groups like the International Intellectual Property Alliance and
the Business Software Association. 
A plan for future indices is to use additional hard data. For example, it would be valuable to include measures of property rights en-
forcement or the extent of formalization of property rights based on actual data instead of expert opinions. Future Hernando de
Soto fellows will concentrate on seeking and including the most comprehensive and up-to-date sources for additional information
on property rights protections. 
In analyzing the final outcome of the scoring process, the reader is presented with two related but ultimately different measures of
property rights protections throughout the sample: ordinal and cardinal. The scores are presented in such a way that the reader can
easily compare countries according to how they rank relative to each other, as well as how they score on a scale of 0 to 10. The
authors hope that while the relative ranking proves useful, it is the score itself that provides the most useful measure of how well a
country protects and enforces property rights.
IPRI Ranking
The 2011 IPRI contains rankings on the relative strength of a property rights regime in 129 economies. This sample includes 
97 percent of the world’s GDP. Figure 2 and Table 1 present the rankings by highest to lowest scores and scores by country, 
respectively.
Because of the larger country coverage this year, the rankings in the 2011 report are not directly comparable to the rankings in the
2010 report. Therefore, the authors will primarily focus on discussing the score changes instead of the ranking changes from 2010.
A more detailed overview of the countries’ score changes for the IPRI and their components can also be found in Appendix I. 
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4.4   
4.3   
3.6   
 4.7   
4.2   
 8.0   
7.9   
4.4   
 6.7   
 3.6   
7.5   
5.3   
 3.9   
 4.1   
6.3   
 5.3   
 5.7   
5.3   
5.0   
 3.6   
4.2   
8.0   
 4.0   
  6.7   
 5.5   
5.1   
5.9   
 3.7   
5.3   
 6.9   
 6.5   
 8.1   
4.6   
 4.4   
 5.2   
 4.9   
 6.7   
 4.5   
8.5   
 7.3   
4.1   
7.8   
  5.6   
 5.8   
 4.5   
 4.6   
  4.7   
 7.8   
  6.4   
 7.2   
 5.6   
 5.0   
 4.2   
7.6   
 6.3   
6.0   
 5.4   
 7.6   
 6.1   
  4.4   
 4.4   
 5.9   
 5.5   
4.4   
3.7   
    
  6.0   
8.2   
 4.7   
4.3   
5.2   
 6.1   
 4.8   
 6.8   
 4.6   
 6.3   
5.0   
 3.9   
 5.2   
5.3   
 4.7   
 4.4   
 8.0   
 8.2   
4.1   
 3.9   
 8.2   
6.7   
4.1   
5.6   
4.0   
 4.9   
  4.7   
 6.2   
 6.9   
6.5   
 7.1   
 5.5   
4.6   
 5.6   
 6.5   
 4.7   
 4.2   
 8.3                
6.3   
 5.8   
 6.6   
  6.3   
 6.5   
 5.0   
 5.2   
 8.5   
8.2   
 4.8   
7.1   
5.1   
  5.3   
5.6   
6.0   
5.3   
4.6   
 4.0   
7.2   
7.7   
 7.5   
 6.1   
 3.4   
 4.9   
 4.8   
3.5   
Table 1: Scores by Country
  
  
Table 2: Top 10 by Component (Number Indicates Rank)
Table 3: Bottom 10 by Component (Number Indicates Rank)
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   




   
 

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  
  










   
 
Finland and Sweden tie for the top spot in this year’s index with a score of 8.5 out of a possible 10. This is the fifth year in a row
that Finland earned the highest ranking despite a decrease from last year’s score of 8.6. Other Scandinavian countries that also
perform well are Norway (8.2), tying for fourth place, and Denmark (8.1), tying for eighth place. Singapore (8.3) is the top-scoring
country in the combined Asia and Oceana region followed closely by New Zealand (8.2) and Australia (8.0). Western Europe is
well represented in the top 10 (see Table 2) with Luxembourg (8.2), Switzerland (8.2), and The Netherlands (8.0). Canada rounds
out the top-scoring group with a score of 8.0.
At the bottom of the rankings are Bolivia (3.9), Moldova (3.9), Nigeria (3.9), Cote D’Ivoire (3.7), Libya (3.7), Angola (3.6), Burundi
(3.6), and Bangladesh (3.6). Bangladesh shows solid improvement over last year’s score of 2.9, allowing it to pass Zimbabwe (3.5)
and Venezuela (3.4) – the two countries at the bottom of the rankings this year.
Figure 3 presents the IPRI rankings by quintile. The color prism relates the quintiles to a specified color: purple for the top quintile,
blue for the second quintile, green for the third, yellow for the fourth, and red for the bottom quintile. In this year’s index, each
quintile has 26 countries except for the bottom, which has only 25. Additionally, the map on the IPRI’s distribution, displayed in
the inside cover of this report, indicates which country belongs to which quintile.
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   
  
      
 
   
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Figure 3: IPRI Ranking by Quintile
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  
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the 2011 IPRI and its component scores. This year’s index finds a one point increase in both
the mean and median scores. While these are largely the result of improvement by low scoring countries (the lowest country score
jumped from 2.9 to 3.4) the effect is somewhat offset by slightly deteriorating scores at the top. This converging of scores across the
data set can be seen in the deviation, which shows a slight decrease from 1.5 to 1.4.
This year’s highest score in any one of the core components is 8.8 in Legal and Political Environment (LP) achieved by Finland, New
Zealand, and Sweden. The lowest score in any of the core components is Zimbabwe’s LP score of 2.1, which is still a notable improvement
over last year’s lowest component score, a 1.6 LP for Chad. Physical Property Rights (PPR) again has the highest component mean at 6.2.
Ranking by Index Core Components
This index is comprised of three core components that can be used independently to assess a country’s performance. This section
presents and discusses countries’ performance in each core component of the index.  
Table 2 and Table 3 show the top 10 and bottom 10 countries for each of the IPRI’s components. The top 10 lists, generally, are
more homogenous than the bottom 10 with Finland ranking first in all three components. Luxembourg, Sweden, and Switzerland
also place in the top 10 in all three components. Interestingly, two countries (the United States in Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
and Bahrain in PPR) make the top five list for a component score but do not make the top 10 IPRI.
The bottom 10 lists are much more heterogeneous with no country making it on all three. Zimbabwe ranks the lowest in the LP
component, Libya in the PPR component, and Moldova in the IPR component.
Figures 4–6 provide a complete rank ordering of the entire 125 country set, according to the three core components of the IPRI. 
Changes in Scores (2010–2011)
A direct comparison of the ordinal rankings between 2010 and 2011 is hindered by the fact that five additional countries (Angola,
Iran, Lebanon, Rwanda, and Swaziland) are included in this year’s rankings, while the Kyrgyz Republic is not included because of
a lack of data. As a result, some changes in the rankings could reflect changes in the composition of countries indexed instead of
the countries’ performance compared with last year. A comparison of results between 2009 and 2010 is found in Tables 5–8, which
present the changes in scores for the IPRI as well as their components.
The countries that demonstrate the most improvement in their IPRI score over the last year are a diverse group. These include Brunei,
Benin, Indonesia, Uganda, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Senegal, Mauritius, and Ecuador. Unfortunately, the following countries show
a decrease in their property rights performance: Iceland, Ireland, South Korea, Denmark, The Netherlands, United States, Lithuania,
Latvia, United Kingdom, and New Zealand. Those countries that are experiencing the largest setbacks in property rights tend to be among
the wealthiest.
Table 4: Summary Statistics
    Indicator                       Mean                            Median                  Deviation                  Minimum                   Maximum
     IPRI                                     5.6                                    5.3                              1.4                               3.4                                 8.5
  
   
   
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Table 5: Changes in the IPRI score (2010–2011)
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Table 6: Changes in the LP score (2010–2011)





































































































































Table 7: Changes in the PPR score (2010-2011)
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Table 8: Changes in the IPR score (2010–2011)
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Regional Distribution of IPRI
Figure 7 presents the average scores by region and component in the 2011 IPRI. Keeping with last year’s report, Mexico and Malta
are assigned to the combined Latin America and Caribbean region and Western Europe, respectively. Angola, Rwanda, and Swazi-
land, newly added countries to the IPRI, are assigned to Africa. Iran and Lebanon are grouped into the combined Middle East and
North Africa region. Appendix III presents the complete regional assignments. 
Figure 7: Average Scores by Region and Component






North Africa North America Western Europe
IPRI 5.6 4.8 6.0 5.1 5.0 5.7 7.8 7.5
LP
5.3 4.1 5.6 5.0 4.4 5.3 7.8 7.7
PPR
6.2 5.6 6.6 5.8 5.7 6.7 7.3 7.2IPR
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 
IPRI and Economic Outcomes 
The underlying assumption of this study is the strong correlation between an effective property rights regime and its significant 
impact on the economic performance of a country. According to the distribution of average income among countries in the IPRI
quintiles, countries with high property rights scores tend to be the nations with higher per capita incomes. Countries with low
property rights scores tend to have lower per capita incomes. Additionally, countries with strong property rights regimes attract
more foreign direct investment (FDI). Finally, developing countries with strong property rights show stronger per capita GDP
growth than those that fail to respect property rights. This observation is especially important considering the role that property
rights can play to alleviate poverty. 
Figure 8 illustrates that, on average, countries in the top quintile of IPRI scores enjoy a per capita income eight times that of their
counterparts in the bottom quintile. Calculations for Figure 8 are based on the averages of the IPRI scores for years 2007–2011
and corresponding data on average GDP per capita in PPP terms for years 2005–2009. Use of averages allows us to establish a
more robust relationship between property rights and income, which may fluctuate because of economic cycles and other exogenous
impacts. The same pattern is observed when using only the last year of the IPRI scores and GDP per capita data. 
































































Figure 9 presents the relationship between the IPRI scores and GDP per capita. The IPRI score is overwhelmingly positively related
to GDP per capita. We find that countries with strong property rights protections have higher GDP per capita income compared
to countries at the bottom of the IPRI ranking. A similar relationship is observed for the IPRI’s core components (Figures 10–12).
Figure 9: Relationship between IPRI and GDP Per Capita
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Figure 11: Relationship between PPR and GDP Per Capita

































































































































































































Figure 13: Relationship between IPRI and FDI Inflows as a Percentage of GDP



















      









      









      









      









      


















      









      









      

















































To further investigate the role that protection of property rights plays in economic development, we consider the relationship
between the IPRI and its components and FDI. Figure 13 demonstrates that there is a positive relationship between the average
IPRI score and average FDI inflows measured as a percentage of GDP. Similarly, Figures 14–16 demonstrate that countries with
a well-established legal system, a stable political environment and strong protection of physical property rights attract more FDI.
This relationship appears to be weaker for the IPR component, but data on IPR is less complete than for other components.
Therefore, our results may be prone to inconsistencies in certain cases because of the lack of comprehensive data. 
Average IPRI, 2007-2011
Average LP, 2007-2011


















































Figure 15:  Relationship between PPR and FDI Inflows as a Percentage of GDP









      









      



















      









      









      









      









      



















      
     
The amount of economic activity that involves IPR is smaller than that which involves physical property rights. This means that
changes in IPR would have less effect on total economic output than a similar change in PPR. Additionally, the relationship appears
to be somewhat hindered by the presence of outliers, such as Ireland, which ranks in the top quintile of the IPRI but has attracted





Countries in the top quintile of the IPRI rankings tend to be developed nations with mature markets that generally expand at a
slower rate than those in many developing economies. We compare countries with high GDP growth to those with low GDP
growth and test whether a strong property rights regime is associated with high economic growth.
Figure 17: Relationship between IPRI and GDP Growth














      





      
    
  
      





      





      














      
    
  
      





      



































   
 
Figures 17–20 demonstrate that those developing countries that respect property rights grow on average faster than those that fail
to provide sound legal and political environments and protection for physical property rights. As with FDI inflows, the relationship

















Figure 19: Relationship between PPR and GDP Growth
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Because GDP per capita is one of the primary measures used to assess economic well-being, we additionally look at how it relates
to IPRI via a regression analysis. We find that a high IPRI score is strongly correlated to economic development, which we measure
in GDP per capita. A one point increase in the IPRI score predicts a $8,960 increase in GDP per capita (R-squared=0.63). Similarly,
the results show that the IPRI components – LP, PPR, and IPR – are highly correlated with GDP per capita.” 
The regression analysis shows a correlation and does not necessarily prove causality. One way to address the problem of simultaneity
to some extent is to lag a property rights measure when estimating its impact on the economic outcome variable. However, with
only five years of data available at the moment, this strategy is not as effective. This is especially true considering that changes in
institutions usually do not produce large changes in outcomes in such a short term. 
Additionally, the nature of the data collected allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant country characteristics (i.e., systematic
differences that do not change or change very slowly). The positive relationship between IPRI scores and GDP per capita holds,
controlling for such country-specific differences. 
Conclusion
The 2011 International Property Rights Index (IPRI) provides important insight as the global economy attempts to climb out of a
serious economic downturn. Clearly delineated property rights are a sine qua non for a flourishing economy. They can also encourage
a quicker recovery by providing a sense of security to entrepreneurs and investors. At a time when economies are struggling to
recover, the world economy could use an infusion of economically viable assets that currently lack legal representation or are poorly
enforced. 
The 2011 IPRI finds that among the 129 countries included in the index those countries at the top of the IPRI ranking continue
to enjoy an overwhelmingly higher GDP per capita than those at the bottom. This relationship holds for components of the IPRI
as well, reaffirming that countries with robust legal and political systems are better positioned to reap the benefits of both physical
and intellectual property rights. 
The 2011 IPRI demonstrates that despite challenging economic times, most countries continue to improve their property rights
regimes, setting themselves on a path to economic development. However, prospects for recovery will most likely be slower and
weaker than need be among the few countries that did not improve property rights. 
While the evidence presented here is quite compelling, the authors invite readers to study further the relationship between property
rights and economic outcomes using the IPRI data. Hopefully, further study will more fully unravel the link between secure property
rights and economic well-being. 
   
  

The 2011 IPRI presents five case studies exploring various aspects of property rights. The case studies also highlight the efforts by
IPRI’s partner organizations to improve the situation with property rights in their respective countries. We thank the contributors
for their invaluable insights that have greatly enhanced the IPRI report.
   
By Marius Doksheim, Civita (Norway)
mmigrants to Norway, who now make up about 10 percent of the population, are quite successful. Even though they were, until
recently, almost exclusively asylum seekers and refugees and tended to come from less developed countries, the immigrant population
in Norway has a rate of labor-market participation almost as high as that of natives. Their youth also have higher rates of participation
in higher education than among native Norwegian youth. Immigrant pupils and students achieve good results and a very high
social mobility. Norwegians are generally more welcoming to immigrants than most others. Why is this?
One reason could be the Norwegian policies for property rights and ownership. As immigrants adapt and begin to own their
dwellings, these policies help them take on homes that are more dispersed and diverse compared to other European countries. Just
looking at neighbouring Sweden and Denmark, the differences are significant. We know that private ownership and diversified
housing have beneficial effects. Moreover, we believe these traits have an impact on the integration of immigrants.
Obviously, there is much standing in the way of home ownership for immigrants. One out of every three immigrants has lived in
Norway for less than five years. With a shorter resident history, immigrants often have less education, capital, or security. They also
have poorer language skills and smaller social networks. These difficulties do not make it easy to compete in a high-priced housing
market like in Norway. In addition, immigrants could face plain discrimination in this market.
It is, however, evident that a growing number of immigrants is becoming homeowners. The tendency is for immigrants to engage
in the housing market just like any other Norwegian citizen. They increasingly avoid bad flats in impersonal and rundown apartment
blocks and move on to freestanding houses with gardens and verandas.
Norway has very strong property rights, and a large proportion of Norwegians own their own home. Even in the cities, a large 
percentage lives in one-family homes or other small buildings. This has had positive effects for Norway and Norwegians. In the
same way, the structure and ownership of immigrant homes can have beneficial effects for immigrants and their integration into
Norwegian society.
If one compares neighbourhoods in Oslo with other cities in Europe, one can see several important differences. In Oslo (and other
cities in Norway), immigrants are more evenly spread. While in Stockholm (Sweden) we find that residents from minority groups
make up more than 90 percent of the local population in certain boroughs, no part of Oslo is made up of more than 50 percent
first- and second-generation immigrants. 
Additionally, one can see that most countries have focused their housing policies on municipal housing in large apartment com-
pounds. In Norway, the emphasis has been on private ownership. This is seen in a variety of forms, from regular freeholders to joint
ownership in private housing associations. Oslo certainly does have its share of rental-based housing complexes, but these large
compounds still remain within much more diverse residential areas compared to other Scandinavian and European cities. 
  
  
When low- and high-priced homes share neighborhoods, and newly arrived immigrants are domiciled within these diverse envi-
ronments, the odds of successful integration are much more favorable. If this is coupled with strong incentives to become home-
owners, immigrants will also tend to copy the housing trends of the majority of Norwegians. The places where immigrants most
often live become special in their “extreme diversity, not only in religion and ethnicity, but also by class, living conditions, education.”
This diversity makes Oslo rather unique.
In Norway as a whole, 45 percent of the immigrant population live in apartment buildings. While this is higher in comparison
with native Norwegians, it is low considering that immigrants more often live in larger cities and have lower incomes. More impor-
tantly, this trend is quickly changing. Ten years ago 60 percent lived in rentals. The number of people living in freestanding privately
owned estates has doubled from 13 percent in 1996 to more than 25 percent today. 
Areas with big apartment blocks and impersonal surroundings can lead to social problems. These areas lack employment opportu-
nities and separate those living there from the rest of society. Those immigrants who succeed move away. 
The Norwegian pattern makes people with higher and lower incomes, at a higher degree than in most other countries, live side by
side. Living side by side, a stronger sense of a diverse but well-integrated community is stimulated. A setting of natives living
alongside immigrants allows for children to attend the same school. Just as important, it encourages successful immigrants to remain
in the area longer, moving only from smaller to larger apartments or on to a villa. This again serves as a strong example for newly
arrived immigrants and their children. 
Together with other Nordic countries, Norway consistently performs among the top countries in the International Property Rights
Index. Ownership is upheld and enforced by an efficient and trustworthy judicial system. Property can safely be used as investment
objects, as collateral for other investments, or most commonly as a safe and lasting home for families. This, along with other policies
supportive of private ownership, can explain why such a high percentage – 80 percent – of Norwegians owns their dwelling.
The immigrant population of Norway has higher ownership rates than immigrants in most other countries. Private ownership is
increasing among immigrants as they receive higher income and better education. Today immigrants in Norway own their homes
to the same degree as all of the population in the United Kingdom and Italy, as well as much more often than the populations of
Sweden, France, and Germany. 
In 2005/2006, 63 percent of immigrants owned their own homes. That is an increase of nine percentage points in only 10 years.
This is beneficial for their integration. Private home ownership is beneficial for a plethora of reasons. Being private owners allows
immigrants, like all other property owners, to get both the reward of increasing value and the penalty of decreasing worth. Ownership
increases savings and financial security.
There are also wider effects to private possession of property. Home ownership has extended benefits. The reason is simple, really:
the purchase of a home is the most important and most costly investment a family makes. Ownership gives increased stability and
security in so many ways; it is a strong sign that you are staying. If the bank agrees to finance, it sure tells someone else they believe
you will succeed as well. Greater stability and stronger ties to the surroundings will lead to a different attachment to the society in
which one owns property. The success of that society becomes much more relevant to your own future.
Many social scientists and economists have shown the beneficial effects of ownership. Coulson (2002) argues that ownership works
through three channels: owners are taking better care of their property, better care of their children, and become better citizens than
renters. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) finds that ownership leads to increased investment in local well-being and increased social
capital because ownership attaches the owner to the local area. Haurin, Parcel, and Haurin (2002) shows how owners give their
   
  
children a better environment for development, better results in schools, and fewer behavioral problems. Boehm and Schlottmann
(1999) argues that children of people owning their home more often take higher education and earn more than the children of
renters. Rossi and Weber (1996) maintains that owners participate more in their local society and politics. It also looks like high
ownership rates makes for high social mobility, according to Rohe, Van Zandt, and McCarthy (2002). 
Of course, it is not just that high ownership rates and strong property rights secure the successful integration of immigrants. Several
other factors play in. But the ownership structure could perhaps explain some aspects of why integration into Norwegian society
has been quite successful. Immigrants, and especially their children, are quickly adapting into the middle class.
Author’s Note: This essay is strongly based on Civitanotat 5/2010: Innvandring og eiendom by Marius Doksheim, Civita.
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      
By Joseph Quensel, Frontier Centre for Public Policy (Canada)
Introduction 
A significant factor that explains indigenous poverty is the lack of enforceable property rights on Indian reserves.
Canada’s Indian Act of 1876 recognizes the unique land ownership systems of its indigenous peoples. While the act preserved a
scarce land base for native inhabitants, it locked these communities out of the modern economy by denying them access to com-
mercial credit. The Indian Act states that the Crown (federal and provincial governments) holds title in trust and benefit to reserve
lands, which are under federal jurisdiction under Canada’s Constitution for Indians. Reserve lands could only be alienated to the
federal government and are not subject to seizure, attachment, lien, or collateralization.
Leasing arrangements on reserve lands exist, but these do not generate as much value as fully transferable property rights. Observers
long recognized that the Indian Act land system reduced land values and promoted low value land use. Peruvian economist Hernando
de Soto said Canada’s indigenous people face a problem common to many developing countries: the indigenous people possess
land, but it is dead capital, meaning it cannot be leveraged in the wider economy.
Who are the Nisga’a? 
The Nisga’a Nation is an indigenous community in rural northwest British Columbia (BC), Canada’s westernmost province. There
are reportedly 6,400 Nisga’a citizens, although a small proportion of that number lives on Nisga’a territory. Sources say the word
Nisga’a comes from a combination of two Nisga’a words: Nisk’ meaning “top lip” and Tl’ak’ meaning “bottom lip.” The term derives
from the Nass River Valley, where the Nisga’a live. Nisga’a Nation consists of four villages, which are regional governments, and a
central government named Nisga’a Lisims Government (NLG) that is based in the community of New Aiyansh. 
Unlike much of Canada, most of British Columbia did not sign historic treaties. As a result, the Nisga’a sought a negotiated settle-
ment over land and governance for over 100 years. The Nisga’a, the federal government, and British Columbia signed the Nisga’a
Final Agreement in 1999. The Nisga’a are signatories to a modern treaty, Nisga’a Treaty, that came into effect in 2000.
The Nisga’a Treaty grants limited self-government in enumerated areas to the Nisga’a government, although many governmental
powers and responsibilities are concurrently held with the federal and BC provincial governments. The treaty was controversial
during its negotiation and adoption because Nisga’a law had supremacy in several legislative areas.
What’s Happening?
Nisga’a Nation made history when, in a voluntary move, it passed a law granting fee simple property rights to its members. Nisga’a citizens
who obtain fee simple title to their residential property under the law will be able to mortgage their property as security for a loan. They
also may transfer, bequeath, lease, or sell their property to any person, whether they be Nisga’a or not, or even indigenous or not.
In October 2009, the Wilp Si’ayuukhl Nisga’a (WSN), the legislative body of NLG, passed the Nisga’a Landholding Transition
Act. The Nisga’a Nation is developing a Torrens-style land title system to register fee simple interests. At present, registration will
occur in a Nisga’a land title office. 
Nisga’a sources claim, “It is believed to be the first Torrens-type, fee simple land title system established by an indigenous government
anywhere in the world.” It is uncertain if this claim is true, but it is true for Canada. 
   
  
The NLG dealt with concerns about the potential erosion of the Nisga’a land base by including an important caveat. Although
Nisga’a citizens who obtain fee simple title to their property under the act will be able to transfer their property to any person, the
property will always remain part of the Nisga’a Lands and be subject to Nisga’a laws under the Nisga’a Final Agreement. This means fee
simple holders will be subject to zoning and land-use regulations adopted by Nisga’a governments. Although the Nisga’a government
shows interest in future expansion into commercial property, at the moment the legislation only applies to residential properties.
The move is not as radical as some claim and is in fact quite limited. Fee simple ownership only applies to residential properties.
The lands affected are lots within Nisga’a villages zoned for residential use and are less than 0.2 hectare (approximately half an acre)
in size. The total amount of land affected is approximately 100 hectares, or .05 percent of Nisga’a Lands. 
The legislation recognizes two means of obtaining fee simple. The first is a Nisga’a village entitlement to a lot for a citizen at no
charge. This meant if the lot qualified – did not have a mortgage, met size requirements, and was residential – the entitlement
holder could accept or decline the offer. The second method is for an entitlement holder to request a lot. The village is required 
reasonably to consider the request, and appeals are available if the request is denied. 
History of the Legislation 
The decision to move toward individual fee simple rights was not one the Nisga’a government entered lightly or without deliberation,
although the issue remains controversial today.
At a roundtable discussion in 2006, the WSN considered ways Nisga’a citizens could hold their residential properties. Nisga’a
sources say the meetings identified the current restrictive system of Nisga’a Village Entitlements and Nisga’a Nation Entitlements
as barriers to economic development. Over the next three years, Nisga’a living in the four Nisga’a villages and in Vancouver, Prince
Rupert, and Terrace were consulted. The Nisga’a have what they call urban locals in these three communities, which provide rep-
resentation for urban-based Nisga’a citizens. Numerous legislative options were considered by the Nisga’a Lisims Government, cul-
minating in the introduction of the Landholding Transition Act.
In 2007, a report was prepared by the Nisga’a government for the executive regarding these community discussions. While there
was support for unrestricted ownership of land, concerns were raised by community members over the potential loss of the land
base. After community discussions, the executive brought forward legislation to create the possibility of unrestricted fee simple on
residential lots in Nisga’a villages, which led to the passage of the aforementioned law in 2009. 
At present, the Nisga’a government is developing and passing consequential amendments associated with the move, including ap-
propriate zoning laws and revisions of land title systems. 
Undemocratic Change?
Some Nisga’a opponents of the move criticized the democratic nature of the change. Nisga’a officials, however, point out that the
Nisga’a Constitution requires a referendum be held if a disposition of more than 40 square kilometers is made by the Nisga’a Nation
or a disposition of more than 10 square kilometers is made by a Nisga’a Village. Officials argue the Constitution does not require
a referendum because the total amount of land that the proposed legislation affects is approximately one square kilometer.
Implications
As a result of the Nisga’a move, other Canadian First Nation communities are engaging in a substantive discussion about property
rights for their own reserves. Manny Jules, an indigenous leader from British Columbia, has engaged other native communities in
a discussion about a First Nations Property Ownership Act, which the Nisga’a move inspired. This proposed voluntary legislation
  
  
would allow participating Indian bands to opt-into a legislative regime in which land title could be transferred from the Crown to
a willing First Nation government, which could then choose to transfer that land to individuals.
While some indigenous scholars and activists have directed intense criticism toward the Nisga’a move, other Indian bands are mon-
itoring the change. The Assembly of First Nations (AFN), the body purporting to represent on-reserve Indians, has been cool
towards the idea, not expressing a clear opinion on the matter. At a conference on the topic of Aboriginal property rights held in
Vancouver, British Columbia in October 2010, several Indian bands expressed an interest in opting into the First Nations Property
Ownership Act.
The eyes of the indigenous community and many other interested observers are fixed on the Nisga’a Nation as it embarks on this
historic experiment. If the Nisga’a are successful in leveraging fee simple to improve their business climate and standard of living,
the case for indigenous property rights in Canada may be bolstered and alleviate some of the apprehensions some communities
have over such a system.
Recommendations
Observers should adopt a ‘wait-and-see’ approach to the Nisga’a fee simple plan. The limited and voluntary nature of the plan
suggests Nisga’a governments are adopting a conservative and incremental approach. The Nisga’a are wise to include education and
support for Nisga’a citizens who wish to assume fee simple ownership. An understanding on the risks of ownership and foreclosure
would be crucial. Native communities would benefit by seeing the advantages, challenges, and potential pitfalls of full property
ownership before embracing it. 
Native communities under the Indian Act should consider the benefits of adopting the First Nation Property Ownership if (or
when) it becomes a legislative option. The First Nations Tax Commission, which is spearheading the initiative, should proceed in
galvanizing support for the bill and helping to make it a reality. 
As currently conceived, the legislation is flexible and can be tailored to specific native realities. Some communities may not be ready
for full property rights or may deem certain parts of the reserve inalienable or only available for sale to First Nation members. Lessons
from the Nisga’a case study may help these communities in developing their own property regimes. 
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By Krishna Neupane, Limited Government (Nepal)
Introduction
Nepal still has a primarily subsistence-based agrarian economy. Agriculture contributes to 40 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP). In the 1960s, with the vast majority (over 90 percent) of Nepal’s population dependent on agriculture for their livelihood,
land reforms were heralded for being a top priority under the system of planned development borrowed largely from then-socialist
India. It was natural for Nepal to replicate policies after its century of isolation from the external world under a family rule. 
Nepal pursued one of the largest programs of land reforms on record since the 1960s. The reforms were planned with an objective
of redistributing land to rural peasants. The strategy behind this plan was to slowly acquire land through strict enforcement of a
‘land ceiling’ over so-called aristocratic families that possessed larger estates. The evidence on these reforms’ outcomes on poverty
is mixed. In contrast to its stated goals, land reforms led to a significant rise in poverty and food insecurity because of fragmentation.
However, one achievement was its ability to properly title the available land to almost 99 percent of households. 
History of Land Reforms
Ownership of land in Nepal is traditionally vested in the state. The most prominent forms of tenure were state-owned land rented
to tenant (raikar), state-offered lands to private individuals (birta), current government employees (jagir), royal vassals and former
rulers (rajya), religious and charitable institutions (guthi), and communal land ownership (kipat). A series of Land Acts were
subsequently enacted in the 1950s retaining only the raikar and birta as the main forms of tenure. Table 1 demonstrates that the
majority of the pre-1950s land in Nepal was possessed by the state.
Table 1: Land Tenure Before 1950





Rajya, Jagir, Rakam, etc. 146, 330 7.7
Total 1,927,000 100





Features and Outcomes of Land Reform in Nepal
The Land Reform Act of 1964 (LRA) fixes ceilings on the land an individual can own, protects the right of tenants by registering his or her
name in the owner’s deed itself, fixes rent on agricultural land, and does away with the traditionally very high interest rates for rural loans.
Population: Total and Farm Size 
Nepal’s population in the past half-century has increased by 2.5 times, while the farm population grew by 2.3 times from its 1961/62
level (Table 2). The proportion of people engaged in agriculture has declined by seven percentage points between 1961/62 and 2001/02.
This does not indicate that the population involved in agriculture has declined significantly, which was a major aim of the LRA.
Redistribution of Land
Another primary objective of the LRA was to redistribute land to the landless and small holders to create an agrarian egalitarian 
society. The government, however, distributed only 1.5 percent of the total agriculture land among the landless. This raises a question:
was the land reform truly necessary? The size of land holdings had already been small. The imposition of land ceilings has been one of
the primary features of the reform for the government since 1964 and, in turn, has directly affected productivity on the land.
Land Holdings
There are two types of holdings: agricultural holdings that use land in farming operations and agricultural holdings that do not re-
quire land. Most holdings that do not require land are used for raising livestock and poultry. The number of agricultural holdings
that use land has been proportionally increasing since 1961/62 but decreased slightly in 1981/82 and 1991/92. However, there was
a slight increase in the proportion of holdings using land in 2001/02. The slight increase in the proportion of holdings using land
resulted in a decrease in the actual number of holdings without land between 1991/92 and 2001/02 from 32,100 to 26,700. This
drop indicates that fragmentation of land has significantly promulgated poverty.
Further Issues
Since the adoption of the Land Reform Act of 1964, the government has achieved land egalitarianism. On the other hand, a half-century
with such reforms has led to land fragmentation and vulnerable property rights security, among other drawbacks highlighted below.
Disguised Unemployment
Land fragmentation has helped to keep people employed in the agrarian sector rather than seeking employment elsewhere. 
Classification 1961/62 1971/72 1981/82 1991/92 2001/02
Total Population (thousands) 9,413 11,556 15,022 18,491 3,151
Farm Population (thousands) 8,410 NA 12,877 16,258 19,032
Proportion of Farm Population 89.34 NA 85.72 87.92 82.21
Source: CBS (2001)
Table 2: Characteristics of Population in Nepal (1961/62-2001/02)
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Increased Land Fragmentation 
At the national level, the average number of parcels per household has been steadily declining. Since 1961/62, the average number
has decreased from 6.8 in 1961/62 to 4.4 in 1981/82, 4.0 in 1991/92, and 3.3 in 2001/02. The main reason for the decline is the
decreasing size of an agricultural holding from 1.11 hectares in 1961/62 to 0.80 hectare in 2001/02. 
Incomplete Registration
It is doubtful that government data over five decades old are accurate. The Badal High Commission for Land Reform stated in
1995 that even after four decades of promulgation of the LRA, more than 450,000 tenant households were not registered (HLRC,
1995). Even the registered households have not been able to avail themselves of their rights as tenants. It is estimated that around
one million poor households have been deprived of their legitimate rights over land resources. Tenants have been cultivating land
for generations but never had any evidence to support their claim. Hard-working tenants had no information about land registration
and could not register within the stipulated time.
Conflict between Owners and Tillers 
One of the main sources of conflict in the country is related to land with a great number of land cases flooding the Supreme Court.
The majority of these cases involve proof of documents or tiller eviction. This gives an indication of the deep-sown seeds of strife
between landowners and tillers. 
Food Insecurity 
By the end of the 1970s, Nepal’s strong ability to export agricultural products was weakening as it turned itself into a net importer. As time
passed after the land reforms, the food deficit became more prominent in some parts of the country. Officially, over 45 of 75 districts in
Nepal today import food except for those in districts that share a border with India. The primary source of imported food is India.
Land Fragmentation and Productivity
According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, land productivity claims by reformers and subsequent implementers have been cast
into serious doubt. Though measurable statistics are not yet available, there is widespread belief that the LRA has not brought the
desired productivity goals. 
Conclusion
A structured, secure, and properly defined private property rights system lubricates a modern economy. Tiny land-locked Nepal’s
political elites have succeeded in portraying land reforms with ultimately undesirable consequences as desirable. The presence of
awkward limitations of property rights have regretfully insulated Nepal from the north-south economic warmth that we see in
much of the rest of Asia. Even citizens whose livelihoods are thoroughly agrarian based are baffled by a situation marked by legal
plunder. Mere access to land would not, of course, ensure that land productivity would increase and poverty would be reduced. 
Instead, a dynamic, commercially-oriented agriculture sector is the best hope to significantly increase farm incomes and 
reduce poverty.
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By Marcos Hidding Ohlson & Martín Krause, CIIMA/ESEADE (Argentina)
In his seminal paper, Ronald Coase (1960) presented what was later called a “theorem” bearing his name: 
“It is always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights. And, of course,
if such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to an
increase in the value of production.” 
One of the most quoted papers in economic history, it opened a flood of research and discussion. Some of it centered on transaction
costs and whether these would be sufficiently high or low to inhibit or to allow such market transactions. Among these costs, the
very definition of property rights takes an important role. If it is not clear to whom they belong or what use can be made of an
asset, a good deal of effort may be needed first to clarify the issue and then to proceed with the transaction. 
Nevertheless, if we stick to the subjective nature of value, costs are subjective as well and inimical to the acting individual. Valuation
becomes evident only as “revealed preference” in action. Therefore, there is not much that an independent observer can say except
that if the transaction was made it must be assumed that the involved parties thought “it would lead to an increase in the value of
production” and if not, that the subjective costs were higher than the subjective benefits. 
To test this proposition, we conducted a field research experiment in a shanty town in the suburbs of Buenos Aires where there
is no formal definition of property rights in housing. Would there be transactions in this case? (Hidding Ohlson & Krause, 2010). 
The Neighborhoods of San Isidro
San Isidro is located some 20 miles north of the place where Buenos Aires was founded in 1580, in a border zone between the areas
occupied, or rather transited, by the Guaraní and Querandí tribes. Juan de Garay, the founder, distributed parcels on the northern
coast of the River Plate among his men somewhere beyond San Isidro. Only two centuries later, a small town to be named San
Isidro, Madrid’s patron saint, started to grow. It completed its development thanks to the migration of people resulting from the
economic boom of Argentina in the second half of the 20th century. 
Large estates were parceled and created the urban downtown with a residential neighborhood of large parcels and houses named
Lomas de San Isidro. La Cava is an informal settlement created mainly on government land. In 1946, the state water company,
Obras Sanitarias, asked the federal government for this plot of land to use the red soil to filter water and to manufacture bricks,
generating a sink or “cava” – from the Spanish word to dig or to excavate – and giving its name to the estate. The digging soon
reached groundwater and the project was set aside. The sink was partially refilled and started to be settled by squatters on the 50
acres of its present area. According to different census estimates, there were between 1,700 to 2,100 houses and between 8,000
to 11,000 people, though the area housed a larger population in the past. 
In San Isidro, as in most of the other city neighborhoods, the right to property is guaranteed by a title recognized by law, granting
its validity to any legal claim, allowing sale and purchase, mortgaging it, and protecting possession against usurpation. Of course,
such guarantee is relative considering Argentina’s low institutional quality and the lack of trust in its political and judicial systems.
The 2009 International Property Rights Index, for example, shows Argentina in position 80 with a total score of 4.3 (on a scale of
1 to 10). 
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In La Cava, only 16 percent of those polled said they have a property title for their houses. Some even asked what that was. Among
the rest, 17 percent said they have an informal document, usually consisting of an informal sale/purchase invoice. 
Altogether, 84 percent said they do not have formal documentation. On average, they lived 15 years at the same house, which
shows low turnover rates. Those who said they have a property title also have lived at the same house 15 years on average. When
asked how they acquired their home, 37 percent bought it, while 26 percent built it. In many cases, people added homes as annexes
of a family house. Six percent say they got their house from the government. 
There are not many problems in the sale/purchase of housing because deals are made with people they trust and payment is in
cash at the moment of possession (90 percent of respondents). Only 27 percent said there could be installments but much trust
or familiar ties were needed.  
We asked La Cava dwellers how they solve problems with neighbors when there is conflict related to continued coexistence, such
as negative externalities. As an example, what happens if a neighbor whose home is at a close distance away plays music at a high
volume or emits smoke or nasty odors? What if there are problems with the dividing walls or unclear borders between one property
and the next, or someone builds a second floor blocking sunlight or damaging the other? Houses are quite precarious, and these
are real possibilities. 
Confirming conclusions from a subjective cost interpretation of the Coase Theorem, 76 percent said they solve these problems
by talking with the other side. They prefer not having intermediaries, either from the same neighborhood or outside, and they
avoid violence at all cost. Only in extreme cases do they resort to it. They know they cannot go to the authorities, and starting
violence is a dangerous game. Besides, in a place where people live very close to each other, having a good relationship with neigh-
bors is an important asset. Those unresolved cases have to do with the nature of the neighbor; they must evaluate his/her reaction,
and sometimes it is better to bear the cost of the externality than the cost of attempting a solution. 
As mentioned, one source of high transaction costs is a disagreement over property rights. It makes bargaining costly and prevents
a negotiated internalization of the externality. Nevertheless, what really matters to the application of the Coase Theorem does
not seem to be just the formal definition of the right to property, but that neighbors know and respect the informal right. This
includes not just the definition of the land plot and its borders but also its accepted use and effects on third parties. 
The high proportion of answers related to negotiated solutions shows there are common codes of conduct regarding alternative
uses of properties, which facilitate negotiations. They are not legal “ordinances,” but they fulfill similar functions. They demand
consensus and generalized acceptance to become “social norms.” 
The lack of formal property rights does not prevent the transfer of the possession, although it does not allow for the existence of
mortgage credit and disincentivizes investment. Acceptance of “informal” rights allows for a solution of negative externalities in
most cases. Many “public goods” are supplied voluntarily, others not. 
Personal relationships and goodwill are critical when there are no written rules or cases in which different rules apply to different people.
It is important who happens to be your neighbor because there are no clear mechanisms to resolve disputes. Regarding security, they
are at the mercy of criminals and must rely on their capacity to defend themselves. Houses are bought and sold among known parties,
groceries lent to those who they trust, and people are afraid of moving if they do not know who will be their new neighbors.
A lack of formal property rights prevents dwellers of La Cava from accessing credit, some public services, even jobs, and having
a sense of security provided by ownership. They cannot appeal to formal authorities to solve problems of negative externalities.




In conclusion, the Coase Theorem is verified in such informal settings though it should probably be rewritten to take into
account the subjective nature of transaction costs. We offer the following suggested rewrite: “It is always possible to modify by
transactions on the market the initial legal or informal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if such market transactions are worth
the subjective costs for the parties, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value
of production.”
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By Nicole Alpert, The Lion Rock Institute (Hong Kong)
The Antiquities and Monuments Office (AMO), under the Leisure and Cultural Services Department, is the professional adviser
to the Hong Kong government and the official board on heritage issues. At present, the Secretary for Development, in the capacity
as the Antiquities Authority under the AMO, has the power to declare a site a monument whether or not it is perceived to have
heritage value. When declaring a site a monument or a proposed monument, the building is legally protected under government
statutory powers from construction in any form.
Sites that are protected under monument status may not have been assessed previously or may have been graded. Grade One on a
heritage scale represents great heritage value. Grades Two and Three signify relatively less significant heritage value (no graded
building is legally protected from demolition or redevelopment). A “proposed” monument designation allows for legal protection
against any demolition or development. The designation can last up to 12 months, at which point a “formal” monument may be
declared or the proposed monument declined.
The grading system has had its fair share of problems, despite having been employed for over a decade. The administrative agency
seems to lack a coherent strategy, as seen from incidences that involve wavering conclusions. An incident in which two grading as-
sessments of a particular site within 10 months of each other (April 2007 to February 2008) reported opposing conclusions on the
site’s heritage value represents a U-turn in heritage policy. Additionally, the secretary has many times declared sites a “proposed”
monument, signifying great heritage value, only to revert the site’s status to a low heritage value of Grade Three. 
Problems in the grading system because of wavering definitions and a lack of transparency undermine the credibility of the AMO
and, therefore, the power to declare statutory powers to protect any piece of land. In the examples to follow, a declaration of a 
proposed monument on privately owned property has been carried out without lawful legitimacy. 
A small minority of the public, especially conservation groups, interested in heritage pressures the government to employ ad hoc
means to “saving” buildings from demolishment, although a building may not be defined as a valued heritage site. The ex post
method often arrives out of crisis management, and a site’s heritage status, or lack of one, is revisited once demolition is underway.
As such, private sector participation is forced on surprised owners who plan demolition works or redevelopment. Because of an ex
post, ad hoc mechanism, the power of the secretary to declare a site a proposed or formal monument is a bargaining tool used to
force landowners’ hand in preservation, although the area’s conservation value is questionable. There are many such initiatives to block
development and force preservation using this ex post method. Each time, the property rights of private landowners are denied.
The government has mentioned both that the current policy is inadequate and that some form of standard guidelines would facilitate
owners. But such a paradigm is yet to be seen, as the administration refuses to provide “one-size-fits-all” guidelines and is comfortable
relying on a case-by-case basis. The current strategy is described as “taking no action if our enemy does not make any move,” and
the AMO has instructed the Buildings Department to inform it “once it receives applications for demolition, so that we can see
what actions we can take.” 
There are numerous issues with the piecemeal approach, most of which arrive from a blatant disrespect of property rights. Both the
opportunity and real costs are endured by owners, as well as destruction of heritage that may have been preserved had sufficient
consultation and proper mechanisms been employed. With 70 percent of identified heritage buildings privately owned, the need




The following case studies represent the ex post, ad hoc development – an inequitable way to conserve heritage properties and an
unfair burden for property owners. Most instances of ad hoc, ex post intervention take place at graded heritage sites in which the
government enters a dialogue with the owners of sites before or while redevelopment procedures are taking place. The secretary
only declares proposed or formal monuments to be protected if deemed necessary – that is, to stop demolition or redevelopment
projects that are not in line with the government’s interests in preservation. 
Normally, the monument status has been declined. Owners grant a promise to conserve and maintain the private heritage property
and to bear preservation costs. Should talks fail, the sites often become “formal” monuments with legal protection against any type
of development, including demolition. In essence, a proposed monument allows the government to hold private heritage property
hostage, while it attempts negotiations with owners. 
The Ho Tung Garden and Mansion at 75 Peak Road is one such site that follows this procedure in 2011. The government entered
a dialogue with the owner concerning preservation of the Grade One, 83-year-old site, but talks ceased abruptly months ago. The
owner, therefore, secured plans to demolish the structure, at which point the secretary held up the multibillion dollar development,
declaring the site a proposed historic monument. 
The secretary says that she has months to negotiate an agreement by using the monument status as a looming threat should a con-
sensus not be met. In that case, the owner may claim a financial loss, a matter for courts to resolve. The secretary admits that she
needs to play the proposed monument card because she was unable to reach a preservation deal with the owners previously. 
Once Jessville Mansion at 128 Pokfulam Road was to undergo redevelopment, the secretary declared the site a proposed monument.
However, in February 2008, the site was downgraded to a Grade Three historical building after the owners agreed to use it as a
clubhouse for an adjacent residential development. The U-turn in the government’s assessment and abuse of the secretary’s power
to declare monument status created confusion for the owners as to the value of their property, the economic opportunity, and the
legal right for redevelopment. 
The King Yin Lei Mansion at 45 Stubbs Road is another case of ex post intervention. The mansion was in the process of being de-
molished once the secretary declared the site a monument. The government used a preservation option of a non-in-situ land exchange
in which the owner is held responsible for restoring the site to AMO’s satisfaction at his own expense. The owner then surrenders
the property for preservation and is granted an adjacent lot for private residential development. 
The government says that purchasing sites such as those outlined above would be a "last resort" because of cost concerns and the
controversial way in which to spend taxpayer money. However, the government has had no difficulty ignoring the property rights
of owners by holding up development prospects and surprising owners with new or revised heritage claims. 
It is possible to balance private property rights and conservation, but the current heritage protocol is only acting from one side of
the scale. The huge lapse in the opposing assessments from April 2007 to February 2008 remains unanswered, furthering suspicions
that the AMO is not assessing heritage sites comprehensively or honestly. 
The government boasts that it has maintained privately owned heritage at no expense to taxpayers, except for those who privately
own heritage buildings. Involving the private sector in heritage is possible, but the government has not respected property rights.
By involving landowners, the government could employ economic incentives such as site buyback, land exchange, change or transfers
in plot ratios (a process in which the owner may transfer the unrealized development potential to another site), or a relaxation of
building restrictions (e.g., height limits). Such incentives can sway a property developer to include preservation in redevelopment.
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However, imposing these economic incentives may anger owners who operate under the assumption that their development rights
are fully protected. 
Conclusion
Heritage is an important part of any society, but the current policy sacrifices the rights of owners for the sake of a minority interest
with little credibility. There is no legitimate reason after a decade of heritage research and assessment why sites that are not identified
as heritage monuments or zoned with development concessions should suddenly be rendered protected. A lack of planning has led
to a lack of credibility in heritage protocols and departments. There is clearly a lack of a long-term, broad-based heritage conservation
policy, as evidenced by the many U-turns the government’s heritage policies take. 
The case studies here exhibit the cost of heritage in Hong Kong. Owners lose much in revenue as development is halted wrongfully.
A standard mechanism to protect property owners should be initiated. We recommend: 
1. Improving current administrative and legal frameworks by applying consistent principles
2. Addressing a lack of understanding of heritage and conservation; without a proper definition, it is
impossible to create a legal system that defends property rights
3. Increasing private sector participation motives by clarifying interests and zoning of conservation areas 
4. Compensating property owners justly and employing market forces for preservation, such as transfer of 
development rights, land swap mechanisms, resumption, easements, or greater plot ratios 
5. Removing constraints on heritage preservation so that private owners are incentivized to preserve historic buildings 
and employ objective guidelines to reference restoration and reuse of heritage properties (e.g., building codes)
6. Revising the existing grading system and Heritage Impact Assessment, which have lost credibility, to enhance 
transparency and eliminate the possibility of misuse with respect to declaration powers on proposed monuments 
7. Computerizing inventory grading lists and assuming regular reviews and rights of “new” ungraded heritage buildings
The number of monuments under the AMO that use the ad hoc, ex post method is rising. Government regulations and interventions
create suboptimal market distortions and uncertainty in property ownership and development rights. The more the government




Gender equality is often taken for granted in developed countries, while in many developing countries there are striking disparities
in property rights between men and women. Women play a crucial role in the economic development of a country, but they are
often denied rights to property either by law or by custom. These practices not only deny women a secure income, but they also
ensure future generations will have to deal with a similar level of poverty. 
This chapter highlights the importance of gender equality with respect to economic development. It presents a separate component
that is aimed at accounting for varying degrees of gender equality in developing countries. 
Concept of Study
Academics and policymakers point out that women’s unequal access to property rights adds an additional layer of complexity to the
understanding of property rights in many countries. Developed countries overwhelmingly have embraced gender equality in both
law and practice with respect to property rights. By contrast, developing countries vary significantly in how much protection is
afforded to women when it comes to issues of property. To account for gender equality, this chapter extends the standard IPRI
measure to include a measure of gender equality (GE) concerning property rights. The IPRI formula was modified to incorporate
gender equality:
IPRI(GE) = IPRI + 0.2*GE
A weight of 0.2 for the gender equality measure is arbitrary. The authors have varied the weight from 0.1 to 0.5 but found scores and
resulting rankings to be highly correlated under different weighting schemes. However, the reader is invited to change this weight ac-
cording to his or her preference. The construction of the GE measure is based on the five indicators displayed in Figure 21.
Figure 21: Structure of The Gender Equality Component (GE)
• Women’s Access to Land
• Women’s Access to Credit
• Women’s Access to Property Other than Land
• Inheritance Practices
• Women’s Social Rights*
*This indicator is a composite of four other variables
combined to represent the social rights of women. 
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Variables
Women’s Access to Land, Women’s Access to Credit, and Women’s Access to Property Other than Land 
These three variables are included in the GE component because they indicate the quality of women’s ownership rights with respect
to three aspects: women’s access to bank loans, their right to acquire and own land, and their right to own property other than land.
The rating of these factors indicates the extent of restrictions or the size of the female population for which restrictions are relevant.
However, some restrictions may only be relevant for women at a specific stage in life (e.g., marriage). 
Source: OECD Gender, Institutions, and Development Database 2009 (GID-DB)
Inheritance Practices
This factor covers inheritance practices, ranking countries on the degree to which regulations show preference to male heirs. This
variable measures the extent to which bequests are equally shared between male and female children. 
Source: OECD Gender, Institutions, and Development Database 2009 (GID-DB)
Women’s Social Rights
This variable covers broader aspects of women’s equality. It is composed of several aspects of women’s social rights that are crucial
to their equal standing in society. These include parental authority, female genital mutilation, freedom of movement, and the ratio
of female-to-male adult literacy. In past IPRI studies, this component also included a measure of repudiation. However, this aspect
is no longer available in the updated data source. This omission is not expected to have a significant impact on the overall score be-
cause the women’s social rights scores are essentially identical in previous years’ data when one excludes repudiation. 
Source: OECD Gender, Institutions, and Development Database 2009 (GID-DB)
Methodology
The methodology of the GE component is identical to the one used to construct the IPRI. The final GE score is also an index
based on the average of equally weighted variables, which range on a scale from 0 to 10. Zero signifies complete discrimination
against women, while a top score is given to countries with fully developed and equal rights for women. Given that all variables in
the original data source are constructed as indicators, we normalize the data to a 0–10 scale.vi Consequently, the result for the final
IPRI(GE) ranking is on a 0–12 scale because of the 0.2 weighting for GE.  For example, assume a country received perfect scores
























7.3                     















  6.5 
 6.5 














































Table 9: Ranking by IPRI (GE) Score
   
  

























































































Table 9 presents the results of the IPRI, integrating the gender equality (GE) variables. This year, 83 countries are scored and ranked
for gender equality. This is primarily because updated data from the primary source of gender equality data are only available for
non-OECD countries. However, OECD countries are overwhelmingly industrialized countries with full respect for gender equality.
These countries are not expected to exhibit any change in the gender equality component over the years. Therefore, non-OECD
countries present a much better sample, representing a wide range of low-income to middle-income countries with a much larger
proportion of developing countries. We primarily focus on these countries because gender equality tends to be weaker. 
Singapore tops the ranking for the IPRI(GE) with a score of 10.3. It is followed by Hong Kong with a score of 9.8 and Taiwan with
a score of 8.9. The remaining countries in the top 10 are more geographically dispersed with countries from the Middle East, Africa,
and Latin America. Zimbabwe and Chad tie for the lowest IPRI(GE) score at 4.4, though Zimbabwe has a lower GE score (3.5
versus Chad’s GE score of 4.0). Bangladesh was third from the bottom, registering an IPRI(GE) score of 4.6.
Table 10 presents the rankings by GE score. Despite including only non-OECD countries, a similar pattern occurs as in previous
reports with a heavy grouping of countries at the top with a score of 10.0 in the GE component. This is the result of the measuring
method that the underlying data source employs, which does not allow for much variation in the scores. However, the final IPRI(GE)
scores and rankings accurately reflect the relative strength of each country’s protection of women’s rights to property.
The IPRI(GE) presents a useful tool to understand the repercussions of gender inequality in property rights for economic develop-
ment. The authors hope that in the future more data become available to allow a more nuanced understanding of women’s rights.
Nevertheless, the current IPRI(GE) is a good approximation of the situation with property rights in the developing world. 
   
  

This chapter presents detailed information on the data sources that were used in the compilation of the IPRI and the IPRI(GE)
measures. This year, the authors have mainly carried an update of the previous data, thus using the same data sources. Below is a
brief review of the data included in the indices, each data source, and its data collection methodology.
Subjective versus Objective Data
The majority of data included in the IPRI stems from survey responses by experts. However, some factors are based on hard data
based on the countries’ regulations, laws, and actual estimates of magnitudes (e.g., copyright piracy). The combination of subjective
and objective data presents several advantages over an index that relies on only one or the other. 
First, objective data that reflect a country’s strength in property rights protection is almost impossible to obtain beyond a narrow
scope of parameters. As a result, there are few alternatives to relying on subjective data collections. Second, instead of merely sum-
marizing a country’s de jure facts regarding property rights protection, the IPRI aims to capture de facto outcomes and the prevailing
effectiveness of the property rights system. Perceptions-based measures often contain information that is not reflected by objective
measures, particularly in developing countries. In fact, the research for the initial IPRI in 2007 focused mainly on the latter intention,
and it, therefore, integrated a large amount of data stemming from the experience and perceptions of experts in the field. In the 
future, the authors will continue to consider alternative compositions of subjective and objective data.
Data Sources
World Economic Forum (WEF) – Global Competitiveness Index
The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report provides information regarding an economy’s competitiveness for a
large set of countries (134 for 2010-2011). The rankings are drawn from a combination of publicly available hard data and the results
of the Executive Opinion Survey. The latter is a comprehensive survey conducted on an annual basis by the WEF together with its 
network of partner institutes – leading research institutes and business organizations – in the countries covered in the report.
There are four variables in the IPRI for which data have been obtained from the 2010-2011 WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report.
These variables are Judicial Independence, Protection of Physical Property Rights, Access to Loans, and Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights. The specific questions that were used to elicit a response can be found in Appendix II. For more detailed information, visit:
http://gcr.weforum.org/gcr2010/
World Bank Institute (WBI) – Worldwide Governance Indicators
The Worldwide Governance Indicators are produced jointly by experts from the Brookings Institution, World Bank Development
Economics Research Group, and the World Bank Institute. They draw on the most recent data available on an annual basis so the
most recent report (2010) contains data gathered from multiple years within the last decade through 2009. The World Governance
Indicators reflect the perceptions on governance of a very diverse group of respondents. Hundreds of variables are drawn from more
than 50 sources and organizations. Several of the data sources are surveys of individuals or domestic firms with first-hand knowledge
of the governance situation in their country. But the report also captures the perception of country analysts at the major multilateral
development agencies, reflecting these individuals’ in-depth experience working on the countries they assess. Other data sources
from NGOs, as well as commercial risk rating agencies, base their assessments on a global network of correspondents typically living
in the country they are rating. The variables Rule of Law, Political Stability and Control of Corruption are drawn from this source.
For more information, see: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
  
  
World Bank Group (WB) – Doing Business
The source of the Registering Property variable is the 2010 edition of the World Bank Group’s Doing Business report. The Doing
Business data are collected in a standardized way on an annual basis. To start, the Doing Business team, along with academic advisors,
designs a survey. The survey uses a simple business case to ensure comparability across countries and over time – with assumptions
about the legal form of the business, its size, its location, and the nature of its operations. Surveys are administered through more
than 8,000 local experts, including lawyers, business consultants, accountants, freight forwarders, government officials, and other
professionals routinely administering or advising on legal and regulatory requirements. 
The Doing Business methodology has five limitations that should be considered when interpreting the data. First, the collected
data refer to businesses in the economy’s largest business city and may not be representative of regulation in other parts of the econ-
omy. Second, the data often focus on a specific business form – generally a limited liability company (or its legal equivalent) of a
specified size – and may not be representative of the regulation on other businesses (e.g., sole proprietorships). Third, transactions
described in a standardized case scenario refer to a specific set of issues and may not represent the full set of issues a business en-
counters. Fourth, the measures of time involve an element of judgment by the expert respondents. Finally, the methodology assumes
that a business has full information on what is required and does not waste time when completing procedures. In practice, completing
a procedure may take longer if the business lacks information or is unable to follow up promptly. Alternatively, the business may
choose to disregard some burdensome procedures. For both reasons, the time delays reported in Doing Business 2010 would differ
from the recollection of entrepreneurs reported in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys or other perception surveys. 
Because of these limitations, it is likely that the Registering Property variable underestimates the extent of procedures and time
required to register property. The estimates presented in the report should be regarded as the low bound for this factor. For more
information about the publication, please see: http://www.doingbusiness.org.
Ginarte-Park (GP) – Index of Patent Rights
The Patent Protection variable in the IPRI comes from the Ginarte-Park Index of Patent Rights (2005). The GP Index quantifies the
strength of national patent laws and is updated every five years. The information used to construct the index is obtained through
review of national patent laws and contains the following five categories: the extent of coverage of patent protection, membership
in international patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and the duration of protection. For
more information on the index and its methodology, please refer to Ginarte & Park (1997). The dataset is available at
http://www1.american.edu/cas/econ/faculty/park.htm. 
The original index contains scores for 124 countries for 2005. Scores for two countries were added strictly following the methodology
in Ginarte & Park (1997). Last year Moldova’s score was calculated based on survey results of five practicing patent attorneys as
well as the author’s review of the patent laws with the helpful assistance of Dr. Walter Park, American University. The scores were
constructed for 2005 to make them comparable to the patent protection scores for the rest of the countries. 
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) – Special 301 Report
The data used for the construction of the copyright piracy factor stem from the IIPA’s submission to the Special 301 Report, prepared
by the U.S. Trade Representative in the context of its annual review of countries’ intellectual property practices. The data used in
the IPRI reflects the estimated level of piracy in the business software and record industries. The previous editions of the IIPA’s
Special 301 Report occasionally included data on other industries such as motion pictures, entertainment software, and books. But
this data become unavailable in recent years. Individual industries estimate their data in different ways. It is reasonable to assume
that the piracy levels reported are underestimated because they only capture piracy experienced by U.S. copyright-based industries.
For more information, see: http://www.iipa.com/2010_SPEC301_TOC.htm. 
   
  
The 2010 Special 301 Report data on business software piracy is complemented with the data from the Seventh Annual BSA and
IDC Global Software Piracy Study (2009) available at http://global.bsa.org/globalpiracy2009/index.html.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – Gender, Institutions and Development Database
(GID-DB)
The OECD GID-DB is the sole source of data used for construction of the IPRI(GE) rankings, which incorporate aspects of gender
equality. The GID is a tool for researchers and policy makers to determine and to analyze obstacles to women’s economic develop-
ment. It covers a total of 124 countries – excluding OECD member-countries – and comprises an array of 60 indicators on gender
discrimination. The eight GID-DB variables, which are incorporated in the GE component, are related to women’s access to loans,
access to land, access to non-land property, inheritance practices, and social rights. These data have been compiled from various




 he authors are pleased to again present country profiles for the IPRI report this year. This appendixincludes a country profile for each country ranked in the index. 
Country profiles feature the IPRI and its components’ scores for the period 2007–2011. They include
commentary that identifies trends or changes in the overall component scores and the IPRI. Importantly,
they also discuss any major advances or regressions in the sub-component scores. This allows readers not
only to see larger trends but also to understand the driving factors behind these changes. Additionally, any
particularly strong or weak features of the countries’ property rights regimes, as measured in the index, are
pointed out. 
The country profiles are a complimentary tool to the IPRI rankings. They provide a snapshot of a country’s
performance in the IPRI over the last five years. As such, they should not be construed as a comprehensive
overview of a country’s property rights regime. However, the authors are hopeful that they will be used in
combination with the rankings to bring attention to specific issues in property rights that need improve-
ment. Alternatively, they can be used to commend any government policies contributing to positive devel-
opments in the protection and enforcement of property rights.
One notable change from last year is the omission of references to specific policy developments.  Data for
the IPRI is collected by a number of different organizations over slightly varying periods of time.  Com-
bining these characteristics with the implementation lags and varying enforcement levels inherent in public
policy, the authors preferred to err on the side of caution and avoid potentially claiming false causality.
Readers are encouraged to use the IPRI as a tool for understanding the impacts of certain policies they 
find interesting.
Finally, the country profiles address any data inconsistencies that hinder the comparison of the IPRI and
its sub-components’ scores across years. Unfortunately, such inconsistencies persist because of the lack of
some sub-component data. Where possible, any gaps previously present in the data have been filled in as
updated sources become available.
The country profiles enhance the IPRI report and provide an additional tool to be used by policy makers,
business leaders, think tanks, and other interested parties to better understand the situation with respect
to property rights in their respective countries. 
When referring to score changes, the names of the IPRI sub-components are capitalized and italicized.
Please see Figure 1 for the structure of the IPRI. The reader is reminded that all IPRI scores are on a 
0–10 scale.

   

Albania increased its IPRI score for the fifth
year in a row to 4.4. While Political Stability
and Control of Corruption remained fairly
constant, Albania saw its LP jump 0.7 points
thanks largely to an increase in survey-based
Judicial Independence from 2.4 to 4.7.
Albania’s PPR also showed solid improve-
ment, largely driven by a 0.9 increase in Pro-
tection of Physical Property.  The PPR jump
would have been larger were it not for a 0.4
fall in Access to Loans, which nearly wiped out
last year’s gains in this sub-component.
IPR rose a whole point thanks to higher
scores for Copyright Piracy and Protection of
Intellectual Property, which increased from
2.4 to 4.0.
ALBANIA World Rank: 100     Regional Rank: 16
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Algeria was able to reverse last year’s slide,
improving its IPRI score by 0.6 points to
4.3.  The driving force behind this growth
was a 1.1 point improvement in PPR, where
all sub-components were better this year.
Protection of Physical Property and Registering
Property grew by 0.8 and 0.6 respectively but
the largest increase was in Access to Loans,
which improved 2 points by itself.
LP did not experience a change.  Judicial
Independence improved half a point, but this
was offset by slight decreases in the three
other sub-components.
The 0.5 point rise in Algeria’s IPR was
driven by a 1.4 point improvement in Pro-
tection of Intellectual Property.  Patent Protec-
tion and Copyright Piracy remained the same.
ALGERIA World Rank: 107     Regional Rank: 15
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Angola returns to the IPRI after a two-year
absence due to a lack of data, though it reen-
ters in the bottom 4 of all countries.  Angola
ranks in the bottom ten for LP.  Having one
of the worst Rule of Law scores and the third
worst Control of Corruption score pulls down
their LP score.  Data for Judicial Independence
was not available.
Angola’s PPR score places them in the 
bottom five for that category, just ahead of
Libya, also from the African region. All sub-
component scores place Angola in the bot-
tom ten.
Angola’s IPR is also in the bottom five.
Both sub-components are in the bottom 15
for the world.
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After three years of consistent scores, 
Argentina experienced improvement in all
components and almost every sub-compo-
nent. Its 4.7 IPRI is a 0.3 point improvement
over last year. Argentina’s LP rose 0.4 this year
due to a 1.7 point improvement in Judicial
Independence. The other sub-components
were relatively stable.
Argentina’s PPR increased 0.4 thanks to 
a 1 point improvement in Access to Loans.
Protection of Physical Property also improved
slightly while Registering Property remained
the same.
Argentina’s IPR rose to its highest level in
five years on the back of a 0.6 increase in 
Protection of Intellectual Property. Copyright
Piracy was also slightly improved.
ARGENTINA World Rank: 87       Regional Rank: 13
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   

Armenia once again saw improvement in
all three components this year, pushing its
IPRI up almost half a point. LP improved by
0.4 points thanks mostly to 1.6 point jump
in Judicial Independence.  Political Stability
also improved but this was offset by slight 
declines in Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption.
PPR is up slightly with a 0.8 increase in
Access to Loans directly offsetting a 0.8 
decrease in Protection of Physical Property.  
Armenia’s excellent Registering Property
increased by 0.1 points as the number of days
needed to register fell from 4 to 3.
IPR grew 0.6 points thanks to 0.2 and one
point gains in Copyright Piracy and Protection
of Intellectual Property respectively.
ARMENIA World Rank: 109     Regional Rank:19
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Like most industrialized countries, Australia
saw a slight decline in all three components,
though it does remain one of the world’s best
countries when it comes to property rights.
LP declined 0.2 points on the back of a 0.5
loss for the weakest sub-component, Political
Stability. Judicial Independence also experi-
enced slightly negative movement.
PPR changed for the first time in five years,
falling by 0.4 points. The decline was led by
a one point loss in Access to Loans while a 0.5
deterioration in Protection of Physical Property
also hurt. Registering Property remained 
unchanged.
IPR fell by 0.1 points due to slight 
decreases in Protection of Intellectual Property
and Copyright Piracy.
AUSTRALIA World Rank: 9         Regional Rank: 3
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AUSTRIA World Rank: 12       Regional Rank: 8
Azerbaijan continued to improve its IPRI
score, raising it 0.4 points this year. LP im-
proved by 0.2 points, led by a 0.6 point im-
provement in Judicial Independence and a
slight improvement in Political Stability.
Control of Corruption did fall by 0.2 points
however.
PPR increased by half a point, largely be-
cause Access to Loans grew 1.3 points to 4.0.
Azerbaijan improved its already excellent
Registering Property by cutting the number of
days required to 4, down from 11. Protection
of Physical Property also rose slightly.
A 0.9 increase in Protection of Intellectual
Property pushed up more than half a point.
Copyright Piracy also improved slightly.
AZERBAIJAN World Rank: 100     Regional Rank: 16
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For the first time in the Index Austria’s
IPRI score fell, specifically by 0.3 points.   LP
fell by 0.3 points, a decline experience by all
its sub-components. The lone exception is
Control of Corruption, which fell only 0.1
points.
PPR decreased for the second year in a row,
with all three components in decline. 
Once again Access to Loans is the weakest sub-
component; this year it fell 0.5 points to 4.6.
IPR reversed its gains from last year, falling
back to 8.1.  The deterioration was largely
due to a 0.6 drop in Protection of Intellectual
Property though Copyright Piracy also de-
clined slightly.
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   

For the second year in a row IPRI improved
in Bahrain along with each component. 
Judicial Independence grew 1.2 points, push-
ing LP up to 5.9.  This would have been a
larger gain had Rule of Law and Control of
Corruption not fallen by 0.3 points each.
PPR in Bahrain improved by 0.7 points.
This was largely driven by a 1.2 point in-
crease in the Access to Loans score.
Bahrain saw its Protection of Intellectual
Property score rise by 0.8 points. This com-
bined with a modest improvement in 
Copyright Piracy to push IPR up half a point.
BAHRAIN World Rank: 28       Regional Rank: 4
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IPRI increased for the second year in a row
in Bangladesh.  LP improved 0.4 points
largely because of a 1.2 point increase for Ju-
dicial Independence. Control of Corruption also
increased 0.3 points while Rule of Law and
Political Stability remained constant.
A 1.2 point gain in Access to Loans drove a
0.8 point increase in PPR.  Protection of Phys-
ical Property and Registering Property also im-
proved by 0.6 points each.
Protection of Intellectual Property increased
by 0.9 points, generating the progress made
in IPR.  While Bangladesh still has a long
way to go, two years of improvement have
helped push it out of last year’s last place
ranking. 
BANGLADESH World Rank: 125     Regional Rank: 18
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IPRI in Belgium continues to remain 
stable, with components exhibiting only
minor changes.  A 0.5 point drop in Judicial
Independence was offset by modest gains in
Political Stability and Control of Corruption.
The net result is no change in LP.
While there are still 7 procedures that need
to be completed to register property in 
Belgium, the number of days it takes fell
from 132 to 79. Unfortunately this great 
improvement was almost entirely offset by
decreases in Protection of Property Rights and
Access to Loans, resulting in a modest gain 
for PPR.
IPR fell slightly due to a small decline in
Protction of Intellectual Property.
BELGIUM World Rank: 17       Regional Rank: 12
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After showing little movement over the last
4 years Benin’s IPRI jumped 0.7 points in
2011. PPR improved the most, gaining a full
1.5 points. Protection of Physical Property
jumped an impressive 2.3 points while Regis-
tering Property and Access to Loans rose by 0.4
and 1.7 respectively.
Protection of Intellectual Property improved
by almost a whole point. This pushed Benin’s
IPR up to 5.2
LP did experience a slight decline. Slight
gains in Judicial Independence and Political
Stability were offset by deterioration in Rule
of Law and Control of Corruption.
BENIN World Rank:64        Regional Rank: 6
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It would seem Bolivia has recovered from
(or adapted to) the constitutional issues that
hurt last year’s ranking as this year’s score of
3.9 is Bolivia’s highest IPRI yet. A 1.3 point
increase in Judicial Independence combined
with a 0.4 point increase in Political Stability
to push LP up to 3.2.  This effect was some-
what dampened by losses in Rule of Law and
especially Control of Corruption.
Access to Loans improved by more than a
while point.  Combined with smaller gains
in Protection of Physical Property and Registering
Property, PPR for 2011 improved by 0.5
points.
IPR increased by over half a point, largely
as the result of a 1.5 point improvement in
Protection of Intellectual Property. Despite these positive gains, however, Bolivia remains towards the bottom of both the world
and regional rankings.
BOLIVIA World Rank: 120     Regional Rank: 21
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IPRI in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued
last year’s improvement, increasing by 0.5
points. While other sub-components re-
mained the same, Judicial Independence rose
by an entire point, resulting in a 0.3 point in-
crease for LP.
Protection of Physical Property decreased
slightly, but solid improvement in both Reg-
istering Property and Access to Loans was able
to raise PPR by half a point.
IPR experienced increases in each available
sub-component. A 1.1 point increase in 
Protection of Intellectual Property helped push
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s IPR score over 3
for the first time.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA World Rank: 113     Regional Rank: 21
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IPRI in Botswana continued to rise this
year, achieving Botswana’s highest score since
2007.  Control of Corruption and Political Sta-
bility did both marginally decrease but these
changes were somewhat hidden by a 0.2
point increase in Judicial Independence.  The
result is a modest decline for LP.
PPR experienced solid gains in both Protec-
tion of Physical Property and Access to Loans of
at least 0.5 points.  A slight decrease in 
Registering Property did not prevent PPR from
improving in 2011.
Protection of Intellectual Property grew by 2
points for Botswana.  This translated into a
0.7 point increase in Botswana’s IPR.
BOTSWANA World Rank: 38       Regional Rank: 2
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Brazil continues to improve its IPRI in
2011, raising it another 0.2 points.  Every
sub-component of PPR grew by at least 0.2
points, except for Control of Corruption
which remained the same.  This resulted in
Brazil’s LP being 0.3 points higher this year.
PPR increased slightly in 2011.  This was
driven by modest gains in Protection of 
Physical Property and Access to Loans.
A 0.3 point rise in IPR was driven by 
improvement in most sub-components this
year. IPR’s increase was driven by a gain of
over half a point in Protection of Intellectual
Property.
BRAZIL World Rank: 64       Regional Rank: 8
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2011 is Brunei’s second year in the IPRI
and it saw substantial improvement in all
three components.  LP improved by 0.7
points due to increases of at least 0.3 in all
sub-components. Judicial Independence im-
proved the most, rising by 1.1 points.
Brunei experienced improvement in both
Protection of Physical Property and Ease of 
Access to Loans which enhanced the PPR
score.  However, companies’ inability to hold
land in their own name continues to hurt this
score.
Intellectual property rights in Brunei 
improved with both a decrease in software
piracy and a 0.7 point increase in Protection
of Intellectual Property. This resulted in a 1.2
point increase for IPR.
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The property rights situation in Bulgaria
continues to improve. For the third year in 
a row LP has risen with gains across sub-com-
ponents, the largest of which being a whole
point in Judicial Independence.
PPR did decrease this year, falling below
2009 levels. This decline was driven by 
weakening Protection of Physical Property and
Access to Loans scores, especially the latter.
Protection of Intellectual Property improved
0.7 points this year.  A slight improvement
in Copyright Piracy also helped raise IPR 0.3
points.
BULGARIA World Rank: 64       Regional Rank: 10
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Burkina Faso reversed the negative trend
IPRI had been experiencing for two years and
improved to its highest rating yet.  LP once
again moved in the opposite direction of
Burkina Faso’s IPRI, falling by 0.1 points.
While Rule of Law improved marginally the
effect was swamped by small declines in Ju-
dicial Independence and Control of Corruption.
PPR increased by an entire point for 2011.
Registering Property led the way by improving
almost 2 points with improvements also seen
in the other sub-components.
IPR returned to the same level it was at two
years ago. A lack of copyright data meant this
swing was once again the result of a change
in Protection of Intellectual Property.
BURKINA FASO World Rank: 77       Regional Rank: 10
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Burundi again improved its property rights
in 2011, though the country remains ranked
in the bottom five. Gains in all three compo-
nents helped increase IPRI by 0.3 points, a
rate of improvement faster than the privious
three years. Judicial Independence rose a whole
point and this would have meant a larger in-
crease for LP had it not been for small de-
clines in Rule of Law and Control of
Corruption.
PPR increased rode improvements in all
three sub-components to increase half a
point.  Protection of Physical Property saw the
largest gains at 0.6 points.
IPR improved by almost half a point
thanks to a better Protection of Intellectual
Property score. Copyright data remains unavailable for Burundi.
BURUNDI World Rank: 125     Regional Rank: 23












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Legal and Political Environment












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Physical Property Rights












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Intellectual Property Rights












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
IPRI
   
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Cameroon’s IPRI changed for the first time
in three years, moving up to 4.2. All three
components improved.  LP rose half a point
thanks largely to a 1.8 jump in Judicial 
Independence. The other sub-components
were relatively stable, though Political Stability
did see some modest gains.
PPR saw the biggest improvement, rising
0.7 points. All three sub-components 
increased, led by a 0.8 point rise in Access to
Loans.
IPR slightly increased because of a 0.3
point improvement in Protection of Intellectual
Property. Other sub-components remained
the same.
CAMEROON World Rank: 109     Regional Rank: 19
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Canada’s IPRI remained the same after two
previous years of slight increases.  There is lit-
tle to complain about however, as Canada re-
mains the highest ranked country in both its
region and the western hemisphere.  LP was
the model of stability, with only offsetting 0.1
point changes in half of the sub-components.
PPR did decrease thanks to 0.4 point 
declines in both Protection of Physical Property
and Access to Loans. Registering Property was
unchanged.
IPR masked the fall in PPR by rising 0.3
points. Canada has one of the best Copyright
Piracy scores in the world despite failing to
bring its laws in line with the WIPO Internet
Treaties. This lack of compliance is why the
IIPA recommends Canada remain on the Special 301 Priority Watch List.
CANADA World Rank: 9         Regional Rank: 1
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For the first time in the index’s history
Chad saw some positive growth in its IPRI
score, and quite a bit of it relatively speaking.
Chad’s LP score had been the lowest in the
world and on a three year decline until 2011.
Improvement in all sub-components raised
Chad’s LP by 0.8 points.  The largest increase
was in Judicial Independence which rose 2.5
points to a merely weak score of 3.8.  Rule of
Law and Political Stability both improved but
remain below 2.0.
All sub-components in PPR improved with
the largest increase found in Access to Loans,
which almost doubled.  Chad’s best sub-com-
ponent is Registering Property with a 
respectable score of 8.3 because the process
only takes 6 days.
IPR increased thanks to a half point improvement in Protecting Intellectual Property.  While Chad’s IPRI and component scores
remain low, 2011 saw a lot of encouraging improvement.
CHAD World Rank: 117     Regional Rank: 20
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Chile’s IPRI improved to 6.7 this year,
making up for last years slight decline and
keeping Chile at the top of the South Amer-
ica region.  LP rose to 7.3 thanks to a second
year of improvement in Judicial Independence.
Political Stability and Control of Corruption
also saw slight gains.
PPR is again 7.0 as most of the sub-com-
ponents were unchanged.  There was a slight
decrease in Access to Loans, though, with the
sub-component score falling from 5.4 to 5.2.
IPR rose to 5.8 for Chile, mostly driven by
a 1 point increase in the Protection of Intellec-
tual Property score.  Copyright Piracy also saw
a modest improvement.
CHILE World Rank: 28       Regional Rank: 1
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For the second year in a row IPRI in China
increased thanks to improvements in all three
components. Judicial Independence jumped a
whole point but this progress was somewhat
offset by deterioration in the Political Stability
and Control of Corruption scores.  The result
is a modest 0.1 increase in China’s LP score.
PPR improved again thanks to increases in
all sub-component variables. Registering 
Property remains China’s highest scoring sub-
component at 8.9, but it was Access to Loans
that improved the most, jumping by a point
and a half.
The rise in the IPR score was due mostly
to a 0.9 increase in Protection of Intellectual
Property. While China did see a modest gain
in Copyright Piracy the score is still only 1.6, reflecting the fact that China has some of the highest rates of piracy in the world.
CHINA World Rank: 60       Regional Rank: 11
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IPRI in Columbia increased modestly for
the second year in a row. LP was again 3.8
due to only minimal increases (Rule of Law)
and decreases (Judicial Independence, Control
of Corruption).
PPR experienced a modest 0.1 point 
increase for 2011. This is because the 0.5
point improvement in Registering Property
was larger than the 0.2 point decrease in 
Protection of Physical Property. Access to Loans
did not change.
IPR in Columbia rose 0.1 points. This 
improvement reflected similar increases in
both Protection of Intellectual Property and
Copyright Piracy.
COLUMBIA World Rank: 75       Regional Rank: 9
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IPRI for Costa Rica changed for the first
time in 4 years, improving to 5.9.  LP rose
0.3 points due to improvement in all four
sub-components. Judicial Independence saw
the largest increase, jumping 0.5 points to
7.5.
PPR held steady at 6.1. Modest gains in
Protection of Physical Property and Registering
Property were stifled by a 0.4 point decline in
Access to Loans.
Protection of Intellectual Property jumped
0.9 points for 2011.  This improvement com-
bined with a slight gain in Copyright Piracy
pushed IPR up to 5.0, the best IPR score for
Costa Rica since 2007.
COSTA RICA World Rank: 50       Regional Rank: 4
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Cote D’Ivoire saw improvement in all three
component scores this year and all sub-com-
ponents, raising IPRI by over half a point.
Most LP sub-components saw improvement,
led by 1.6 point rise in Judicial Independence.
Only Control of Corruption was unchanged.
PPR rose 0.7 points thanks to a 1.5 point
rise in Access to Loans.  It should be noted
though that Access to Loans is still only 2.2,
up from an abysmal 0.7.
Protection of Intellectual Property grew 0.9
points and, along with marginal gains in
Copyright Piracy, pushed IPR up half a point.
While this across-the-board improvement is
a welcome sight, more is still needed as Cote
D’Ivoire remains among the lowested rated
countries in the region and the world.
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Croatia reversed last years decline and rose
to its highest IPRI rating in the Index’s five
year history. LP improved for the second year
in a row thanks to modest gains in all sub-
components except Control of Corruption,
which experienced a marginal decline.
Improvements in both Protection of Physical
Property and Registering Property drove the in-
crease in PPR.  Access to Loans decreased for
the second year in a row, though only slightly.
IPR rose to its highest level because the 
expert opinions that form Protection of 
Intellectual Property improved. Copyright
Piracy remained unchanged for the fourth
year in a row.
CROATIA World Rank: 64       Regional Rank: 10
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For the second year in a row Cyprus saw
improvement in IPRI and three components.
A rise in three sub-components increased LP.
The lone exception was Political Stability,
which fell 0.3 points.
PPR increased despite a small decline in Ac-
cess to Loans.  This year data was available for
Registering Property; the inclusion of Cyprus’
9.1 score in this sub-component pushed PPR
up 0.7 points.  Protection of Physical Property
remained the same.
Expert opinion regarding the protection of
intellectual property improved for 2011.
This combined with a slight positive change
for Copyright Piracy resulted in a 0.3 point 
increase for IPR.
CYPRUS World Rank: 25       Regional Rank: 3
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For the third year in a row the Czech Re-
public saw an increase in its IPRI.  Like last
year, all three components experienced a pos-
itive change.  LP improved slightly as three
of the four sub-components increased.  Polit-
ical Stability saw a minor decline.
PPR rose 0.3 points thanks to improve-
ments in two sub-components, including a
1.1 increase in Registering Property.  Access to
Loans was the exception to the trend, falling
by 0.1 points.
Expert opinion regarding Czech defense of
intellectual property rose this year.  This,
along with a slight improvement in Copyright
Policy, pushed IPR up for the third year in a
row.
CZECH REPUBLIC World Rank: 33       Regional Rank: 2
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After 4 years of consistency Denmark saw
a decline in its IPRI score. LP remained the
same, with marginal declines in Judicial Inde-
pendence and Rule of Law offsetting gains in
Political Stability and Control of Corruption.
Access to Loans tumbled 2.3 points to a
score of 5.1.  This combined with a 0.8 point
decrease in Protection of Physical Property to
pull down Denmark’s PPR to its lowest score
in the history of the index.
Expert opinion of Denmark’s protection of
intellectual property fell slightly in 2010.
Along with a slight rise in the rate of copy-
right piracy, this caused Denmark’s IPR to
fall for the second year in a row to a score of
8.3.
DENMARK World Rank: 8         Regional Rank: 6
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The IPRI score for the Dominican Republic
reversed last year’s decline and improved 0.2
points for the 2011 index. LP rose for the
first time in two years thanks to a 1.0 point
increase in Judicial Independence. This 
improvement was somewhat dampened by
minor declines in Rule of Law and Control 
of Corruption.
PPR improved thanks to increases in all
three sub-components.  Access to Loans re-
mains the weakest sub-component but saw
the biggest change, growing by 0.9 points.
IPRI increased slightly even though expert
opinion on the Dominican Republic’s  
Protection of Intellectual Property fell. This was
because of a decline in the level of copyright
piracy.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC World Rank: 93       Regional Rank: 15












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Legal and Political Environment












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Physical Property Rights












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Intellectual Property Rights












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
IPRI
Unlike last year, it was all good news in
Ecuador with increases in IPRI and every
component.  LP increased largely due to a 1.1
point rise in Judicial Independence, though
the actual score remains low at 2.8. Rule of
Law and Control of Corruption both fell by
0.2 points.
PPR rose thanks to increases of 0.8 and 0.5
for Protection of Physical Property and Access
to Loans respectively. Registering Property was
unchanged.
Protection of Intellectual Property jumped
1.1 points for 2011. This positive changed
increased IPR despite a small decline in Copy-
right Policy.
ECUADOR World Rank: 100     Regional Rank: 18
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Egypt again saw an improvement in its
IPRI due to increases in PPR and IPR.  LP
declined slightly because of a drop of a full
point for Judicial Independence. This loss
swamped the positive effects of a half point
improvement in Control of Corruption.
PPR saw improvements in all three 
sub-components and rose accordingly. The
largest gain was a 0.8 point improvement in
Access to Loans, though this score remains the
lowest in the component at 4.3.
IPR rose for the second year in a row 
because of a 0.7 point increase in Protection
of Intellectual Property.  Copyright piracy lev-
els were unchanged for 2011.
EGYPT World Rank: 71       Regional Rank: 12
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El Salvador saw modest gains in its IPRI
and most of its components.  Despite a 0.3
point decrease in Rule of Law, improvement
in the three other sub-components was able
to raise El Salvador’s LP score slightly.
PPR was unchanged for 2011, though the
same was not true for the sub-components.
Access to Loans fell 0.6 points to 3.4, though
gains in Protection of Physical Property made
up for this decline. Registering Property was
stable.
Improved expert opinion caused Protection
of Intellectual Property to jump a whole point.
Copyright Piracy did not change, however, so
this only translated into a 0.4 point gain for
IPR.
EL SALVADOR World Rank: 81       Regional Rank: 11
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While its IPRI did not change in 2011 
Estonia continues to hold the highest score
for Central and Eastern Europe. LP 
improved rising 0.3 points because of im-
provement across all four sub-categories.  
Judicial Independence saw the largest change,
jumping 0.6 points.
PPR declined this year after two years of
improvement.  Deterioration in Protection of
Physical Property and Access to Loans were the
main reason, especially a 1.7 point drop in
the loans category.
IPR increased for the fourth year in a row
as professional opinions of Estonia’s intellectual
property rights protection continued to 
improve.  Levels of copyright piracy were the
same for 2011.
ESTONIA World Rank: 28       Regional Rank: 1
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IPRI in Ethiopia jumped 0.5 points in
2011, almost matching its improvement for
the previous three years combined. The 0.2
point gain for LP masked some turmoil
within the sub-components: Rule of Law and
Control of Corruption both declined while 
Judicial Independence jumped 1.1 points.
While Political Stability did improve, its 1.5
score is among the lowest in the world.
PPR improved for 2011 with increases 
in all three sub-components. Protection of 
Physical Property and Access to Loans both
went up by a whole point.
IPR rose for the third year in a row. 
Copyright piracy data was unavailable, but
Protection of Intellectual Property went up by
over a point. 
ETHIOPIA World Rank: 98       Regional Rank: 16
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Despite a slight decline Finland enjoyed the
highest IPRI in the world for the fifth year in
a row, tied for first place with Sweden. It had
the strongest score in every component. LP
decreased by 0.1 points after three years 
of stability. Improvement in Rule of Law
was swamped by small losses in Judicial 
Independence and Control of Corruption.
Protection of Physical Property and Register-
ing Property remained stable but Access to
Loans fell by a whole point. This pulled 
Finland’s PPR score down by 0.3 points.
Finland saw small improvements in Protec-
tion of Intellectual Property and Copyright
Piracy. These 0.1 point increases were not
enough to change IPR for 2011 however.
FINLAND World Rank: 1         Regional Rank: 1
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IPRI increased in France for the fourth
consecutive year. Judicial Independence, 
Political Stability, and Control of Corruption
all deteriorated slightly, but small progress in
Rule of Law was enough to prevent LP from
changing for 2011.
Protection of Physical Property lost 0.3 points
but improvement in Registering Property and
Access to Loans easily compensated for this
change. This resulted in PPR increasing 
0.2 points. Neither IPR nor any of its sub-
components experienced any change for this
year’s index.
FRANCE World Rank: 20       Regional Rank: 13
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   

Georgia improved its scores for IPRI and
all three components for its second year of
inclusion in the index. A 1.2 point jump in
Judicial Independence combined with a 
0.4 point rise in Rule of Law to push LP up
this year. Political Stability and Control of 
Corruption were unchanged.
Progress in all three sub-components 
resulted in an improvement in PPR for 2011.
All variables increased by 0.2 points.
IPR remains the weakest part of Georgia’s
otherwise strong property rights portfolio,
but there was progress here as well. Profes-
sional opinion about Georgia’s protection of
intellectual property improved, raising that
variable by a whole point. While Copyright
Piracy remained the same, this was enough change for IPR to experience a 0.5 point improvement. Patent data remains unavailable.
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IPRI decreased in Germany for the third
year in a row. LP also experienced a decline
as all four sub-components deteriorated.
Political Stability saw the largest change,
falling by 0.5 points.
A 0.5 point drop in Protection of Physical
Property and a 0.8 point drop in Access to
Loans lowered PPR to a score of 7.1. Both 
of these sub-components decreased in the
previous two years as well.
The IPR score was affected by a declining
expert opinion of the protection of intellectual
property. This decline combined with a 
slight rise in the level of copyright piracy hurt 
Germany’s IPR score for 2011.
GERMANY World Rank: 13       Regional Rank: 9












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Legal and Political Environment












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Physical Property Rights












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Intellectual Property Rights
















In its second year in the index, Ghana 
saw improvement in its IPRI and all three
components. LP rose 0.3 points thanks to
improvement in every sub-component except
Rule of Law, which remained the same. 
Judicial Independence experienced the largest
change, jumping 0.8 points.
Access to Loans remains weak but was able
to increase an entire point for 2011.  Minor
improvements in Protection of Physical Prop-
erty and Rule of Law also helped push PPR
up by 0.5 points.
Data for copyright piracy in Ghana was not
available, but expert opinion regarding pro-
tection of intellectual property has improved.
This resulted in a 0.5 rise in IPR.
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In 2011 Greece’s IPRI fell for the third con-
secutive time.  LP fell again this year, largely
because of deteriorating scores in Rule of Law
and Political Stability.  Judicial Independence
and Control of Corruption were relatively
stable.
PPR also fell this year thanks to decreases
in all three sub-component scores. Access to
Loans saw the biggest change, declining by
half a point.
IPR for Greece did increase this year thanks
to improving professional opinion about pro-
tection of intellectual property rights.  Other
sub-component scores were unchanged.
GREECE World Rank: 52       Regional Rank: 19
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
IPRI in Guatemala improved for 2011,
rising 0.2 points. While Guatemala’s LP score
is the same, there were some changes in 
sub-components.  Political Stability fell by 0.3
points but this was offset by marginal gains
in Judicial Independence and Control of 
Corruption.
Despite a deterioration of Protection of
Physical Property, PPR rose 0.4 points this
year.  This was largely the result of a 0.7 point
increase in the Access to Loans score.
Improving expert opinion raised Protection
of Intellectual Property by 0.8 points.  A small
increase in Guatemala’s Copyright Piracy score
also helped push IPR up to a score of 4.0.
GUATEMALA World Rank: 98       Regional Rank: 17
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IPRI in Guyana made a dramatic increase
in 2011. A 0.2 point rise in Rule of Law and
a 1.5 point jump in Judicial Independence
caused LP to improve by 0.4 points. This was
despite a small deterioration in Control of
Corruption.
Protection of Physical Property and Access to
Loans both improved by at least 0.6 points.
This resulted in Guyana’s PPR score increasing
for the third year in a row.
Copyright Piracy data was unavailable, 
but improving professional opinion caused
Protection of Intellectual Property to jump by
2.6 points. This led to a 1.3 point increase in
IPR for 2011.
GUYANA World Rank: 93       Regional Rank: 15
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IPRI in Honduras experienced a slight in-
crease for the third consecutive year.  LP rose
0.3 points on the back of improvement in
most sub-components, the largest change
being a 0.8 jump in Judicial Independence.
Only Control of Corruption declined, and that
fall was slight.
PPR deteriorated a little this year, falling
0.2 points.  Both Protection of Physical Prop-
erty and Access to Loans decreased while Reg-
istering Property remained unchanged.
IPR in Honduras rose 0.2 points thanks to
improving professional opinions about intel-
lectual property protection.  Copyright
piracy levels were the same as last year.
HONDURAS World Rank: 87       Regional Rank: 13
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IPRI in Hong Kong rose to its highest level
since the index began.  A stable LP score
masked movement in the sub-components.
Judicial Independence rose 0.4 points, making
up for declines in the three other variables.
Protection of Physical Property and Register-
ing Property both saw modest gains, but they
were larger than the decline that happened in
Access to Loans.  This resulted in a small im-
provement in PPR.
Copyright Piracy jumped by 2 points in
2011.  This increase was reflected in the im-
proving professional opinions about Hong
Kong’s protection of intellectual property.
The result is a 0.8 increase in IPR.
HONG KONG World Rank: 13       Regional Rank: 4
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
Hungary’s IPRI score decreased for the 
second year in a row.  LP did not change for
2011. This was because the small gains in 
Judicial Independence were offset by deterio-
ration in Control of Corruption.
PPR fell slightly this year to 6.3.  While
Registering Property remains very strong the
other sub-components declined, with Protec-
tion of Physical Property falling by 0.9 points.
IPR rose slightly in 2011, reflecting im-
proved professional opinions about Hun-
gary’s protection of intellectual property.
Copyright piracy levels were also down a
small amount.
HUNGARY World Rank: 37       Regional Rank: 3
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IPRI decreased in Iceland for the second
year in a row. LP also fell for the second 
consecutive year. Both Rule of Law and Control
of Corruption deteriorated, though Judicial
Independence did improve slightly.
PPR took quite a hit, falling by 1.3 points.
This was the result of large declines in both
Protection of Physical Property (down 1.3
points) and Access to Loans (down an alarming
2.7 points).
IPR declined in 2011 after three consecu-
tive years of improvement. Protection of Intel-
lectual Property fell a whole point, though
Iceland’s Copyright Piracy score did improve.
ICELAND World Rank: 21       Regional Rank: 14
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IPRI in India improved marginally in
2011.  LP decreased for the third consecutive
year because of deterioration in Rule of Law
and Political Stability.  Judicial Independence
is slightly on the rise however.
PPR was unchanged from last year. All
three sub-components were relatively stable.
Improving professional opinions increased
India’s Protection of Intellectual Property score
by 0.6 points.  This resulted in a 0.2 rise in
IPR despite a marginal fall in Copyright
Piracy.
INDIA World Rank: 55       Regional Rank: 10
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IPRI saw significant improvement in 
Indonesia in 2011.  LP rose 0.5 points thanks
to strong improvement in Judicial Independ-
ence, Rule of Law, and Political Stability.
These gains more than made up for a mar-
ginal decline in Control of Corruption.
All three sub-components of PPR experi-
enced improvement, with Protection of Phys-
ical Property and Access to Loans both
increasing at least 1.6 points.  The result was
a 1.2 point rise in PPR.
Copyright piracy levels may have stayed the
same, but professional opinion about intel-
lectual property rights protection as a whole
increased that variable by 1.2 points.  This
led to a 0.8 point rise in IPR.
INDONESIA World Rank: 77       Regional Rank: 13
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
Iran joins the IPRI for the first time this
year. LP is the weakest component, held
down by a 2.0 score for Political Stability.
Rule of Law and Control of Corruption also
need improvement, scoring 3.2 and 3.3 
respectively.
PPR is Iran’s strongest component with a
score of 5.4.  It earns high marks for Registering
Property: while the process does take 9 proce-
dures the 36 days needed is fairly good for
the region.
Professional opinion of Iran’s intellectual
property rights environment is not very high.
It scored a 3.7 in Protection of International
Property.  Copyright data was unavailable.
IRAN World Rank: 109     Regional Rank: 16
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After three years of stability, IPRI in Ireland
fell by 0.4 points. LP declined slightly to 8.2.
This was the result of a deterioration of all
sub-component scores. Political Stability
experiencing the largest change, falling 0.3
points.
Protection of Physical Property decreased 0.6
points while Access to Loans was cut in half,
falling to 3.0.  This resulted in a 1.1 point 
decline in PPR.
IPR was unchanged in 2011. Copyright
piracy levels rose slightly but professional
opinion about the general level of intellectual
property protection in Ireland rose to offset
the resulting sub-component score change.
IRELAND World Rank: 15       Regional Rank: 11
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IPRI was unchanged for Israel in 2011.
The LP score underwent a modest improve-
ment, rising 0.2 points. A whole point in-
crease for Judicial Independence was largely
offset by marginal declines in the three other
sub-components.
PPR continues its decline from 2008 as a
result of deterioration in both Protection of
Physical Property and Access to Loans. Access to
Loans fell by a whole point.
IPR saw a marginal improvement this year.
Copyright piracy levels are up slightly 
but professional opinion about intellectual
property rights protection as a whole has 
improved.
ISRAEL World Rank: 38       Regional Rank: 7
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Italy’s IPRI and component scores 
remained relatively stable for 2011.  LP rose
0.2 points thanks largely to a 0.7 point 
increase in Judicial Independence.  The impact
of this change was weakened by small declines
in Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.
PPR was unchanged for 2011.  The sub-
components were fairly stable, though Access
to Loans did see a notable improvement.
Copyright piracy levels were slightly up and
professional opinions on Italy’s protection of
intellectual property deteriorated a bit.  This
lowered IPR by 0.2 points.
ITALY World Rank: 47       Regional Rank: 18
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
IPRI increased slightly for Jamaica in 2011,
reflecting modest improvements to some
components. Judicial Independence rose half
a point though the impact of this change was
somewhat offset by declines in Political Sta-
bility.  The net result is a 0.1 point increase
for LP.
Protection of Physical Property fell 0.6
points, lowering PPR by 0.2 points.  This was
the only change in the situation with respect
to physical property.
Copyright data was unavailable, but pro-
fessional opinions about Jamaica’s protection
of intellectual property did improve.  This
raised Jamaica’s IPR score by 0.2 points.
JAMAICA World Rank: 63       Regional Rank: 7
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Property rights in Japan underwent signif-
icant change in 2011, despite what the 
unchanged IPRI score may suggest. Judicial
Independence jumped 0.8 points while 
Control of Corruption saw a 0.2 point 
increase. These gains were somewhat offset
by a small decline in Rule of Law but they still
resulted in LP rising 0.2 points.
PPR was more stable than its sub-compo-
nents. Protection of Physical Property fell 
almost a whole point to 8.0 while Access to
Loans improved by a solid 0.4 points. Regis-
tering Property was basically unchanged.
Copyright piracy levels remained the same
but professional opinions regarding the intel-
lectual property environment in Japan fell
slightly.  The result is a 0.1 decrease in IPR.
JAPAN World Rank: 15       Regional Rank: 5
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IPRI in Jordan was unchanged from last
year. LP fell slightly on deteriorating scores
for Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.
Political Stability did see a minor improve-
ment.
PPR declined slightly as Protection of Phys-
ical Property fell 0.4 points, wiping out most
of its progress since 2008.  Access to Loans also
fell marginally.
Professional opinions about the protection
of intellectual property in Jordan improved
along with a small improvement in Copyright
Piracy. This resulted in a 0.1 point gain in
IPR.
JORDAN World Rank: 44       Regional Rank: 8
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Kazakhstan saw a marginal improvement
in IPRI for 2011.  All four sub-components
for LP rose, with Judicial Independence seeing
the largest change of 0.5. Accordingly, LP
rose 0.4 points.
Kazakhstan’s Access to Loans score plunged
1.2 points down to 3.0.  Marginal improve-
ments in Protection of Physical Property meant
this pulled the PPR score down 0.2 points.
Copyright piracy levels were the same
though professional opinions about the pro-
tection of intellectual property as a whole did
improve slightly.  The result is a 0.1 increase
for IPR.
KAZAKHSTAN World Rank: 100     Regional Rank: 16
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
IPRI improved in Kenya for the third con-
secutive year. LP was unchanged. A 0.3 point
gain in Judicial Indpendence was offset by
marginal losses in the other sub-components.
After two years of growth PPR stagnated in
2011. Protection of Physical Property did see a
small improvement though.
Copyright piracy levels decreased while
professional opinions regarding the intellec-
tual property protection in Kenya improved.
These factors combined to raise IPR by 0.2
points.
KENYA World Rank: 100     Regional Rank: 17
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Korea’s IPRI continued to decline, falling
to its lowest score since the beginning of the
index. Judicial Independence and Political 
Stability fell 0.6 and 0.4 points respectively.
While Rule of Law and Control of Corruption
did improve marginally, the net effect was a
0.1 point decrease in LP.
Protection of Physical Property declined but
not as bad as Access to Loans which plum-
meted 2.6 points.  A high Registering Property
score helps keep PPR above 6.0.
The amount of copyright piracy fell but so
did professional opinions about Korea’s 
protection of intellectual property. This
pulled IPR down 0.2 points.
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (SOUTH KOREA) World Rank: 38       Regional Rank: 7
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IPRI increased marginally for Kuwait in
2011. A 0.3 point gain in Judicial Independ-
ence was offset by declines in the rest of the
sub-components. This pulled down LP by
0.1 points.
PPR decreased 0.4 points despite most 
sub-components being relatively stable. 
Registering Property and Access to Loans both
declined marginally but Protection of Physical
Property fell an entire point.
Copyright Piracy improved a bit and profes-
sional opinions about Kuwait’s intellectual
property environment improved substan-
tially, raising Protection of Intellectual Property
by 1.6 points. This resulted in IPR rising 0.9
points.
KUWAIT World Rank: 50       Regional Rank: 10
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IPRI for Latvia changed for the first time
since 2007, increasing by 0.1 points. Judicial
Independence, Rule of Law, and Political 
Stability all improved in 2011. This caused
LP to rise 0.3 points.
PPR fell to its lowest score since the index
began. Registering Property did improve
slightly, but this was more than offset by
losses of a whole point for both Protection of
Physical Property and Access to Loans.
Latvia’s Copyright Piracy score improved
marginally while Protection of Intellectual
Property rose 0.7 points. This pushed IPR up
for the second year in a row.
LATVIA World Rank: 60       Regional Rank: 8
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
Lebanon joins the IPRI for the first time
this year. Lebanon’s LP score is 3.3.  It is ham-
pered by a weak Access to Loans score (2.0)
while the other three sub-components range
from 3.4 to 3.9.
PPR is Lebanon’s highest component score
at 6.5. It’s bolstered by a fairly strong 8.1 
Registering Property score.  The entire process
takes about 8 steps and 25 days to complete.
IPR is Lebanon’s weakest component score,
coming in at 3.3.  Professional opinion of the
intellectual property environment is low
while software piracy rates hover around
70%.
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IPRI in Libya did not change for 2011.
Deterioration in Judicial Independence, Rule
of Law, and Control of Corruption pulled
down LP. Political Stability did improve
slightly.
PPR rose on the backs of progress found in
Protection of Physical Property and Access 
to Loans. Data was still not available for 
Registering Property.
Both Copyright Piracy and Protection of 
Intellectual Property improved. This led to a
0.2 point increase for IPR.
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IPRI in Lithuania lost most of the gains it
made last year.  LP did increase for the third
year in a row. Judicial Independence and Rule
of Law saw moderate gains while only Politi-
cal Stability saw negative change among LP
sub-components
PPR underwent a large decrease in 2011.
This was caused by declines in Protection of
Physical Property and especially Access to Loans
which fell 1.2 points. Registering Property
remained strong.
Expert opinion regarding Lithuania’s 
protection of intellectual property remained
the same this year, as did Copyright Piracy.
This meant there was no change for IPR.
LITHUANIA World Rank: 47       Regional Rank: 6
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In addition to leading the world in per
capita GDP, Luxembourg increased its con-
sistently high IPRI score in 2011. Judicial 
Independence increased for the fourth consec-
utive year but marginal declines in Political
Stability and Control of Corruption meant LP
remained the same.
PPR increased thanks to a 0.4 rise in 
Protection of Physical Property.  Access to Loans
saw a slight decrease.
Protection of Intellectual Property improved
0.8 points this year.  Copyright piracy levels
were the same so IPR only rose 0.3 points.
LUXEMBOURG World Rank: 4         Regional Rank: 3












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Legal and Political Environment












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Physical Property Rights












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Intellectual Property Rights












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
IPRI
   

Macedonia made significant improvements
to all three components in 2011. All 
sub-component scores of LP increased. Of
particular note, Judicial Independence in-
creased by 1.2 points.
PPR also saw a rise in all sub-component
scores.  Access to Loans led the way, rising 0.5
points though it remains the weakest of all
sub-components scoring just 2.9.
Improving expert opinion pushed Protec-
tion of Intellectual Property up 1.4 points.
This combined with a small improvement in
Copyright Piracy to raise IPR 0.8 points.
MACEDONIA World Rank: 87       Regional Rank: 14
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Madagascar’s IPRI score has been relatively
stable over the five years covered by the index.
LP fell 0.3 points as every sub-component
decreased except for Judicial Independence.
The largest change was a 0.6 point decrease
for Rule of Law.
PPR improved remarkably for the second
year in a row. This was largely driven by a 0.7
point increase for Access to Loans.
All sub-component scores for IPR were
relatively stable this year. This meant no
change in Madagascar’s IPR score.
MADAGASCAR World Rank: 107     Regional Rank: 18
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Malawi improved IPRI for its second year
back in the index.  Small gains in Rule of Law
and Control of Corruption outweighed slight
losses in Judicial Independence and Political
Stability and pushed LP up 0.1 points.
PPR Improved Remarkably in 2011. This
was largely driven by 0.6 point improvements
in both Protection of Physical Property and 
Access to Loans.
Improving expert opinion caused Protection
of Intellectual Property to jump two points this
year.  This led to a one point increase for IPR.
MALAWI World Rank: 71       Regional Rank: 7
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IPRI in Malaysia was unchanged for 2011.
LP slipped 0.1 points thanks to small drops
in Political Stability and Control of Corruption.
Judicial Independence and Rule of Law both
improved marginally.
PPR slightly increased in 2011. This is due
to the 0.4 point increase in Registering Property
despite the decreases in the other two 
sub-categories.
Copyright Piracy was unchanged but 
improving professional opinions caused 
Protection of Intellectual Property to increase
by 0.4 points.  This translated into a 0.1
point gain for IPR.
MALAYSIA World Rank: 44       Regional Rank: 8
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IPRI in Mali slipped back to 2009 levels
this year.  LP experienced a net change for the
first time since 2008. All four sub-compo-
nents were declined with both Judicial Inde-
pendence and Control of Corruption falling
half a point.
PPR grew 0.4 points in 2011.  This was
driven by a 1.1 point jump in Access to Loans,
which remains a weak 2.7 despite this 
improvement.
Copyright data was unavailable, but pro-
fessional opinion of Mali’s intellectual prop-
erty rights environment improved. This
nudged IPR up to 4.9.
MALI World Rank: 84       Regional Rank: 11
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After three years of stagnation Malta’s IPRI
improved to 6.8.  LP decreased for the second
year in a row because of declines in Rule of
Law, Control of Corruption, and especially a
0.5 point drop in Political Stability.
PPR saw solid improvement in 2011. This
was driven by a 0.7 point increase in Access to
Loans. Data for Registering Property remained
unavailable.
Improving expert opinion raised Protection
of Intellectual Property 1.1 points. This pushed
IPR up 0.4 points as Copyright Piracy was
unchanged from last year.
MALTA World Rank: 27       Regional Rank: 16
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After last year’s significant decline IPRI in
Mauritania increased 0.2 points this year.  LP
was unchanged as losses in Judicial Independ-
ence and Political Stability were offset by gains
in Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.
PPR improved in 2011.  Marginal im-
provements in all sub-components raised
PPR by 0.3 points.
Improving expert opinion pushed Protec-
tion of Intellectual Property up by 0.8 points.
This led to a 0.4 point increase in IPR.
Copyright Data remained unavailable.
MAURITANIA World Rank: 93       Regional Rank: 14
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IPRI in Mauritius increased for the second
year in a row.  LP was unchanged despite
small improvements in Judicial Independence,
Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.
These gains were offset by a 0.5 decline in Po-
litical Stability.
Protection of Physical Property and Access to
Loans both declined this year, but the num-
ber of days needed to register property
dropped from 210 to 26.  This led to a 3.2
point increase in Registering Property which
translated into a 0.8 point improvement in
PPR.
Mauritius saw improvement in Copyright
Piracy and expert opinion regarding the in-
tellectual property environment in general.
This led to a 0.1 increase in IPR for the year.
MAURITIUS World Rank: 38       Regional Rank: 2
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After two years of decline Mexico saw its
IPRI improve in 2011.  LP rose 0.2 points
behind strong improvement in Judicial Inde-
pendence and Rule of Law.  Political Stability
did experience a slight decline however.
PPR improved this year thanks to increases
in all three sub-components scores.  Access to
Loans saw the biggest change, rising by half a
point.
Protection of Intellectual Property increased
a solid 0.6 points in 2011.  This was some-
what offset but a 0.2 point deterioration in
Copyright Piracy.  The net result is a 0.1 point
increase for IPR.
MEXICO World Rank: 77       Regional Rank: 10
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Moldova experienced a large fall in IPRI in
2011. Declines in Political Stability and Control
of Corruption pulled LP down 0.2 points de-
spite a small increase in Judicial Independence.
PPR improved 0.4 points thanks to in-
creases in all three sub-component scores.
The largest change was a 0.9 increase in Reg-
istering Property. This jump occured because
the number of days needed to register prop-
erty in Moldova fell from 48 to 5 this year.  
Declining scores in Protection of Intellectual
Property and Copyright Piracy resulted in a 1.8
point decline in IPR for 2011.
MOLDOVA World Rank: 120     Regional Rank: 24
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All three components increased in Mon-
tenegro in 2011 for the second consecutive
year. Protection of Property increased 2 points
in 2011. Montenegro increased in every com-
ponent, but remained the same in the Control
of Corruption category and decreased by 0.1
in Access to Loans. 
The PPR score increased by 0.4 points in
2011 because of the improvements in Regis-
tering Property and the Protection of Physical
Property Rights despite the decrease in their
Access to Loans. 
The IPR score dramatically increased 1.2
points. This is a significant improvement
from previous years. The Intellectual Property
Rights Score sub-component increased 2
points. The IPR score has improved greatly, but still needs more work. 














2007 2008 2009 2010 2011












































2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
IPRI
IPRI in Morocco continues to demonstrate
its stability. All three components have shown
slight increases in 2011, but no dramatic
changes. The biggest change was in IPR in
the sub-component of Protection of Intellec-
tual Property, which increased approximately
one point. Morocco’s LP score scarcely
increased by 0.1 point in 2011. 
The PPR saw some slight improvement in
2011. The sub-component, Access to Loans,
showed the most dramatic change, rising 0.6
points. 
Morocco’s IPR score has passed 5.0, which
was the score of 2007 to 2009 before the de-
crease in 2010. The increase in Protection of
Intellectual Property helped greatly. 
MOROCCO World Rank: 64       Regional Rank: 11
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IPRI has undergone the most dramatic
change since 2007. It is up by 0.5 points. The
three components have also increased.
Mozambique’s LP has shown improvement
over the past few years.
Mozambique hit its lowest level in 2010 of
PPR and has since dramatically increased to
5.2 in 2011. This is the most significant
change it has had since data has been avail-
able. Registering Property did not change in
2011.
IPR increased in 2011, but Mozambique
still has limited data. Data on copyright
piracy remains elusive.
MOZAMBIQUE World Rank: 87       Regional Rank: 13
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Since 2008, Nepal’s IPRI has remained at
a stagnant 4.0 until 2011. IPRI in Nepal has
increased from 4.0 to 4.4. LP has had trouble
increasing due to decreases in its subcate-
gories of Rule of Law, Political Stability, and
Control of Corruption. Despite these decreases
Judicial Independence increased .9 points.
PPR in Nepal changed by 0.3 points due
to all of its subcategories increasing in 2011.
Access to Loans showed the most increase. 
The IPR score increased substantially com-
pared to 2010 and the previous years. It went
up by 0.6 points. 
NEPAL World Rank: 100     Regional Rank: 16
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IPRI in the Netherlands experienced a neg-
ative change in 2011. Since 2007, IPRI has
remained unchanged. IPRI has decreased by
0.4 points because LP and PPR decreased. Ju-
dicial Independence and Control of Corruption
both decreased while Political Stability and
Rule of Law remain virtually unchanged. 
The PPR score again decreased in 2011 by
a whole point. Every subcategory of PPR de-
creased. The greatest change was observed in
Access to Loans by 1.7 points. 
This year the IPR score remained un-
changed.
NETHERLANDS World Rank: 9         Regional Rank: 7
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New Zealand’s IPRI in 2011 decreased
from 8.3 to 8.2. LP remained unchanged
from 2010. LP’s subcategories, Judicial Inde-
pendence, Rule of Law, and Control of Corrup-
tion increased, while Political Stability
decreased.
PPR saw a dramatic decrease this year, its
largest decrease since the start of the index. It
decreased .5 points. Registering Property was
the only subcategory that increased and it
only increased slightly by 0.2 points. 
This year the IPR increased by 0.1 point. 
NEW ZEALAND World Rank: 4         Regional Rank: 2
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In 2011 Nicaragua made progress in all of
its components of IPRI.  IPRI increased by
0.5 points. LP also increased by 0.5 points
and Judicial Independence made the most
drastic increase of the subcategories from 1.3
to 3.0. 
The PPR score increased by 0.6 points
which is a significant improvement compared
to the basically stagnant 0.1 change over the
past four years. Access to Loans showed the
greatest change out of the subcategories. It is
worth noting that all of the subcategories of
PPR increased. 
Just as LP and PPR rose, IPR also increased.
Patent Protection and Copyright Piracy stayed
the same in 2011 but Protection of Intellectual
Property drastically increased from 2.9 to 3.7. 
NICARAGUA World Rank: 113     Regional Rank: 19
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This year Nigeria saw improvement in
some of its components.  LP was the lone 
exception decreaseing by 0.2 points. All of
the subcategories of LP decreased except for
Political Stability.
The PPR score increased by 0.1 points.
Access to Loans showed the greatest change
out of the subcategories, it is worthy to note
that all of the subcategories of PPR increased.
IPR is still improving. There are slight 
increases in all of the subcategories, but a major
increase in Protection of Intellectual Property. 
NIGERIA World Rank: 120     Regional Rank: 21
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Norway has very strong property rights
protections, but this year every component
decreased, with the exception of LP staying
the same. Judicial Independence and Control
of Corruption are the only sub-categories of
LP that increased. 
Norway’s PPR decreased by 0.3 points and
the Registering Property was the only sub-cat-
egory that increased (by 0.2 points) in 2011.
Copyright Piracy still continues to deterio-
rate slightly in Norway. The other subcate-
gories of IPR remained unchanged. Overall
IPR decreased by 0.1 point. 
NORWAY World Rank: 6         Regional Rank: 3












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Legal and Political Environment












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Physical Property Rights












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Intellectual Property Rights












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
IPRI
This is Oman’s second year in IPRI. The
total overall IPRI score increased by 0.2
points in 2011. The only component that did
not show an increase is LP, which showed a
slight decrease. Judicial Independence is the
only subcategory that improved. 
PPR seems to be very strong in Oman
again. It increased by 0.2 points this year.
Oman’s Access to Loans, however, decreased
by 0.2 points, but that did not stop PPR
from increasing. 
Again, IPR was the weakest component in
Oman. Patent Protection did not have any
data again this year. Protection of Intellectual
Property increased by a whole point. 
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Pakistan reversed its decrease from last year
in 2011. Pakistan can see improvements in
all components. LP has increased by 0.3
points and Judicial Independence showed the
most drastic increase. When raw data for 
Political Stabiilty is rescaled for the IPRI the
score comes out as a -0.2. This number was
changed to a flat 0.0 to fit within the IPRI’s
scale. This adjustment did not affect compo-
nent or IPRI scores.
The PPR score increased by 0.2 points,
which is back to its 2009 score. Registering
Property and Access to Loans both showed
slight increases in 2011. 
IPR finally made a change from its past two
years of remaining at a 3.3 to a 3.6. Patent
Protection remained the same, while the other subcategories of IPR increased.
PAKISTAN World Rank: 113     Regional Rank: 17
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IPRI increased again for the second consec-
utive year. The LP score underwent a positive
change of 0.3. Two subcategories of LP, Judicial
Independence and Rule of Law both increased
and aided in the overall increase of LP.
PPR, however, did not increase. It made an
increase in 2010 to 6.9, but regressed back to
6.8, just like the previous years since 2007.
Rule of Law and Control of Corruption, both
made negative changes. 
IPR increased 0.3 points. This is a signifi-
cant increase from its previous years of 
remaining stagnant between 4.9 and a score
of 5.0. Protection of Intellectual Property
showed greatest increase by 0.3 points. 
PANAMA World Rank: 55       Regional Rank: 5
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All components of IPRI increased by 0.3
points or more in 2011. IPRI’s total score 
increased half a point, which is the largest 
increase it has seen since 2007. The past three
years it has stayed at a score of 3.5. Judicial
Independence made a significant increase,
while Politial Stability made a significant 
decrease.
Paraguay’s PPR has made the greatest
change. Since 2007, PPR has stayed stagnant
at 4.7, but now is at a 5.4. All subcategories
of PPR have made significant increases; the
most notable would be Access to Loans, which
increased more than a point.
IPR increased by half of a point. Protection
of Intellectual Property made the most signifi-
cant increase in 2011. 
PARAGUAY World Rank: 117     Regional Rank: 20
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All components of IPRI in Peru increased
in 2011. IPR showed the greatest increase
from 3.6 to 4.4. IPR made the greatest
changes. LP increased slightly in 2011, which
was hindered by the decreases in Political Sta-
bility and Control of Corruption.
Peru’s PPR increased by 0.7 points, which
is major increase from the 5.7 to 5.8 scores it
has stayed at the past few years. All the sub-
categories increased, which helped it make
that significant change. 
The greatest increase was Peru’s IPR score.
Copyright Piracy made the greatest change
since 2010, of 1.5 points.
PERU World Rank: 81       Regional Rank: 11
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After three consecutive years of declining
IPRI, it finally increased by 0.2 points in
2011. The LP score remains the same as
2010. Rule of Law decreased this year while
Judicial Independence and Political Stability re-
mained the same and Control of Corruption
increased. 
The PPR score made the greatest increase
since data has been available. Registering Prop-
erty remained the same while the other two
subcategories improved. 
IPR slightly increased this year. Protection
of Intellectual Property made a solid increase
of a whole point, while Patent Protection and
Copyright Piracy remained unchanged. 
PHILIPPINES World Rank: 87       Regional Rank: 15
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IPRI increased for the third consecutive
year in Poland. This is due to the dramatic
increases in all three components, all of
which reached new highs. All subcategories
of LP showed increases. Judicial Independence
showed the greatest increase. 
PPR has increased the greatest by 0.8
points in 2011. The past few years it has re-
mained around 4.8. Access to Loans showed
the slightest increase compared to Registering
Property and Protection of Physical Property. 
The IPR score has made a dramatic in-
crease from its previous years as well. Protec-
tion of Intellectual Property has increased
roughly by 1.3 points. Total IPRI has in-
creased greatly and all components have in-
creased by a significant margin. 
POLAND World Rank: 43       Regional Rank: 5
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Portugal’s IPRI decreased for the second
consecutive year. All of the components of
IPRI took a slight decrease with an exception
of IPR remaining the same. LP fell 0.3
points. The changes in LP are due to the fact
that the Rule of Law made a slight increase
and Control of Corruption remained the same,
while the other subcategories of LP decreased. 
The PPR score was affected by the changes
in Protection of Physical Property and Access to
Loans, which decreased in 2011. Registering
Property, however, made a significant increase
by a half point. 
The IPR score has remained the same for
the third consecutive year. There were slight
increases in Copyright Piracy, but these are
leveled out due to the decrease in Intellectual Property Rights. 
PORTUGAL World Rank: 25       Regional Rank: 15
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This is Puerto Rico’s second year in the
IPRI. Since last year the overall IPRI has 
increased and the components of IPRI have
either increased or stayed the same. All 
of LP’s subcategories increased, except for 
Political Stability. 
PPR remained unchanged in 2011. Regis-
tering Property made significant progress and
increased by a half point.
Again, the IPR data had to depend upon
the Copyright Piracy and Protection of Intellec-
tual Property data due to the lack of patent
rights information. However, IPR did in-
crease 0.2 points. 
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Qatar’s IPRI score increased for the third
consecutive year. The LP score made a signif-
icant increase by 0.7 points. All of LP’s sub-
categories increased with a special notice to
Control of Corruption which increased by 0.8
points. 
PPR is increasing for its third consecutive
year. It is slight but positive nonetheless. 
Registering Property did not help PPR, it 
decreased slightly by .2 points. 
Qatar’s IPR score stayed the same despite
increases the last few years. Patent protection
data is still not available in for Qatar. 
QATAR World Rank: 23       Regional Rank: 2
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Romania’s total IPRI score continues to 
increase. All categories of LP increased except
Control of Corruption, which slightly 
decreased by 0.2 points
Romania’s PPR score improved to some 
extent. Romania’s Access to Loans category 
decreased, even though it made a slight 
increase in 2010. Protection of Physical Property
Rights made the greatest increase with 
Registering Property following close behind it.
Despite IPR’s significant increase in 2010,
the IPR score decreased to 5.4 in 2011.
Patent Protection remained relatively the same
while the other two categories decreased in
score. 
ROMANIA World Rank: 60       Regional Rank: 8
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All components of Russia’s IPRI in 2011
increased by at least 0.2 points. Overall IPRI
increased 0.3 points and is following an in-
creasing trend. Political Stability and Control
of Corruption both decreased this year, but LP
still increased this year.  
The PPR score increased for the third con-
secutive year. The Access to Loans was the only
subcategory that remained unchanged.
IPR increased significantly compared to the
subsequent years after 2007. Protection of In-
tellectual Property drastically increased by a
whole point. 
RUSSIA World Rank: 93       Regional Rank: 15
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The year 2011 marks the first year Rwanda
is featured in IPRI. Among the LP subcate-
gories, the Judicial Independence score was
drastically higher than the other subcate-
gories. LP is not Rwanda’s highest scored
component of IPRI. 
The PPR score is the highest marked com-
ponent of IPRI in 2011. Among the PPR
scores, the Registering Property score was out-
standingly higher than any other score. 
There is no available data on Copyright
Piracy in Rwanda, but Intellectual Property
Rights seem to have higher priority than
Patent Protections. 
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
This is the second year in which Saudi 
Arabia appears in IPRI. Overall IPRI 
increased and all of its components increased
in 2011. The Judicial Independence score is
still remarkably higher than its other 
sub-components and increased greatly from
last year.
The PPR score is still the highest score out
of the IPRI components. Registering Property
increased 0.2 points and makes it a 9.8. Saudi
Arabia is very strong in Registering Property.
IPR increased significantly due to all of its
sub-components increasing. 
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This is the second year Senegal is in the
IPRI. All components increased this year. In
2010, Judicial Independence was significantly
lower than its other LP subcategories and this
year, Judicial Independence drastically 
increased by 1.7 points. Rule of Law and Po-
litical Stability remained the same and Con-
trol of Corruption decreased by 0.2 points. 
The PPR score increased significantly in
2011. Access to Loans increased the most by 2
whole points. All subcategories of PPR 
increased as well.
Senegal’s IPR slightly increased in 2011.
Intellectual Property Rights increased the most
while Patent Protection and Copyright Piracy
remained relatively the same. 
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IPRI increased for the fifth consecutive year
in Serbia. All of IPRI’s components increased
as well. LP slightly increased and Judicial
Independence showed the greatest increase.
However, Control of Corruption slightly 
decreased. 
Serbia’s PPR score increased 0.4 points in
2011. All subcategories of PPR increased,
with Registering Property and Access to Loans
increasing the greatest. 
IPR increased fairly significantly. However,
Patent Protection does not have data available. 
SERBIA World Rank: 109     Regional Rank: 19
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IPRI slightly increased this year. All of
IPRI’s components are all at scores of 8.3 in
2011. LP underwent a negative change of 0.2
points. All of its subcategories decreased as
well. Political Stability underwent the most
significant change of LP by 0.4 points.
This year, PPR remained unchanged. 
Protection of Physical Property decreased 
while Registering Property and Access to Loans 
increased.
IPR increased for the second consecutive
year. Copyright Piracy increased dramatically
by 1.4 points. 
SINGAPORE World Rank: 3         Regional Rank: 1
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The IPRI score decreased slightly in 2011,
by 0.1 points. IPRI in Slovakia has made a
pattern of increasing by 0.1 points and 
decreasing by 0.1 points every other year. LP
decreased as well this year. Rule of Law was
the only subcategory that increased. This is the
second consecutive year for LP decreasing. 
PPR has decreased for second year in a row.
The only increase in PPR was Registering
Property, which increased by 0.1 points. 
IPR score increased this year despite its
stagnant 6.2 score the past two years. Patent
Protection and Copyright Piracy remained
relatively the same, while Intellectual Property
Rights drastically increased.
SLOVAKIA World Rank: 38       Regional Rank: 4
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The past four years IPRI in Slovenia has
remained unchanged until 2011. This year,
IPRI has increased 0.2 points. LP has 
increased as well. All subcategories made 
positive changes except Political Stability. 
PPR remained the same even though 
Registering Property increased substantially by
1.1 points, but Access to Loans decreased by
1.3 points.
Slovenia’s IPR increased by 0.4 points in
2011. Intellectual Property Rights and Copy-
right Piracy both showed increases, which
aided in IPR increasing. 
SLOVENIA World Rank: 53       Regional Rank: 7
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Overall IPRI in South Africa decreased in
2011. The past four years it has remained at
6.8. All components of IPRI decreased. LP
decreased for the third consecutive year. 
Political Stability was the only sub-compo-
nent that increased and it only increased by
0.1 point.
The PPR decreased significantly despite its
major increase from 2009 to 2010. PPR is
now the lowest it has been since data has been
available. Protection of Physical Property and
Access to Loans both significantly decreased
while Registering Property remained unchanged. 
South Africa’s IPR score decreased slightly
due to the Intellectual Property Rights decreasing
by 0.2 points and Patent Protection and 
Copyright Piracy Level remaining the same.
SOUTH AFRICA World Rank: 32       Regional Rank: 1
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IPRI in Spain has decreased significantly
this year by 0.3 points. All of the components
of IPRI have made noteworthy decreases as
well. LP decreased by 0.2 points. Judicial 
Independence was the only increase made in
2011 for LP. 
For the second consecutive year PPR 
decreased by 0.3 points. Registering Property
was the only positive change that PPR 
underwent.
IPR decreased significantly by 0.3 points.
Patent Protection was the only subcategory
that remained fairly the same as 2010. 
SPAIN World Rank: 33       Regional Rank: 17
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
IPRI increased this year despite its slight
decrease last year. IPRI has made a significant
increase of 0.4 points. LP made a significant
increase of half a point. Political Stability and
Judicial Independence have made the greatest
increases, with Political Stability increased by
1.4 points.
PPR slightly increased in 2011. Registering
Property and Access to Loans both increased,
but the decrease in Protection of Physical 
Property affected the score of PPR to make a
slight increase.
IPR score increased to its highest level since
2007. Intellectual Property Rights showed the
greatest positive change.
SRI LANKA World Rank: 77       Regional Rank:13
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Swaziland joins IPRI for the first time. The
country’s LP was the weakest component
with Judicial Independence showing the 
better score of the other sub-components. 
PPR was the strongest component of
Swaziland’s IPRI. Registering Property was
very solid in Swaziland with a score of 7.6. 
IPR in Swaziland was based on limited data
because there were no figures on Copyright
Piracy.
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For the third consecutive year in a row the
IPRI score did not change. Despite this lack
of change Sweden tied with Finland for the
highest IPRI score in the world.  LP made a
slight increase by 0.1 of a point. The LP 
sub-components did not make any signifi-
cant changes either. There are no notable
changes for LP; the sub-components either
increased or decreased by 0.1 or stayed
the same. 
The PPR score decreased by 0.3 points and
all its sub-components decreased as well. 
Access to Loans made the most drastic decrease
by 0.6 points. 
The sub-component of IPR that changed
was Protection of Intellectual Property by 0.6
points. 
SWEDEN Rank: 1                   Regional Rank: 1
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For the second consecutive year the IPRI
in Switzerland has decreased. LP made the
most significant decrease of 0.2 points with
Control of Corruption decreasing the most out
of the sub-components. 
Registering Property is the only sub-compo-
nent of PPR that increased in 2011. Since
2008, PPR has been decreasing slightly.
The IPR score remained the same as it has
the past 2 years. 
SWITZERLAND World Rank: 6         Regional Rank: 3
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
This is Syria’s second year in the IPRI.
Syria’s total IPRI score decreased by 0.1
points in 2011 and all components, but IPR
decreased in 2011. LP slightly decreased by
0.1 points. Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption were the sub-components that 
increased. 
PPR score is still the strongest aspect of
IPRI, but decreased significantly to 6.2. 
Registering Property and Access to Loans
increased significantly, but the decrease in
Protection of Physical Property Rights affected
the PPR more drastically. 
The IPR score increased slightly in 2011.
This is due to the slight increases in Patent
Protection and Intellectual Property Rights;
however, there is no data available for Copyright Piracy.
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This year Taiwan has seen a significant 
increase in the total IPRI as well as in all of
its components for the third consecutive year.
LP increased slightly due to the decrease in
Political Stability and the unchanging Control
of Corruption. Rule of Law remains the
strongest sub-component of LP. 
PPR score has increased significantly in
2011, compared to the subsequent years after
2007 in which it remained unchanged. 
Registering Property is the strongest sub-compo-
nent of PPR and increased this year slightly.
Taiwan’s IPR score made a significant 
increase following its decrease in 2010. It 
is now at its highest since data has been 
available. Copyright Piracy made the greatest
increase by one whole point with Protection of Intellectual Property following behind it with half a point.
TAIWAN World Rank: 23       Regional Rank: 6
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IPRI has drastically increased this year. This
is the greatest increase and highest score for
Tanzania since the start of the index. LP has
remained unchanged for the second consec-
utive year. 
PPR increased for the third consecutive
year. All of its sub-components increased.
Access to Loans showed the greatest increase and
remains the highest scoring sub-component of
PPR. 
IPR increased the most of all the compo-
nents of IPRI even though there is no data
available for Copyright Piracy. Protection of 
Intellectual Property increased the greatest, by
1.6 points, and remains the highest sub-com-
ponent of IPR. 
TANZANIA World Rank: 75       Regional Rank: 9
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Despite the decreases last year, this year all
components, but PPR increased. IPRI overall
increased slightly by 0.1 points. LP took a
positive change this year despite its negative
trend the past few years. Judicial Independence
is LPs strongest sub-component and increased
the greatest in 2011.
The PPR score decreased for the second
consecutive year. The Protection of Physical
Property Rights decreased again by 0.6 points,
not as big as a decrease in 2010 when it
dropped a whole point. Registering Property is
PPR’s strongest sub-component and increased
0.2 points. 
The IPR score increased 0.2 points. 
Copyright Piracy increased the greatest by 0.8
points, but Intellectual Property Rights remains its highest scoring sub-component. 
THAILAND World Rank: 64       Regional Rank: 12
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
For the second consecutive year, IPRI has
increased. LP has increased significantly by
0.6 points. Judicial Independence remains LP’s
highest scoring sub-component and showed
the greatest increase among the other 
sub-components. 
The PPR score underwent a slight negative
change despite its significant increase in
2010. The Ease of Access to Loans decreased
the most by 0.7 points. 
From its modest increase in 2010, IPR has
increased drastically in 2011. Patent Protection
remained the same, but Intellectual Property
Rights increased significantly by 1.1 points. 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO World Rank: 55       Regional Rank: 5
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IPRI in 2011 increased modestly, back to
its 2009 score. The LP score remained the
unchanged component in 2011. All of the
sub-components of LP remained relatively
the same, which explains why it remained the
same.No real change has been made in this 
component.
The PPR score has made a significant 
increase in 2011. Registering Property
Remains the highest sub-component of PPR
and has made a significant increase for the
third consecutive year along with Protection
of Physical Property. Access to Loans increased
for the second consecutive year.
IPR scored increased significantly by 0.3
points despite its decrease in 2010. Protection
of Intellectual Property showed the greatest increase. 
TUNISIA World Rank: 47       Regional Rank: 9
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IPRI increased slightly by 0.1 point in
2011. LP showed a slight decrease for the 
second consecutive year. Political Stability
showed the greatest decrease and remains the
lowest sub-component of LP. 
Turkey’s PPR score made a modest increase
in 2011. Registering Property remained the
same and still remains the highest sub-com-
ponent of PPR. Protection of Physical Property
Rights drastically increased by a half point. 
IPR underwent a similar change as PPR. It
increased for the third consecutive year. The
Protection of Intellectual Property score in-
creased by 0.3 points this year. 
TURKEY World Rank: 64       Regional Rank: 10
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Uganda has made great improvements in
IPRI this year. It has made a drastic increase
of 0.7 points. All components of IPRI 
increased this year. LP made the smallest
increase of all the components. Judicial 
Independence made the greatest increase of a
whole point, but the reason LP did not make
a drastic increase compared to the other 
components is due to the decrease in Political 
Stability and Control of Corruption. 
The PPR has made the most drastic 
increase and is tied with IPR for the strongest
component for IPRI. Even though Registering
Property score suffered in 2008, it has made
a drastic increase by 2.4 points to become the
strongest sub-component of PPR. 
IPR increased by 0.6 points. It is one of the strongest components of IPRI. Intellectual Property Rights made the most significant
increase of 1.1 points. 
UGANDA World Rank: 93       Regional Rank: 14
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IPRI in Ukraine decreased for the second
consecutive year. LP also increased for the
first time since 2008. Judicial Independence
was the only sub-component that changed
positively. 
The PPR score was affected by the changes
in Protection of Property Rights and Access 
to Loans. 
IPR made a significant positive change in
2011. Protection of Intellectual Property is the
most prevalent aspect to this significant
change.
UKRAINE World Rank: 117     Regional Rank: 23
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IPRI modestly increased for the third 
consecutive year. LP decreased slightly by 0.1
points due to the negative changes in Rule of
Law and the unchanging Judicial Independence.
The PPR score has changed for the first
time since data has been available. It made a
modest increase in 2011. Registering Property
has made the most significant increase from
9.3 to a 10 because it takes one day to register
property.
IPR has made a significant increase because
of the increase in Protection of Intellectual
Property.
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES World Rank: 21       Regional Rank: 1
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The United Kingdom saw a negative
change in IPRI. This trend has been happen-
ing since data has been available when this
country’s IPRI started out at 8.3 and has now
decreased to a 7.7 score. LP has remained
unchanged for the second consecutive year.
Judicial Independence has, however, made a
significant increase by a whole point.   
In 2011, the PPR score decreased signifi-
cantly by half of a point. Despite the 
increases in Protection of Physical Property
Rights and Registering Property, Access to Loans
made a drastic drop of 2.6 points. 
The IPR score increased significantly this
year by 0.2 points. This is largely due to the
increase in Protection of Intellectual Property. 
UNITED KINGDOM World Rank: 14       Regional Rank: 10
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IPRI in the United States has taken a 
notable decline, by .4 points. All components
of IPRI have decreased in 2011. All sub-com-
ponents of LP have decreased. Rule of Law is,
however, still the highest scoring component
of LP. 
PPR has decreased the most significantly.
All of its sub-components decreased except
Registering Property, which only increased by
0.1 points. 
IPR regressed back to its 2009 score of 8.4.
IPR is still the highest scoring IPRI compo-
nent though. Protection of Intellectual Property
was the only sub-component that decreased,
but that made the difference in the overall
IPR score, despite the positive changes in the
other sub-components. 
UNITED STATES World Rank: 17       Regional Rank: 2
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For the third consecutive year, IPRI in
Uruguay increased. LP continued last year’s
progress thanks to improvement in all four
sub-component scores. The most notable
change was a 0.8 point improvement for 
Judicial Independence.
Access to Loans jumped a point and a half in
2011.  This combined with an improvement
in Protection of Physical Property to push PPR
up 0.6 points.
Professional opinion regarding the intellectual
property environment in Uruguay improved
this year. Along with a slight improvement in
Copyright Piracy this resulted in a 0.3 point
increase for IPR.
URUGUAY World Rank: 44       Regional Rank: 3
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Despite improvement in all three compo-
nents Venezuela had the lowest IPRI for
2011. LP improved 0.3 points but was still a
dreadful 2.3. Control of Corruption and Rule
of Law both declined, with the latter falling
to the lowest score in the world at 1.2.
PPR remained the same as last year. A 0.4
increase in Protection of Physical Property was
offset by a 0.3 decrease in Access to Loans.
IPR grew 0.3 points thanks to a notable
improvement in the professional opinions 
regarding Venezuela’s intellectual property 
environment. This was slightly dampened by
a small rise in the amount of copyright piracy.
VENEZUELA World Rank: 129     Regional Rank: 22
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Vietnam continued its improvement in
IPRI for 2011. Control of Corruption rose half
a point while Judicial Independence increased
a whole point.  This improvement was some-
what tempered by a decline in Political 
Stability, resulting in a 0.4 gain for LP.
PPR saw improvement across all sub-com-
ponents, with the largest change being a 0.8
increase for Access to Loans.  This led to a 0.4
gain for PPR as well.
Copyright Piracy rose half a point, though
it was still a low score at 1.5. Improving 
expert opinions reflected this change and 
Protection of Intellectual Property rose as well,
pushing IPR up 0.3 points.
VIETNAM World Rank: 81       Regional Rank: 14
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IPRI in Zambia improved for the third
consecutive year.  Zambia saw notable gains
of 0.4 and 1.2 for Control of Corruption and
Judicial Independence respectively. This 
resulted in a rise of 0.5 points for LP.
PPR remained stable at a score of 5.8 again
this year.  A 0.3 increase in Access to Loans was
offset by a 0.3 decrease in Protection of 
Physical Property.
Expert opinion regarding Zambia’s intellectual
property environment improved this year,
raising Protection of Intellectual Property a
whole point.  Copyright piracy levels were
unchanged, resulting in a net increase of 0.3
for IPR.
ZAMBIA World Rank: 84       Regional Rank: 11
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IPRI improved in 2011 but Zimbabwe remains
one of the lowest scoring countries in the world. LP
increased 0.3 points thanks to gains in Judicial 
Independence and Political Stability. The improvement
would have been greater had it not been for deterio-
ration in Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.
PPR increased for the third year in a row. Protection
of Physical Property rose 1.3 points to 3.1. This 
improvement was somewhat offset by a 0.6 point 
deterioration in Access to Loans.
IPR improved after four years of stagnation. 
The 0.4 point increase was due to improved expert
opinion regarding Zimbabwe’s protection of intellectual
property rights. Copyright Piracy was unchanged.
ZIMBABWE World Rank: 128     Regional Rank: 25
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2 0 1 0  I P R I  P A R T N E R  O R G A N I Z A T I O N S
T he International Property Rights Index (IPRI) is the flagship publication of the Property RightsAlliance (PRA). The PRA is committed to promoting property rights around the world. TheIPRI is an annual comparative study that aims to quantify the strength of property rights – both
physical and intellectual – and to rank countries accordingly. The IPRI report demonstrates the link 
between property rights protection and economic development. The 2011 edition contains the ranking
of 129 economies, which represents 97 percent of the world GDP. 
The 2011 edition contains the IPRI rankings, rankings by IPRI core components, regional distribution
of IPRI scores, and changes in IPRI scores since 2010. The 2011 edition again features individual
country profiles, which provide the historic progression of IPRI scores and their components, point
to any advances or regressions, and show strong or weak aspects of countries’ property rights. 
Additionally, to account for gender-based disparities existing in property rights in developing 
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